I. Introductory. Concept of the "region, " 533.— II. Labor cost per unit of labor and per unit of product, 536.—III. Regional differences in wages, 537. — Gratuities and payments in kind, 542. — Real wages, 544. — IV. The supply of labor, 545.—Legislative and other restrictions, 548.—V. Differences in productivity, 552. — Spinners and weavers, 558. — VI. Conclusions, 564.

I. Customary dynamic analysis, 489. — II. Alternative dynamic system, 492.— III. Concluding remarks, 493.

I. The model, 97. — II. The equations of change: Free currency interflow and the “Rybczynski” effect, 99. — III. Comparative statics and comparative systems, 104. — IV. Concluding remarks, 107. — Appendix: The case of perfect mobility of capital, 109.

Chau-nan Chen, Tien-wang Tsaur; Currency Substitution and Foreign Inflation*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 February 1983, Page

The paper provides a rigorous and exact formulation of the relationship between the Gini measure of inequality in total income across families, and corresponding measures of inequality in such components of total income as wages, transfer income, etc. It is shown that serious problems of bias arise when individual family data are not available and when data on averages for families grouped by the size of total income are used instead. These problems are illustrated with reference to data for Taiwan, 1964 to 1976.

When studying an outcome Y that is weakly positive but can equal zero (e.g., earnings), researchers frequently estimate an average treatment effect (ATE) for a “log-like” transformation that behaves like log (Y) for large Y but is defined at zero (e.g., log (1 + Y), arcsinh(Y)). We argue that ATEs for log-like transformations should not be interpreted as approximating percentage effects, since unlike a percentage, they depend on the units of the outcome. In fact, we show that if the treatment affects the extensive margin, one can obtain a treatment effect of any magnitude simply by rescaling the units of Y before taking the log-like transformation. This arbitrary unit dependence arises because an individual-level percentage effect is not well-defined for individuals whose outcome changes from zero to nonzero when receiving treatment, and the units of the outcome implicitly determine how much weight the ATE for a log-like transformation places on the extensive margin. We further establish a trilemma: when the outcome can equal zero, there is no treatment effect parameter that is an average of individual-level treatment effects, unit invariant, and point identified. We discuss several alternative approaches that may be sensible in settings with an intensive and extensive margin, including (i) expressing the ATE in levels as a percentage (e.g., using Poisson regression), (ii) explicitly calibrating the value placed on the intensive and extensive margins, and (iii) estimating separate effects for the two margins (e.g., using Lee bounds). We illustrate these approaches in three empirical applications.

Macro-finance analyses commonly link firms’ borrowing constraints to the liquidation value of physical assets. For U.S. nonfinancial firms, we show that 20% of debt by value is based on such assets (asset-based lending in creditor parlance), whereas 80% is based predominantly on cash flows from firms’ operations (cash flow–based lending). A standard borrowing constraint restricts total debt as a function of cash flows measured using operating earnings (earnings-based borrowing constraints). These features shape firm outcomes on the margin: first, cash flows in the form of operating earnings can directly relax borrowing constraints; second, firms are less vulnerable to collateral damage from asset price declines, and fire sale amplification may be mitigated. Taken together, our findings point to new venues for modeling firms’ borrowing constraints in macro-finance studies.

We find consistent evidence of negative autocorrelation in decision making that is unrelated to the merits of the cases considered in three separate high-stakes field settings: refugee asylum court decisions, loan application reviews, and Major League Baseball umpire pitch calls. The evidence is most consistent with the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy—people underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance—leading to negatively autocorrelated decisions that result in errors. The negative autocorrelation is stronger among more moderate and less experienced decision makers, following longer streaks of decisions in one direction, when the current and previous cases share similar characteristics or occur close in time, and when decision makers face weaker incentives for accuracy. Other explanations for negatively autocorrelated decisions such as quotas, learning, or preferences to treat all parties fairly are less consistent with the evidence, though we cannot completely rule out sequential contrast effects as an alternative explanation.

A new data set on national poverty lines is combined with new price data and almost 700 household surveys to estimate absolute poverty measures for the developing world. We find that 25% of the population lived in poverty in 2005, as judged by what “poverty” typically means in the world's poorest countries. This is higher than past estimates. Substantial overall progress is still indicated—the corresponding poverty rate was 52% in 1981—but progress was very uneven across regions. The trends over time and regional profile are robust to various changes in methodology, though precise counts are more sensitive.

How does wealth taxation differ from capital income taxation? When the return on investment is equal across individuals, a well-known result is that the two tax systems are equivalent. Motivated by recent empirical evidence documenting persistent return heterogeneity, we revisit this question. With heterogeneity, the two tax systems typically have opposite implications for efficiency and inequality. Under capital income taxation, entrepreneurs who are more productive and therefore generate more income pay higher taxes. Under wealth taxation, entrepreneurs who have similar wealth levels pay similar taxes regardless of their productivity, which expands the tax base, shifts the tax burden toward unproductive entrepreneurs, and raises the savings rate of productive ones. This reallocation increases aggregate productivity and output. In the simulated model parameterized to match the U.S. data, replacing the capital income tax with a wealth tax in a revenue-neutral way delivers a significantly higher average welfare. Turning to optimal taxation, the optimal wealth tax (OWT) is positive and yields large welfare gains by raising efficiency and lowering inequality. In contrast, the optimal capital income tax (OKIT) is negative—a subsidy—and delivers lower welfare gains than OWT, owing to the welfare losses from higher inequality. Furthermore, when the transition path is considered, the gains from OKIT turn into significant welfare losses for existing cohorts, whereas OWT continues to deliver robust welfare gains. These results suggest that moderate wealth taxation may be a more appealing alternative than capital income taxation, which can be significantly more distorting under return heterogeneity than under the equal-returns assumption.