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Multinational Corporations and Trade Structure

Review of Economic Studies 1985 52(3), 443
First, a model of horizontally and vertically integrated firms is developed. These firms are then embedded in a general equilibrium model of trading countries. It is shown how multinational corporations emerge as a result of differences across countries in factor compositions. Intersectoral, intraindustry, and intrafirm trade can coexist, and intrafirm trade takes place in invisibles (headquarter services) and intermediate inputs. It is shown how the various trade components depend on the structure of the world economy. The model predicts trade patterns which are close to observed trade patterns.

Identity Politics and Trade Policy

Review of Economic Studies 2021 88(3), 1101-1126
We characterize trade policies that result from political competition when assessments of well-being include both material and psychosocial components. The material component reflects, as usual, satisfaction from consumption. Borrowing from social identity theory, we take the psychosocial component as combining the pride and self-esteem an individual draws from the status of groups with which she identifies and a dissonance cost she bears from identifying with those that are different from herself. In this framework, changes in social identification patterns that may result, for example, from increased income inequality or heightened class or ethnic tensions, lead to pronounced changes in trade policy. We analyse the nature of these policy changes.

Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Review of Economic Studies 1996 63(2), 265
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.

Trade and Inequality: From Theory to Estimation

Review of Economic Studies 2017 84(1), 357-405
While neoclassical theory emphasizes the impact of trade on wage inequality between occupations and sectors, more recent theories of firm heterogeneity point to the impact of trade on wage dispersion within occupations and sectors. Using linked employer–employee data for Brazil, we show that much of overall wage inequality arises within sector–occupations and for workers with similar observable characteristics; this within component is driven by wage dispersion between firms; and wage dispersion between firms is related to firm employment size and trade participation. We then extend the heterogenous-firm model of trade and inequality from Helpman et al. (2010) and estimate it with Brazilian data. We show that the estimated model provides a close approximation to the observed distribution of wages and employment. We use the estimated model to undertake counterfactuals, in which we find sizable effects of trade on wage inequality.