Introduction, 610. — Case 1: Firms whose response functions pass through the origin, 612. — Case 2: Firms whose response functions are positive at zero promotion levels, 619. — General discussion and conclusions, 626.

Introduction, 652. — I. Assumptions, 652. — II. The cost-minimizing locus, 653. — II. Relationships of the cost-minimizing and efficiency loci, 655. — IV. The interdependence of cost and demand, 656. — V. Conclusion, 658.

I. A numerical example, 504. — II. Generalizations, 508. — III. A direct logical criticism, 510. — IV. Changes in the rate of profit and changes in the “quantity of capital, †512. — V. The trap of an old mode of thinking, 514.

Introduction, 314. — Definition of the precautionary demand for cash, 314. — The concepts, 315. — Optimal precautionary cash balances, 316. — Comparison with transactions demand for cash, 320. — Comparison with related studies, 320. — Appendix, 322.

Journal Article “The Demand for Money: A Cross-Section Study of Business Firms”: Further Comment Get access Edward L. Whalen Edward L. Whalen Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 79, Issue 1, February 1965, Pages 160–162, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880522 Published: 01 February 1965

The Rationality of Official Intervention in the Forward Exchange Market: Reply Get access Jerome L. Stein Jerome L. Stein Brown University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 79, Issue 1, February 1965, Pages 150–152, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880520 Published: 01 February 1965

I. Introduction, 238. — II. Behavioral assumptions underlying theories of managerial enterprise, 239. — III. Target rate of return pricing as a managerial tool, 244. — IV. Management goals and restraints on managerial autonomy, 248. — V. Implications for the theory of the firm, 253.

I. Characteristics of the game-theoretic approach, 559. — II. Theories of fixed-threat bargaining: Nach's theory, 563; the Zeuthen-Harsanyi theory, 566; Raiffa's theories, 569; a welfare theory, 572; further critique, 574. — III. Theories of variable-threat bargaining: an illustrative duopoly situation, 582; Nash's theory, 589; a Shapley theory, 593; Raiffa's theories, 594; Braithwaite's theory, 595; other theories, 597; Critical evaluation, 599. — IV. Conclusion, 602.

I. Fighting speculative flurries, 312. — II. Living with a deficit on the basic balance, 314. — III. Conclusion, 316.

Journal Article State and Regional Payments Mechanisms: Comment Get access Richard L. Pfister Richard L. Pfister Dartmouth College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 74, Issue 4, November 1960, Pages 641–648, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884359 Published: 01 November 1960