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The Unequal Gains from Product Innovations: Evidence from the U.S. Retail Sector*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(2), 715-783 open access
This article examines how product innovations led to inflation inequality in the United States from 2004 to 2015. Using scanner data from the retail sector, I find that annual inflation for retail products was 0.661 (std. err. 0.0535) percentage points higher for the bottom income quintile relative to the top income quintile. When including changes in product variety over time, this difference increases to 0.8846 (std. err. 0.0739) percentage points a year. In CEX-CPI data covering the full consumption basket, the annual inflation difference is 0.368 (std. err. 0.0502) percentage points. I investigate the following hypothesis: (i) the relative demand for products consumed by high-income households increased because of growth and rising inequality; (ii) in response, firms introduced more new products catering to such households; (iii) as a result, the prices of continuing products in these market segments fell due to increased competitive pressure. Using a shift-share research design, I find causal evidence that increasing relative demand leads to increasing product variety and lower inflation for continuing products. A calibration indicates that the hypothesized channel accounts for a large fraction (over 50%) of observed inflation inequality.

The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(3), 1225-1298 open access
Abstract What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes, including housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles.

Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(3), 1627-1673 open access
Abstract We present results from a large-scale randomized experiment across 350 schools in Tanzania that studied the impact of providing schools with (i) unconditional grants, (ii) teacher incentives based on student performance, and (iii) both of the above. After two years, we find (i) no impact on student test scores from providing school grants, (ii) some evidence of positive effects from teacher incentives, and (iii) significant positive effects from providing both programs. Most important, we find strong evidence of complementarities between the programs, with the effect of joint provision being significantly greater than the sum of the individual effects. Our results suggest that combining spending on school inputs (the default policy) with improved teacher incentives could substantially increase the cost-effectiveness of public spending on education.

Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(1), 349-396 open access
Since the 1972 U.S. Clean Water Act, government and industry have invested over |$|1 trillion to abate water pollution, or |$|100 per person-year. Over half of U.S. stream and river miles, however, still violate pollution standards. We use the most comprehensive set of files ever compiled on water pollution and its determinants, including 50 million pollution readings from 240,000 monitoring sites and a network model of all U.S. rivers, to study water pollution’s trends, causes, and welfare consequences. We have three main findings. First, water pollution concentrations have fallen substantially. Between 1972 and 2001, for example, the share of waters safe for fishing grew by 12 percentage points. Second, the Clean Water Act’s grants to municipal wastewater treatment plants, which account for |$|650 billion in expenditure, caused some of these declines. Through these grants, it cost around |$|1.5 million (2014 dollars) to make one river-mile fishable for a year. We find little displacement of municipal expenditure due to a federal grant. Third, the grants’ estimated effects on housing values are smaller than the grants’ costs; we carefully discuss welfare implications.

Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(2), 1021-1077 open access
Social scientists have long viewed the decision to protest as strategic, with an individual's participation a function of their beliefs about others' turnout. We conduct a framed field experiment that recalibrates individuals' beliefs about others' protest participation, in the context of Hong Kong's ongoing antiauthoritarian movement. We elicit subjects' planned participation in an upcoming protest and their prior beliefs about others' participation, in an incentivized manner. One day before the protest, we randomly provide a subset of subjects with truthful information about others' protest plans and elicit posterior beliefs about protest turnout, again in an incentivized manner. After the protest, we elicit subjects' actual participation. This allows us to identify the causal effects of positively and negatively updated beliefs about others' protest participation on subjects' own turnout. In contrast with the assumptions of many recent models of protest participation, we consistently find evidence of strategic substitutability. We provide guidance regarding plausible sources of strategic substitutability that can be incorporated into theoretical models of protests.

Firming Up Inequality*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(1), 1-50 open access
Abstract We use a massive, matched employer-employee database for the United States to analyze the contribution of firms to the rise in earnings inequality from 1978 to 2013. We find that one-third of the rise in the variance of (log) earnings occurred within firms, whereas two-thirds of the rise occurred due to a rise in the dispersion of average earnings between firms. However, this rising between-firm variance is not accounted for by the firms themselves but by a widening gap between firms in the composition of their workers. This compositional change can be split into two roughly equal parts: high-wage workers became increasingly likely to work in high-wage firms (i.e., sorting increased), and high-wage workers became increasingly likely to work with each other (i.e., segregation rose). In contrast, we do not find a rise in the variance of firm-specific pay once we control for the worker composition in firms. Finally, we find that two-thirds of the rise in the within-firm variance of earnings occurred within mega (10,000+ employee) firms, which saw a particularly large increase in the variance of earnings compared with smaller firms.

Forward and Spot Exchange Rates in a Multi-Currency World*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(1), 397-450
Separate literatures study violations of uncovered interest parity (UIP) using regression-based and portfolio-based methods. We propose a decomposition of these violations into a cross-currency, a between-time-and-currency, and a cross-time component that allows us to analytically relate regression-based and portfolio-based facts and to estimate the joint restrictions they put on models of currency returns. Subject to standard assumptions on investors’ information sets, we find that the forward premium puzzle (FPP) and the “dollar trade” anomaly are intimately linked: both are driven almost exclusively by the cross-time component. By contrast, the “carry trade” anomaly is driven largely by cross-sectional violations of UIP. The simplest model that the data do not reject features a cross-sectional asymmetry that makes some currencies pay permanently higher expected returns than others, and larger time series variation in expected returns on the U.S. dollar than on other currencies. Importantly, conventional estimates of the FPP are not directly informative about expected returns because they do not correct for uncertainty about future mean interest rates. Once we correct for this uncertainty, we never reject the null that investors expect high-interest-rate currencies to depreciate, not appreciate.

The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(1), 51-107 open access
We use insurance claims data covering 28% of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance in the United States to study the variation in health spending on the privately insured, examine the structure of insurer-hospital contracts, and analyze the variation in hospital prices across the nation. Health spending per privately insured beneficiary differs by a factor of three across geographic areas and has a very low correlation with Medicare spending. For the privately insured, half of the spending variation is driven by price variation across regions, and half is driven by quantity variation. Prices vary substantially across regions, across hospitals within regions, and even within hospitals. For example, even for a nearly homogeneous service such as lower-limb magnetic resonance imaging, about a fifth of the total case-level price variation occurs within a hospital in the cross section. Hospital market structure is strongly associated with price levels and contract structure. Prices at monopoly hospitals are 12% higher than those in markets with four or more rivals. Monopoly hospitals also have contracts that load more risk on insurers (e.g., they have more cases with prices set as a share of their charges). In concentrated insurer markets the opposite occurs-hospitals have lower prices and bear more financial risk. Examining the 366 mergers and acquisitions that occurred between 2007 and 2011, we find that prices increased by over 6% when the merging hospitals were geographically close (e.g., 5 miles or less apart), but not when the hospitals were geographically distant (e.g., over 25 miles apart).

Shift-Share Designs: Theory and Inference*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(4), 1949-2010 open access
Abstract We study inference in shift-share regression designs, such as when a regional outcome is regressed on a weighted average of sectoral shocks, using regional sector shares as weights. We conduct a placebo exercise in which we estimate the effect of a shift-share regressor constructed with randomly generated sectoral shocks on actual labor market outcomes across U.S. commuting zones. Tests based on commonly used standard errors with 5% nominal significance level reject the null of no effect in up to 55% of the placebo samples. We use a stylized economic model to show that this overrejection problem arises because regression residuals are correlated across regions with similar sectoral shares, independent of their geographic location. We derive novel inference methods that are valid under arbitrary cross-regional correlation in the regression residuals. We show using popular applications of shift-share designs that our methods may lead to substantially wider confidence intervals in practice.

Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(1), 281-347 open access
Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output-sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agricultural productivity. We report results from a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induced variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants were randomized into three groups: (i) some kept 50% of their output; (ii) others kept 75%; (iii) others kept 50% of output and received a lump-sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. We find that tenants with higher output shares used more inputs, cultivated riskier crops, and produced 60% more output relative to control. Income or risk exposure have at most a small effect on farm output; the increase in output should be interpreted as an incentive effect of the output-sharing rule.