Knowledge that Transforms

In our connected era, we spend significant time and effort satisfying our curiosity. Often, we choose which information we seek, but sometimes the selection is made for us. We hypothesized that humans exhibit enhanced curiosity in the context of choice. We designed a task in which healthy participants saw two lotteries on each trial. On some trials, participants chose which lottery to play. On other trials, the lottery was selected for them. Participants then indicated their curiosity about the outcome of the to-be-played lottery via self-report ratings (Experiment 1, N = 34) or willingness-to-wait decisions (Experiment 2, N = 34). We found that participants exhibited higher curiosity ratings and greater willingness to wait for the outcome of lotteries they had chosen than for lotteries that had been selected for them (controlling for initial preference). This demonstrates that choice boosts curiosity, which may have implications for boosting learning, memory, and motivation.

Recent evidence shows that AI-generated faces are now indistinguishable from human faces. However, algorithms are trained disproportionately on White faces, and thus White AI faces may appear especially realistic. In Experiment 1 ( N = 124 adults), alongside our reanalysis of previously published data, we showed that White AI faces are judged as human more often than actual human faces—a phenomenon we term AI hyperrealism. Paradoxically, people who made the most errors in this task were the most confident (a Dunning-Kruger effect). In Experiment 2 ( N = 610 adults), we used face-space theory and participant qualitative reports to identify key facial attributes that distinguish AI from human faces but were misinterpreted by participants, leading to AI hyperrealism. However, the attributes permitted high accuracy using machine learning. These findings illustrate how psychological theory can inform understanding of AI outputs and provide direction for debiasing AI algorithms, thereby promoting the ethical use of AI.

We studied how gendered beliefs about intellectual abilities transmit through peers and differentially impact girls’ academic performance relative to boys’. Study 1 ( N = 8,029; 208 classrooms) exploited randomly assigned variation in the proportion of a child’s middle school classmates who believe that boys are innately better than girls at learning math. An increase in exposure to peers who report this belief generated losses for girls and gains for boys in math performance. This peer exposure also increased children’s likelihood of believing the gender–math stereotype, increased the perceived difficulty of math, and reduced aspirations among girls. Study 2 ( N = 547) provided proof of concept that activating a gender–math performance gap among college students reduces women’s math performance but not verbal performance. Men’s task performance was not affected. Our findings highlight how the prevalence of stereotypical beliefs in one’s ambient and peer environment, even when readily contradictable, can shape children’s beliefs and academic ability.

Words and the concepts they represent vary across languages. Here we ask if mother-tongue concepts are altered by learning a second language. What happens when speakers of Tsimane’, a language with few consensus color terms, learn Bolivian Spanish, a language with more terms? Three possibilities arise: Concepts in Tsimane’ may remain unaffected, or they may be remapped, either by Tsimane’ terms taking on new meanings or by borrowing Bolivian-Spanish terms. We found that adult bilingual speakers ( n = 30) remapped Tsimane’ concepts without importing Bolivian-Spanish terms into Tsimane’. All Tsimane’ terms become more precise; for example, concepts of monolingual shandyes and yụshñus (~green or blue, used synonymously by Tsimane’ monolinguals; n = 71) come to reflect the Bolivian-Spanish distinction of verde (~green) and azul (~blue). These results show that learning a second language can change the concepts in the first language.

Not all older adults with dementia-related neuropathology in their brains experience cognitive decline or impairment. Instead, some people maintain relatively normal cognitive functioning despite neuropathologic burden, a phenomenon called cognitive resilience. Using a longitudinal, epidemiological, clinical-pathologic cohort study of older adults in the United States ( N = 348), the present research investigated associations between well-being and cognitive resilience. Consistent with preregistered hypotheses, results showed that higher eudaimonic well-being (measured via the Ryff Psychological Well-Being Scale) and higher hedonic well-being (measured via the Satisfaction with Life Scale) were associated with better-than-expected cognitive functioning relative to one’s neuropathological burden (i.e., beta-amyloid, neurofibrillary tangles, Lewy bodies, vascular pathologies, hippocampal sclerosis, and TDP-43). The association of eudaimonic well-being in particular was present above and beyond known cognitive resilience factors (i.e., socioeconomic status, education, cognitive activity, low neuroticism, low depression) and dementia risk factors (i.e., apolipoprotein E [ ApoE] genotype, medical comorbidities). This research highlights the importance of considering eudaimonic well-being in efforts to prevent dementia.

A long-standing debate concerns whether developmental dyscalculia is characterized by core deficits in processing nonsymbolic or symbolic numerical information as well as the role of domain-general difficulties. Heterogeneity in recruitment and diagnostic criteria make it difficult to disentangle this issue. Here, we selected children ( n = 58) with severely compromised mathematical skills (2 SD below average) but average domain-general skills from a large sample referred for clinical assessment of learning disabilities. From the same sample, we selected a control group of children ( n = 42) matched for IQ, age, and visuospatial memory but with average mathematical skills. Children with dyscalculia showed deficits in both symbolic and nonsymbolic number sense assessed with simple computerized tasks. Performance in the digit-comparison task and the numerosity match-to-sample task reliably separated children with developmental dyscalculia from controls in cross-validated logistic regression (area under the curve = .84). These results support a number-sense-deficit theory and highlight basic numerical abilities that could be targeted for early identification of at-risk children as well as for intervention.

Rooted in the novel and the mysterious, awe is a common experience in childhood, but research is almost silent with respect to the import of this emotion for children. Awe makes individuals feel small, thereby shifting their attention to the social world. Here, we studied the effects of art-elicited awe on children’s prosocial behavior toward an out-group and its unique physiological correlates. In two preregistered studies (Study 1: N = 159, Study 2: N = 353), children between 8 and 13 years old viewed movie clips that elicited awe, joy, or a neutral (control) response. Children who watched the awe-eliciting clip were more likely to spend their time on an effortful task (Study 1) and to donate their experimental earnings (Studies 1 and 2), all toward benefiting refugees. They also exhibited increased respiratory sinus arrhythmia, an index of parasympathetic nervous system activation associated with social engagement. We discuss implications for fostering prosociality by reimagining children’s environments to inspire awe at a critical age.

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

U.S. police departments have attempted to address racial inequities in policing with diversity training. However, little research has evaluated whether these trainings are effective at changing officers’ beliefs, motivations, and actions. To examine their efficacy, we tested a day-long implicit-bias-oriented diversity training designed to increase U.S. police officers’ knowledge of biases, concerns about bias, and use of evidence-based strategies to mitigate bias (total N = 3,764). The training was immediately effective at increasing knowledge about bias, concerns about bias, and intentions to address bias, relative to baseline. However, the effects were fleeting. Although the training was linked to higher knowledge for at least 1 month, it was ineffective at durably increasing concerns or strategy use. These findings suggest that diversity trainings as they are currently practiced are unlikely to change police behavior. We conclude with theorizing about what organizations and training programs could do for greater impact.

Individuals differ in how they weigh their own utility versus others’. This tendency codefines the dark factor of personality (D), which is conceptualized as the underlying disposition from which all socially and ethically aversive (dark) traits arise as specific, flavored manifestations. We scrutinize this unique theoretical notion by testing, for a broad set of 58 different traits and related constructs, whether any predict how individuals weigh their own versus others’ utility in proactive allocation decisions (i.e., social value orientations) beyond D. These traits and constructs range from broad dimensions (e.g., agreeableness), to aversive traits (e.g., sadism) and beliefs (e.g., normlessness), to prosocial tendencies (e.g., compassion). In a large-scale longitudinal study involving the assessment of consequential choices (median N = 2,270; a heterogeneous adult community sample from Germany), results from several hundred latent model comparisons revealed that no meaningful incremental variance was explained beyond D. Thus, D alone is sufficient to represent the social preferences inherent in socially and ethically aversive personality traits.