We provide an economics-based review of the pros and cons of ESG disclosures, emphasizing environmental disclosures from an investor-centric perspective. Our survey intends to guide corporate management and regulators in navigating the ESG disclosure terrain. Rather than summarizing the vast and growing ESG literature, we assess the economic arguments for ESG disclosure regulation and the form of this disclosure. We discuss investors’ demand for ESG information and its supply by publicly traded firms. We analyze the case for and against mandatory ESG disclosure. Finally, we weigh the efficiency of disclosure requirement characteristics, assuming mandatory ESG disclosure is warranted. We intend to be positive rather than prescriptive, providing a line of reasoning readers can employ to reach their own conclusions about what we ought to do.

We use unique disclosures in the insurance industry to examine whether client-engaged specialists (i.e., external actuaries) affect opportunism within the claim loss reserve. Using a fixed-effects approach, we find that external actuaries significantly affect the opportunism in the claim loss reserve, approaching half the effect of the auditor. With respect to actuary characteristics, we find a positive (negative) association between actuary permissiveness (actuary size) and opportunism in the claim loss reserve. In additional analyses, we find that the relation between actuary permissiveness and claim loss reserve opportunism is stronger when insurers have incentives to opportunistically manage the claim loss reserve. This relation continues to persist in the presence of high-quality auditors. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that client-engaged external actuaries can be used to support opportunistic claim loss reserve estimates.

We use publicly available information to estimate the country location of multinational firms’ cash holdings, examine why investors discount the value of cash held overseas, and examine whether that discount changes after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. We provide three main results. First, our firm-year foreign cash estimates are reasonably accurate, evidenced by high correlations with simulated data and proprietary country-level data, high adjusted R 2 when explaining a firm’s total cash holdings, and the ability to replicate prior findings. Second, we demonstrate that investors value foreign cash holdings more negatively than domestic cash holdings when the cash is held in high agency-cost countries. Finally, we find that investors no longer appear to discount foreign cash after the TCJA, when the U.S. moved from a worldwide to a quasi-territorial taxation system.

We study the extent to which creditors shape the executive bonus plans of their financially distressed borrowers. Financial distress can exacerbate agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers as concerns with underinvestment become more acute due to managerial myopia and debt overhang. Consequently, we expect creditors to exert their influence to ensure that these managers’ incentive-compensation plans encourage longer-term investments and directly reward outcomes that benefit creditors without exposing managers to unnecessary risk. We argue that bonus plans are an especially important way to provide these incentives because their flexibility allows creditors to more precisely target specific investment objectives. We find that borrowers’ bonus plans tend to have longer horizons and more convex payouts following covenant violations, especially when bonus plans can be a particularly effective way to address distress-related agency conflicts. Our evidence suggests that creditors protect their interests by exercising their control rights to shape their borrowers’ incentive-compensation plans.