Knowledge that Transforms

Pre-IPO firms may “test the waters” by meeting privately with investors in order to allow access to management and more time to make an investment decision. However, these meetings have the potential to undermine the SEC’s objectives of protecting investors and supporting market efficiency by allowing institutional investors, but not retail investors, private access to management. We find lower retail trading after IPOs of firms that held testing-the-waters meetings, consistent with the meetings reducing retail investor participation. Moreover, retail investors that still participate in the market in the presence of testing-the-waters meetings have inferior investment outcomes. Nonetheless, we find no evidence of lower overall market liquidity or slower price discovery following testing-the-waters meetings. In fact, we observe a reduction in stock return volatility. Overall our evidence suggests that, while testing-the-waters meetings may harm retail investors, there does not appear to be a negative impact on overall market function.

A few highly successful firms (“superstar firms”) have captured large market shares and earned massive profits in recent decades. We examine whether superstar firms are associated with a greater likelihood of financial distress for firms exposed to them in product markets. Building on recent research, we identify superstars as firms with the highest markups in the industry and whose industry markup share increases over time. We then measure, with product similarity scores, a firm’s overall product market exposure to superstars. We document that firms with greater exposure are more likely to file for bankruptcy. We examine why superstar exposure is associated with bankruptcy and show that firms with the greater superstar exposure exhibit weaker financial performance and greater riskiness. Furthermore, we show that the association between superstar exposure and the likelihood of bankruptcy strengthens when superstars have greater market power.

This study investigates the role of individual managers in banks' financial reporting. We exploit the connectedness between different managers and find that individual bank managers explain approximately 19 percent of banks' loan loss provisions. This observation is consistent with the substantial reporting discretion that individual bank managers use in the estimation of loan loss provisions and that is increasingly subject to financial stability concerns by prudential supervisors. Our results suggest that these concerns are valid, as individual management discretion is associated with greater discretionary loan loss provisions and proxies for opportunistic accounting, especially the reduction in the timeliness of these provisions and the lesser degree to which the allowance for credit losses maps into future charge-offs. These findings are relevant for the design of regulatory measures aimed at limiting the managerial influence on accounting choices in banking and can inform debates on the desirability of discretion within the reporting process of banks.

The new lease standard (ASC 842) allows firms to keep variable leases off balance sheet, in part based on the assumption that future expenses are difficult to estimate reliably. We show that variable lease expenses are both prevalent and substantial, exhibiting persistence and predictability comparable to operating lease expenses while showing limited sensitivity to revenue changes. These patterns are consistent with variable lease payments being based on stable drivers. Following ASC 842 adoption, firms report lower minimum operating lease commitments and higher variable lease expenses, suggesting a substitution from operating to variable leases. Neither equity betas nor credit ratings reflect potential variable lease liabilities. Conservative estimates show that recognition of variable lease liabilities would increase debt by 7.1% on average. Our findings provide evidence on the properties of variable leases and the potential implications of keeping them off balance sheet.

We study the extent to which creditors shape the executive bonus plans of their financially distressed borrowers. Financial distress can exacerbate agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers as concerns with underinvestment become more acute due to managerial myopia and debt overhang. Consequently, we expect creditors to exert their influence to ensure that these managers’ incentive-compensation plans encourage longer-term investments and directly reward outcomes that benefit creditors without exposing managers to unnecessary risk. We argue that bonus plans are an especially important way to provide these incentives because their flexibility allows creditors to more precisely target specific investment objectives. We find that borrowers’ bonus plans tend to have longer horizons and more convex payouts following covenant violations, especially when bonus plans can be a particularly effective way to address distress-related agency conflicts. Our evidence suggests that creditors protect their interests by exercising their control rights to shape their borrowers’ incentive-compensation plans.

This paper documents the difference in asymmetric labor adjustment between male and female employees, as alluded to in the labor economics literature. Based on detailed gender-specific employment disclosures of Korean-listed firms, we report a significant presence of labor cost stickiness. Breaking labor costs down, we further show that labor cost stickiness is mainly attributable to the asymmetric adjustment of employment rather than that of wages. More importantly, this adjustment is more salient for males than it is for females, suggesting that managers tend to dismiss females to a greater extent than males during sales downturns than they recruit during sales upturns. In cross-sectional analyses, we present evidence that formal and informal institutions underlie the asymmetric labor adjustment. Lastly, gender differences in asymmetric labor adjustment widen the tenure gap across gender, which may contribute to the low likelihood of firms appointing and promoting female executives.

I investigate whether auditors engage in greater monitoring of acquirers during industry merger waves. Merger waves are periods of industry transformation (i.e., disruption) that are accompanied by greater uncertainty, limited internal and external corporate monitoring, and poorer acquisition performance. These factors threaten the quality of acquirers’ financial reports. I test whether auditors respond to these periods by increasing their effort, which improves audit quality, and by resigning from high-risk engagements to reduce their portfolio risk. For in-wave audits, I find that audit fees are higher, financial statements are less likely to be materially misstated, auditors are more likely to timely identify and report internal control deficiencies, and auditor resignations are higher. Overall, these findings are consistent with auditors adapting to merger waves and providing higher-quality corporate monitoring within the scope of their influence. Importantly, this study provides insights that broaden our understanding of auditing and M&A transactions.

We conjecture that a greater opportunity for audit partners to share personal industry knowledge with each other within audit offices is associated with higher audit quality. Using Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Form AP data, we analyze each partner’s client portfolio and construct sharing measures. First, we find extant measures of an audit office’s industry market share, industry portfolio share, and industry diversity are quite noisy in inferring our sharing measures. Next, we perform multivariate analyses and find negative associations between the opportunity to share industry knowledge and both restatements and absolute abnormal accruals. Further, we find this association varies cross-sectionally with other important auditor and client characteristics. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with a positive association between the opportunity for partners to share their industry knowledge with each other and audit quality.

Insurers can boost their earnings by accruing interest income from their corporate bond investments. We document that insurers have higher corporate bond investments as well as less equity and cash holdings, when their parents meet or just beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts, compared to when their parents miss or comfortably beat the forecasts. The investment in corporate bonds to boost earnings is more pronounced when bond offerings provide more opportunities for accruing interest income, when the parent’s corporate governance is weaker, when the parent’s managers have more equity incentives, when insurers face more competition, when other earnings management techniques are used, or when the insurance segment is more important to the parent. Finally, insurers suspected of helping their parents meet or beat earnings benchmarks experience worse investment performance in subsequent years, presumably because, by investing more in corporate bonds, the insurers forgo investment opportunities with higher longer-term returns.

Research concludes that managers’ political orientation influences their decision-making and offers the political connections and risk tolerance hypotheses as explanations. We investigate partisan bias as an additional way political orientation may influence managers’ decisions. Partisan bias results in individuals whose partisan orientation aligns with that of the US president expressing more optimistic economic expectations. We examine whether partisan bias is present in managers’ annual earnings forecasts. We find that firms with CEOs whose partisanship aligns with that of the US president issue more optimistically biased annual earnings forecasts than firms with other CEOs. Higher-ability CEOs, however, are less susceptible to partisan bias. Additionally, we find that overestimating customer demand contributes to the forecast over-optimism of partisan-aligned CEOs and results in greater firm overinvestment. Furthermore, investors fail to discount the news in forecasts of partisan-aligned CEOs, and their firms’ post-forecast abnormal returns are lower.