Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.

We study how people’s beliefs about the economy covary with household-level events, utilizing a unique link between Danish administrative data and a large-scale survey of consumer expectations. We find that compared to actual inflation, people’s inflation forecasts covary much more strongly (and negatively) with both recently realized household income changes and measures of expected future household income changes. We formally establish that these findings are stark deviations from the Bayesian rational expectations benchmark. Similar results hold for perceptions of past inflation (“backcasts” ), suggesting that imperfect recall is a key mechanism for biased forecasts. Building on this, a series of additional tests, some of which utilize data on adverse health events, suggests that the forecast biases are at least partly due to affect-cued recall. That is, negative (positive) household-level events cue negative (positive) recollections, which lead to pessimistic (optimistic) forecasts.

This article empirically studies the effects of the early law and economics movement on the U.S. judiciary. We focus on the Manne Economics Institute for Federal Judges, an intensive economics course that trained almost half of federal judges between 1976 and 1999. Using the universe of published opinions in U.S. Circuit Courts and 1 million District Court criminal sentencing decisions, we estimate the within-judge effect of Manne program attendance. Selection into attendance was limited, as the program was popular among judges of all backgrounds, frequently oversubscribed, and admitted participants on a first-come, first-served basis. We find that after attending economics training, participating judges use more economics language in their opinions, rule against regulatory agencies more often, and impose more severe criminal sentences. We argue that economics, as a rigorous social science, was especially effective in persuading judges.

We show that “commodity currency” exchange rates have surprisingly robust power in predicting global commodity prices, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and against a variety of alternative benchmarks. This result is of particular interest to policy makers, given the lack of deep forward markets in many individual commodities, and broad aggregate commodity indices in particular. We also explore the reverse relationship (commodity prices forecasting exchange rates) but find it to be notably less robust. We offer a theoretical resolution, based on the fact that exchange rates are strongly forward-looking, whereas commodity price fluctuations are typically more sensitive to short-term demand imbalances.

Frictions that impede the mobility of workers across occupations and space are a prominent feature of developing countries. We disentangle the role of insecure property rights from other labor-mobility frictions for the reallocation of labor from agriculture to nonagriculture and from rural to urban areas. We combine rich household and individual-level panel data from China and an equilibrium quantitative framework featuring sorting of workers across locations and occupations. We explicitly model the farming household and the endogenous decisions of who operates the family farm and who potentially migrates, capturing an additional channel of selection in the household. We find that land insecurity has substantial negative effects on agricultural productivity and structural change, raising the share of rural households operating farms by over 40 percentage points and depressing agricultural productivity by more than 20%. Comparatively, these quantitative effects are as large as those from all residual labor-mobility frictions. We measure a sharp reduction in overall labor-mobility barriers over 2004–2018 in the Chinese economy, all accounted for by improved land security, consistent with reforms covering rural land in China during the period. JEL Codes: O11, O14, O4, E02, Q1.

Concerns about excessive mobile phone use among youth are mounting. We present estimates of behavioral and contextual peer effects, along with comprehensive evidence on how students’ own and their peers’ app usage affect academic performance, physical health, and labor market outcomes. Our analysis draws on administrative data from a Chinese university covering three student cohorts over four years. We exploit random roommate assignments, differential exposure to a policy shock (gaming restrictions for minors), and differential exposure to a discrete event (the introduction of a blockbuster video game) for identification. App usage is contagious: a one s.d. increase in roommates’ in-college app usage raises own usage by 5.8%. High app usage is harmful across all measured outcomes. A one s.d. increase in app usage reduces GPAs by 36.2% of a within-cohort-major s.d. and lowers wages by 2.3%. Roommates’ app usage reduces a student’s GPA and wages through both disruptions and behavioral spillovers, generating a total negative effect that exceeds half the magnitude of the impact from the student’s own app usage. Extending China’s three-hour-per-week gaming restriction for minors to college students would boost their initial wages by 0.9%. High-frequency GPS and app usage data show that heavy app users spend less time in study halls, are more frequently late or absent from class, and get less sleep.