Knowledge that Transforms

, 1106-1115] concluded that forecasting ability was improved by allowing participants to work in teams and providing them with probability training. Here, we reevaluated Mellers et al.'s conclusions using an item response theory framework that models latent ability from forecasting choices. We found that the relationship between latent ability estimates and forecast accuracy differed from the interpretation of the original findings once key extraneous variables were statistically controlled. The best fit models across the first 2 years of the tournament included one or more extraneous variables that substantially eliminated, reduced, and, in some cases, even reversed the effects of the experimental manipulations of teaming and training on latent forecasting ability. We also show that latent traits associated with strategic responding can discriminate between superforecasters and non-superforecasters, making it difficult to identify the latent factors that underlie the superforecasters' superior performance.

Awaiting news of uncertain outcomes is distressing because the news might be disappointing. To prevent such disappointments, people often “brace for the worst,” pessimistically lowering expectations before news arrives to decrease the possibility of surprising disappointment (a negative prediction error, or PE). Computational decision-making research commonly assumes that expectations do not drift within trials, yet it is unclear whether expectations pessimistically drift in real-world, high-stakes settings, what factors influence expectation drift, and whether it effectively buffers emotional responses to goal-relevant outcomes. Moreover, individuals learn from PEs to accurately anticipate future outcomes, but it is unknown whether expectation drift also impedes PE-based learning. In a sample of students awaiting exam grades ( N = 625), we found that expectations often drift and tend to drift pessimistically. We demonstrate that bracing is preferentially modulated by uncertainty; it transiently buffers the initial emotional impact of negative PEs but impairs PE-based learning, counterintuitively sustaining uncertainty into the future.

Reality is fleeting, and any moment can only be experienced once. Rewatching a video, however, allows people to repeatedly observe the exact same moment. We propose that people may fail to fully distinguish between merely observing behavior again (through replay) from that behavior being performed again in the exact same way. Using an assortment of stimuli that included auditions, commercials, and potential trial evidence, we demonstrated through nine experiments ( N = 10,412 adults in the United States) that rewatching makes a recorded behavior appear more rehearsed and less spontaneous, as if the actors were simply precisely repeating their actions. These findings contribute to an emerging literature showing that incidental video features, like perspective or slow motion, can meaningfully change evaluations. Replay may inadvertently shape judgments in both mundane and consequential contexts. To understand how a video will influence its viewer, one will need to consider not only its content, but also how often it is viewed.

Motion silencing is a striking and unexplained visual illusion wherein changes that are otherwise salient become difficult to perceive when the changing elements also move. We develop a new method for quantifying illusion strength (Experiments 1a and 1b), and we demonstrate a privileged role for rotational motion on illusion strength compared with highly controlled stimuli that lack rotation (Experiments 2a to 3b). These contrasts make it difficult to explain the illusion in terms of lower-level detection limits. Instead, we explain the illusion as a failure to attribute changes to locations. Rotation exacerbates the illusion because its perception relies upon structured object representations. This aggravates the difficulty of attributing changes by demanding that locations are referenced relative to both an object-internal frame and an external frame. Two final experiments (4a and 4b) add support to this account by employing a synchronously rotating external frame of reference that diminishes otherwise strong motion silencing. All participants were Johns Hopkins University undergraduates.

To estimate object properties such as mass or friction, our brain relies on visual information to efficiently compute approximations. The role of sensorimotor feedback, however, is not well understood. Here we tested healthy adults ( N = 79) in an inclined-plane problem, that is, how much a plane can be tilted before an object starts to slide, and contrasted the interaction group with observation groups who accessed involved forces by watching objects being manipulated. We created objects of different masses and levels of friction and asked participants to estimate the critical tilt angle after pushing an object, lifting it, or both. Estimates correlated with applied forces and were biased toward object mass, with higher estimates for heavier objects. Our findings highlight that inferences about physical object properties are tightly linked to the human sensorimotor system and that humans integrate sensorimotor information even at the risk of nonveridical perceptual estimates.

Understanding how initiatives to support Black-owned businesses are received, and why, has important social and economic implications. To address this, we designed three experiments to investigate the role of antiegalitarian versus egalitarian ideologies among White American adults. In Study 1 ( N = 199), antiegalitarianism (vs. egalitarianism) predicted viewing initiatives supporting a Black-owned business as less fair, but only when the business was competing with other (presumably White-owned) businesses. In Study 2 ( N = 801), antiegalitarianism predicted applying survival-of-the-fittest market beliefs, particularly to Black-owned businesses. Antiegalitarianism also predicted viewing initiatives supporting Black-owned businesses as less fair than initiatives that targeted other (presumably White-owned) businesses, especially for tangible (vs. symbolic) support that directly impacts the success of a business. In Study 3 ( N = 590), antiegalitarianism predicted rejecting a program investing in Black-owned businesses. These insights demonstrate how antiegalitarian ideology can have the effect of maintaining race-based inequality, hindering programs designed to reduce that inequality.

The tendency for people to consider themselves morally good while behaving selfishly is known as moral hypocrisy. Influential work by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) found evidence for intergroup moral hypocrisy such that people were more forgiving of transgressions when they were committed by an in-group member than an out-group member. We conducted two experiments to examine moral hypocrisy and group membership in an online paradigm with Prolific workers from the United States: a direct replication of the original work with minimal groups ( N = 610; nationally representative) and a conceptual replication with political groups ( N = 606; 50% Democrats and 50% Republicans). Although the results did not replicate the original findings, we observed evidence of in-group favoritism in minimal groups and out-group derogation in political groups. The current research finds mixed evidence of intergroup moral hypocrisy and has implications for understanding the contextual dependencies of intergroup bias and partisanship.

Countless policies are crafted with the intention of punishing all who do wrong or rewarding only those who do right. However, this requires accommodating certain mistakes: some who do not deserve to be punished might be, and some who deserve to be rewarded might not be. Six preregistered experiments ( N = 3,484 U.S. adults) reveal that people are more willing to accept this trade-off in principle, before errors occur, than in practice, after errors occur. The result is an asymmetry such that for punishments, people believe it is more important to prevent false negatives (e.g., criminals escaping justice) than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives (e.g., wrongful convictions) than to prevent them. For rewards, people believe it is more important to prevent false positives (e.g., welfare fraud) than to fix them and more important to fix false negatives (e.g., improperly denied benefits) than to prevent them.

= 815 adults, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in the United States), we investigated whether people could ignore quantitative information when they judged for themselves that it was misreported. Participants recruited online viewed sets of values sampled from Gaussian distributions to estimate the underlying means. They attempted to ignore invalid information, which were outlier values inserted into the value sequences. Results indicated participants were able to detect outliers. Nevertheless, participants' estimates were still biased in the direction of the outlier, even when they were most certain that they detected invalid information. The addition of visual warning cues and different task scenarios did not fully eliminate systematic over- and underestimation. These findings suggest that individuals may incorporate invalid information they meant to ignore when forming beliefs.

The mind represents abstract magnitude information, including time, space, and number, but in what format is this information stored? We show support for the bipartite format of perceptual magnitudes, in which the measured value on a dimension is scaled to the dynamic range of the input, leading to a privileged status for values at the lowest and highest end of the range. In six experiments with college undergraduates, we show that observers are faster and more accurate to find the endpoints (i.e., the minimum and maximum) than any of the inner values, even as the number of items increases beyond visual short-term memory limits. Our results show that length, size, and number are represented in a dynamic format that allows for comparison-free sorting, with endpoints represented with an immediately accessible status, consistent with the bipartite model of perceptual magnitudes. We discuss the implications for theories of visual search and ensemble perception.