Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as “bargaining chips” to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition’s bargaining power and lead to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g. balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than hard ones.

Abstract Due to the absence of unemployment insurance (UI) choices, the traditional approach to estimating the value of UI is to infer it from the observed consumption response to job loss under some assumption on risk preferences. Exploiting the rich data and unique policy context in Sweden, we propose two alternative approaches that relax this assumption and we implement all three methods on the same sample of workers. The first approach considers the difference in marginal propensity to consume (MPC) when unemployed versus employed, which allows to identify the difference in prices to smooth consumption in the respective states. The second approach exploits UI choices embedded in the Swedish UI system in a Revealed Preference approach. While the drop in consumption expenditures is relatively small (∼13%), we find that the MPC is around 25% higher when unemployed than employed, translating into a marginal value of transfers that is at least 60% higher when unemployed than employed. This high value of UI is confirmed by our RP estimates and indicates substantial risk aversion given the relatively small drop in consumption expenditures.

Abstract We study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic Spence (1973, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355—374) model of job market signalling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e., their expertise. In equilibrium, some high-type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better informed firms, which make positive profits. Workers’ education decisions and firms’ use of their expertise are strategic complements, allowing for multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. We characterize wage dispersion and the extent of signalling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms. Our model can also be applied to a variety of other signalling problems, including securitization, corporate financial structure, insurance markets, or dividend policy.

Abstract Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.

Abstract We study default effects in the context of a residential electricity-pricing program. In the large-scale randomized controlled trial we analyse, one treatment group was given the option to opt-in to time-varying pricing while another was defaulted into the program but allowed to opt-out. We provide dramatic evidence of a default effect on program participation, consistent with previous research. A novel feature of our study is that we also observe how the default manipulation impacts customers’ subsequent electricity consumption. Passive consumers who did not opt-out but would not have opted in—comprising more than 70% of the sample—nonetheless reduce consumption in response to higher prices. Observing of this follow-on behaviour enables us to assess competing explanations for the default effect. We draw conclusions about the likely welfare effects of defaulting customers onto time-varying pricing.

Abstract The willingness to pay for insurance captures the value of insurance against only the risk that remains when choices are observed. This article develops tools to measure the ex ante expected utility impact of insurance subsidies and mandates when choices are observed after some insurable information is revealed. The approach retains the transparency of using reduced-form willingness to pay and cost curves, but it adds one additional sufficient statistic: the percentage difference in marginal utilities between insured and uninsured. I provide an approach to estimate this additional statistic that uses only the reduced-form willingness to pay curve, combined with a measure of risk aversion. I compare the approach to structural approaches that require fully specifying the choice environment and information sets of individuals. I apply the approach using existing willingness to pay and cost curve estimates from the low-income health insurance exchange in Massachusetts. Ex ante optimal insurance prices are roughly 30% lower than prices that maximize observed market surplus. While mandates reduce market surplus, the results suggest they would actually increase ex ante expected utility.

Abstract Unlike in standard models, decision makers often narrowly bracket and make each decision in isolation. I develop a new approach, which I term narrow thinking, to systematically model narrow bracketing. The definition of narrow thinking is that different decisions are based on different, non-nested, information. As a result, the narrow thinker makes each decision with imperfect knowledge of other decisions and faces difficulties coordinating her multiple decisions. The narrow thinker effectively cares less about her other decisions when making each decision. The main application of narrow thinking is to provide a smooth model of mental accounting without requiring the decision maker to have explicit budgets. My approach generates unique predictions about how the degree of mental accounting depends on expenditure shares and cognitive limitations. It also illustrates how narrow bracketing and mental accounting can be explained by the same underlying friction.

Abstract What is the role of monetary policy in a bubbly world? To address this question, we study an economy in which financial frictions limit the supply of assets. The ensuing scarcity generates a demand for “unbacked” assets, i.e., assets that are backed only by the expectation of their future value. We consider two types of unbacked assets: bubbles, which are created by the private sector, and money, which is created by the central bank. Bubbles and money share many features, but they also differ in two crucial respects. First, while the rents from the creation of bubbles accrue to entrepreneurs and foster investment, the rents from money creation accrue to the central bank. Second, while bubbles are driven by market psychology, and can rise and fall according to the whims of the market, money is under the control of the central bank. We characterize the optimal monetary policy and show that, through its ability to supply assets, monetary policy plays a key role in the bubbly world. The model sheds light on the recent expansion of central bank liabilities in response to the bursting of bubbles.

Abstract A long-standing question about consumer behaviour is whether individuals’ observed purchase decisions satisfy the revealed preference (RP) axioms of the utility maximization theory (UMT). Researchers using survey or experimental panel data sets on prices and consumption to answer this question face the well-known problem of measurement error. We show that ignoring measurement error in the RP approach may lead to overrejection of the UMT. To solve this problem, we propose a new statistical RP framework for consumption panel data sets that allows for testing the UMT in the presence of measurement error. Our test is applicable to all consumer models that can be characterized by their first-order conditions. Our approach is non-parametric, allows for unrestricted heterogeneity in preferences and requires only a centring condition on measurement error. We develop two applications that provide new evidence about the UMT. First, we find support in a survey data set for the dynamic and time-consistent UMT in single-individual households, in the presence of nonclassical measurement error in consumption. In the second application, we cannot reject the static UMT in a widely used experimental data set in which measurement error in prices is assumed to be the result of price misperception due to the experimental design. The first finding stands in contrast to the conclusions drawn from the deterministic RP test of Browning (1989, International Economic Review, 979–992). The second finding reverses the conclusions drawn from the deterministic RP test of Afriat (1967, International Economic Review, 8, 6–77) and Varian (1982, Econometrica, 945–973).

Abstract Can attitudes towards minorities, an important cultural trait, be changed? We show that the presence of African American soldiers in the UK during World War II reduced anti-minority prejudice, a result of the positive interactions which took place between soldiers and the local population. The change has been persistent: in locations in which more African American soldiers were posted there are fewer members of and voters for the UK’s leading far-right party, less implicit bias against blacks and fewer individuals professing racial prejudice, all measured around 2010. Our results point towards intergenerational transmission from parents to children as the most likely explanation.