I. Goods and money, 303. — II. The variables of the model, 304. — III. The real-sphere behavior equations, 305. — IV. The money-sphere behavior equations, 306. — V. Two equilibrium conditions, 308. — VI. A politically given parameter, 308. — VII. Solution, 309. — VIII. The sensitivity of national output to changes in the parameters, 310. — IX. Conclusion, 312.

I. Introduction, 252. — II. Assumptions, 253. — III. The duopolists' hypotheses about rival behavior, 255. — IV. The duopolists' maximum effective, expected profits, 257. — V. Minimum requirements of A and B confronted, 258. — VI. Chances for agreement, 258. — VII. The result of bargaining, 260. — VIII. Lesson on bargaining techniques, 260.

I. The problem, 418. — The assumptions, 420. — II. Diagrammatic analysis, 420. — The marginal cost curve: selling-effort and quality criteria independent, 422; selling-effort and quality criteria not independent, 431. — Different ways of increasing sales, 432. — The concept "quality improvement, " 435. — III. Varying the price assumption, 435. — The "locus, " 437. — The optimum price, 437. — IV. The problem of the initial quality, 438.