I. Introductory. Concept of the "region, " 533.— II. Labor cost per unit of labor and per unit of product, 536.—III. Regional differences in wages, 537. — Gratuities and payments in kind, 542. — Real wages, 544. — IV. The supply of labor, 545.—Legislative and other restrictions, 548.—V. Differences in productivity, 552. — Spinners and weavers, 558. — VI. Conclusions, 564.

This study examines whether three factors—the transparency of expense disclosures, donor evaluation focus, and organization performance—influence how directors monitor management expense misreporting in nonprofit organizations. An experiment with 189 nonprofit directors finds that the enhanced transparency of expense disclosures increases director monitoring by reducing the tendency to accept management expense misreporting. Further, an organization's nonfinancial performance and the perceived fairness of donor evaluation focus interact to influence director monitoring practices. Specifically, when directors know an organization's nonfinancial performance is poor and understand that this performance will negatively influence the willingness of donors to contribute, directors monitor less if they think that donors are adopting a more balanced approach to organizational evaluation that focuses on both financial and nonfinancial performance; that is, there is a reverse fair process effect as this donor approach is perceived as being fairer than if donors focus solely on financial performance. However, monitoring is equally strong regardless of donor evaluation focus when directors know that an organization's nonfinancial performance is good and a donation is forthcoming.

In this article I analyze the role of cooperation between firm divisions in the budgeting process. I study a setting in which cooperation is a necessary condition for information sharing among division managers, which in turn benefits the principal. The results in this article can help reconcile the differing views between practitioners and academic researchers on the desirability of cooperation in the budgeting process. The results also have implications for some common budgeting processes observed in practice, including bundling budgeting and bottom‐up budgeting.

External recruitment is often believed to be harmful in that it trades off the need for outside talents with the incentives of inside workers. This article shows that, even from an incentive viewpoint, external recruitment has its powerful function. Specifically, if promotion is based on relative performance, then negative activities (sabotages) are a valuable instrument for competition. This results in inefficiency of the firm. External recruitment, by reducing the marginal return of negative effort relative to that of productive effort, restores the incentives in productive activity. Even without sabotage concern, external recruitment can avoid shirking equilibrium or prevent workers’ collusion.

Gaussian empirical Bayes methods usually maintain a precision independence assumption: The unknown parameters of interest are independent from the known standard errors of the estimates. This assumption is often theoretically questionable and empirically rejected. This paper proposes to model the conditional distribution of the parameter given the standard errors as a flexibly parameterized location‐scale family of distributions, leading to a family of methods that we call close . The close framework unifies and generalizes several proposals under precision dependence. We argue that the most flexible member of the close family is a minimalist and computationally efficient default for accounting for precision dependence. We analyze this method and show that it is competitive in terms of the regret of subsequent decision rules. Empirically, using close leads to sizable gains for selecting high‐mobility Census tracts.

I document that the right tail of the firm size distribution systematically thickens with economic development. To rationalize this fact, I develop a parsimonious idea search model in which both aggregate growth and the firm size distribution are endogenously determined. The model features an asymptotic balanced growth path along which Gibrat's law holds at each date, and the right tail of the firm size distribution thickens monotonically toward Zipf's law. The model also implies that policies favoring large firms can improve welfare by better utilizing the diffusion externalities arising from idea search.

This paper quantifies the importance of the granular channel for the U.S. economy by taking into account that large firms are less volatile than small firms, a feature also known as the size-variance relationship. Intuitively, the largest firms, whose shocks drive granularity, are the least volatile; thus, their influence on aggregates is mitigated. By imposing estimates from the universe of employers for the size-variance relationship in a simple, quantitative framework, I find that the granular hypothesis can rationalize 15% of U.S. aggregate fluctuations, establishing a lower bound for the role of granularity in the U.S. economy.

Valuation risk of a security—uncertainty about its fair value—is a subject of considerable concern in the mutual fund industry. If funds report different values for identical securities, investors cannot easily compare their performance. Yet it is not unusual to see identical illiquid stocks, small-cap stocks, stocks with high analyst dispersion, stocks with less analyst coverage, and newly listed stocks valued differently across mutual funds. An equity fund that has positive price dispersion in its portfolio holdings, that performs poorly, that belongs to a fund family with an inclination for aggressive reporting, that holds more stocks subject to stale prices, that holds more pre-IPO firms, or that experiences net outflows will tend to show positive price dispersion again in the next quarter. This behavior is significant in a volatile market. Aggressive reporting helps funds gain in the mutual fund tournament.

A simple general equilibrium production economy matches moments of the value premium and equity premium. Value firms have low productivity, but will eventually produce high cash flows. The present value of these temporally distant cash flows is especially sensitive to equity premium movements. The value premium is the reward for bearing this sensitivity. Capital adjustment costs are important. Without these costs, value firms would disinvest heavily, leading to high cash flows today, low cash-flow growth going forward, and little exposure to discount rate shocks. Empirical evidence verifies that value firms have higher cash-flow growth and supports other predictions.

This paper examines the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the economic impact of corporate capital investments. I find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for focused firms than for diversified firms. I also show that focused firms exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance than diversified firms. The overall findings in this study suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of the net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firms.