Knowledge that Transforms

Context drives our interpretations of music as surprising, frightening, or awe-inspiring. However, it remains unclear how formal musical training affects our ability to hierarchically integrate complex tonal information to efficiently predict, remember, and segment music. We scrambled naturalistic music at multiple timescales to manipulate coherent tonal context while controlling for multiple acoustic cues. Memory (Experiment 1; n = 108, age range = 19–41 years) and prediction (Experiment 2; n = 108, age range = 20–41 years) improved with more intact context for both musicians and nonmusicians. Listeners’ event boundaries were influenced by the amount of tonal context but also reflected nested phrase structure, and musicians were more sensitive to longer-timescale “hyperphrase” structure (Experiment 3; n = 95, age range = 20–42 years) and could better identify the amount of scrambling (Experiment 4; n = 108, age range = 19–41 years). These results indicate that listeners integrate tonal context across complex phrases to efficiently encode, predict, and segment naturalistic music and that in general, training has surprisingly little impact on this integration.

Americans readily identify with class labels, such as working class and middle class . In turn, these identities affect their social affiliations, cultural values, and physical health. Despite theoretical predictions that class identity can change, little work has empirically examined the long-term malleability of class identity. Here we ask, can class identity change in the long term? And if so, when? We tested this question by examining whether the 2008 Great Recession changed how Americans viewed their social and economic standing in society—that is, their class identity. In three of four data sets (total N = 164,296), we found that the 2008 Great Recession shifted Americans toward identifying as a lower class. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of the formation of class identity and for the political and social development of the United States following 2008.

A fundamental underlying question about the nature of overconfidence has continued to be subject to scholarly dispute: Is overconfidence a genuine psychological trait? To advance this contested research topic, we engaged in an adversarial collaboration in which two research teams agreed upon a set of critical tests and preregistered their analyses and predictions prior to data collection. Our study ( N = 942; U.S. adults from CloudConnect) leverages a methodological innovation: To measure trait overconfidence absent task-related confounds, we developed a set of novel tasks in which performance is ostensibly random. When we assess confidence this way, we find robust relationships across tasks as measured by both confirmatory factor analyses and raw correlations. This indicates that some people do believe that they are able to perform relatively well on tasks even when there is little reason for that confidence. Our results support the claim that overconfidence might be a trait.

Can nonnative English accents become barriers to garnering attention in public discourse? The current study examined this question. Analyzing 5,367 TED Talks through computational methodologies such as voice recognition, natural language processing, and vision models, we investigated the relationship between speakers’ accents and online engagement. After adjusting for various control variables with a series of robustness checks, we found a sizeable disparity in public discourse: Speakers with nonnative accents received less engagement than speakers with native accents. To complement our findings, we conducted a controlled social-psychological experiment among English-speaking American adults ( N = 462) and a direct replication ( N = 916) that corroborated our computational analyses and highlighted stereotyping and processing disfluency as key factors driving reduced engagement in accented speakers. Our research highlights the pervasive impact of accent discrimination in global communication and emphasizes the need for strategies to mitigate its detrimental effects on knowledge exchange across cultural and linguistic boundaries.

To navigate complex physical environments, animals keep track of the spatial relations among objects using various reference frames, both body-based (e.g., left/right) and environment-based (e.g., east/west), but how these spatial representations interact remains unresolved. Whereas neuroscientific findings show habitual integration across reference frames, psycholinguistic accounts suggest humans use one reference frame at a time, as in speech. This article examines whether people spontaneously use two reference frames in the same action. When placing a single object in a two-dimensional array, adult participants ( N = 110) routinely used an environment-based frame to determine the object’s left–right position while using a body-based frame to determine its front–back position at the same time. Such hybrid responses were prevalent among both Indigenous Tsimane’ and educated U.S. participants, suggesting that people across cultures habitually construct compound cognitive maps to represent the multidimensional spatial relations that compose natural settings.

Recognition memory refers to the process of distinguishing between previously experienced and novel events. Apart from the objective quality of stored memories, recognition depends on the retrieval context produced by all items (foils) presented together with actually memorized targets and causing confusion. Memory models often conceptualize target-foil confusability via distances in psychological spaces where greater confusability originates from shorter interitem distances. We tested whether recognition spaces change when other foils are added to the retrieval context or when target memory strength is changed ( N = 1,311 adults). Using signal-detection modeling, we found that separately measured distances, d ′s, from each foil to the target provide a good linear prediction of those distances for all foils being presented together against that target. Those predictions stay accurate even when the absolute distances are scaled up or down because of a change in memory strength. This suggests strong metric invariance of spaces used for recognition decisions under variable retrieval contexts.

Scholars have extolled the virtues of rationality for centuries while also debating what rationality is and who is rational. Advancing these debates, we used word embeddings trained on 840 billion words of internet text-and validated with Prolific workers in the United States-to uncover the representation, group stereotypes, and occupational correlates of rationality at scale in naturalistic language. Four results emerged. First, rather than being synonymous with competence, representations of rationality included both an analytic/logic component and an interpersonal/trust component. Second, irrationality was not merely the opposite of rationality but contained its own unique subcomponents (volatility and unfairness). Third, rationality was consistently ascribed to high-power targets across 66 social groups. Last, rationality (especially its analytic component) was consistently associated with both earnings and wage gaps across 101 occupations. Associations with demographic representation were less consistent. Complementing normative approaches, these descriptive findings advance canonical debates about rationality, extending understanding of its components, stereotypes, and correlates.

In seven studies, we investigated how reporting partial vote counts influences perceptions of election legitimacy. Beliefs in election fraud, as in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, may be fueled by the cumulative redundancy bias (CRB), which skews perceptions toward early leaders in partial vote counts. In line with this prediction, participants (Prolific adult participants from the United States and the United Kingdom) consistently rated early leaders more favorably and were more likely to suspect fraud when the eventual winner gained a late lead. This effect persisted across simulated elections (Studies 1–3) and real-world vote counts from the 2020 election in Georgia (Study 4). It is important to note that fraud suspicions already arose before the count was completed (Study 5) and persisted despite explanatory interventions (Study 6). Partisanship did not eliminate the CRB’s influence on fraud beliefs (Study 7). Our findings suggest that the sequential reporting of vote counts may amplify false perceptions of election fraud and could be mitigated by revising how results are communicated.

Gender differences in occupational interests are often assumed to reflect sex differences in empathizing or systemizing preferences. Do such essentialized explanations lead people to provide gender-biased learning affordances that constrain women’s career interests? In Study 1 ( N = 292), North American STEM professionals endorsing a biologically essentialized (vs. sociocultural) explanation for gender differences in occupational interests provided women (men) with more empathizing (systemizing) learning affordances in a mock management task. Study 2 replicated these gendered affordances by experimentally manipulating essentialized explanations ( N = 379; participants were North American men with management experience in male-dominated fields). In Study 3, North American undergraduate women ( N = 300) who received gendered learning affordances reported greater interest in, and possible alignment with, empathizing work assignments, whereas those who received countergendered affordances reported greater interest in, and possible alignment with, systemizing assignments. These results reveal that gender-essentialist beliefs can foster self-fulfilling gender gaps in occupational interests.

= 2,524 U.S.-based adults recruited from the University of California, Berkeley, or Amazon Mechanical Turk) provide support for doubling-back aversion, a reluctance to pursue more efficient means to a goal when they entail undoing progress already made. These effects emerged in diverse contexts, both as participants physically navigated a virtual-reality world and as they completed different performance tasks. Doubling back was decomposed into two components: the deletion of progress already made and the addition to the proportion of a task that was left to complete. Each contributed independently to doubling-back aversion. These effects were robustly explained by shifts in subjective construals of both one's past and future efforts that would result from doubling back, not by changes in perceptions of the relative length of different routes to an end state. Participants' aversion to feeling their past efforts were a waste encouraged them to pursue less efficient means. We end by discussing how doubling-back aversion is distinct from established phenomena (e.g., the sunk-cost fallacy).