We use trends in self-reported disability to gauge the impact of the growth of disability transfer programs on the labor force attachment of older working-aged men. Our tabulations suggest that between 1949 and 1987, about half of the 4.9 percentage point drop in the labor force participation of men aged 45–54 and between one quarter and one third of the 19.9 point drop among men aged 55–64 represented a movement of men out of the labor force and onto the rolls of transfer programs targeted at the disabled. Since the expansion of transfer programs represents only one of the forces behind this movement, these figures represent upper bounds on the impact of such programs on work force attachment.

Teen childbearing is commonly believed to cause long-term socioeconomic disadvantages for mothers and their children. However, earlier cross-sectional studies may have inadequately accounted for marked differences in family background among women who have first births at different ages. We present new estimates that take into account unmeasured family background heterogeneity by comparing sisters who timed their first births at different ages. In two of the three data sets we examine, sister comparisons suggest that biases from family background heterogeneity are important, and, therefore, that earlier studies may have overstated the consequences of teen childbearing.

Tim S. Campbell, Yuk-Shee Chan; Optimal Financial Contracting with ex post and ex ante Observability Problems*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume

We present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of "cheap talk, " we consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less "risky"). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not.