Knowledge that Transforms

We establish that macroprudential controls limiting capital flows can curb risks arising from foreign currency borrowing by corporates in emerging markets. Firm-level data show that Indian firms tend to issue more foreign currency debt when the interest rate differential between India and the U.S. is higher. This “carry trade” relationship, however, breaks down once regulators institute more stringent interest rate caps on borrowing; in response, riskier borrowers cut issuance most. Prior to adoption of this macroprudential measure, stock price exposure of issuers to currency risk rises after issuance, as witnessed during the “taper tantrum” episode of 2013; this source of vulnerability is nullified by the measure, as confirmed during the October 2018 oil price shock and the COVID-19 outbreak. We find no evidence of the policy’s efficacy being undermined by leakage or regulatory arbitrage.

This article studies the origins and function of customs and norms that intend to keep women from being promiscuous. Using large-scale survey data from more than 100 countries, I test the anthropological theory that a particular form of pre-industrial subsistence—pastoralism—favoured the adoption of such customs and norms. Pastoralism was characterized by frequent and often extended periods of male absence from the settlement, implying difficulties in monitoring women’s behaviour and larger incentives to imposing restrictions on women’s promiscuity. The article shows that women from historically more pastoral societies (i) are subject to stronger anti-abortion attitudes; (ii) are more likely to have undergone infibulation, the most invasive form of female genital cutting; (iii) are more restricted in their freedom of mobility; and (iv) adhere to more restrictive norms about women’s promiscuity. At the historical society level, pastoralism predicts patrilocality, the custom of living close to the husband’s family after marriage, allowing them to monitor the bride. Instrumental variable estimations that make use of the ecological determinants of pastoralism support a causal interpretation of the results. I also provide evidence that the mechanism behind these patterns is male absence, rather than male dominance, per se, or historical economic development.

We study dynamic signalling when the sender does not see the signals that her actions generate. The sender then uses her past play to forecast what a receiver believes, in turn forcing the receiver to forecast the previous forecast, and so forth. We identify a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian games where this endogenous higher-order uncertainty can be handled. The sender’s second-order belief is key: it is a private state that she controls, and it creates a new channel for information transmission. We examine the role of higher-order uncertainty and this new signalling channel in applications to macroeconomics, reputation, and trading: inflationary biases under discretion can be larger; career-concerned agents may benefit from not knowing their reputations; and informed trades can carry more price impact. We also introduce an existence method for boundary value problems that can be used in other dynamic games.

This article provides a general framework to study the role of production networks in international GDP comovement. We first derive an additive decomposition of bilateral GDP comovement into components capturing shock transmission and shock correlation. We quantify this decomposition in a parsimonious multi-country, multi-sector dynamic network propagation model, using data for the G7 countries over the period 1978–2007. Our main finding is that while the network transmission of shocks is quantitatively important, it accounts for a minority of observed comovement under the estimated range of structural elasticities. Contemporaneous responses to correlated shocks in the production network are more successful at generating comovement than intertemporal propagation through capital accumulation. Extensions with multiple shocks, nominal rigidities, and international financial integration leave our main result unchanged. A combination of TFP and labour supply shocks is quantitatively successful at reproducing the observed international business cycle.

How do people form beliefs about novel risks, with which they have little or no experience? Motivated by survey data on beliefs about COVID we collected in 2020, we build a model based on the psychology of selective memory. When a person thinks about an event, different experiences compete for retrieval, and retrieved experiences are used to simulate the event based on how similar they are to it. The model predicts that different experiences interfere with each other in recall and that non-domain-specific experiences can bias beliefs based on their similarity to the assessed event. We test these predictions using data from our COVID survey and from a primed-recall experiment about cyberattack risk. In line with our theory of similarity-based retrieval and simulation, experiences and their measured similarity to the cued event help account for experience effects, priming effects, and the interaction of the two in shaping beliefs.

What generates the observed differences in economic outcomes by health? How costly it is to be unhealthy? We show that health dynamics are largely driven by ex-ante fixed heterogeneity, or health types, even when controlling for one’s past health history. In fact, health types are the key driver of long spells of bad health. We incorporate these rich health dynamics in an estimated structural model and show that health types and their correlation with other fixed characteristics are important to account for the observed gap in economic outcomes by health. Monetary and welfare losses due to bad health over the life-cycle are large, concentrated, and to a large extent due to factors pre-determined earlier in life. A large portion of the related monetary costs is due to income losses, especially for people of working age, while a substantial portion of the welfare losses arises because health affects life expectancy.

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer’s valuations within a set of distributions, called an “ambiguity” set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling, which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases.

Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (e.g. court, arbitration, or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held justifiability/strength of their claims. A justified party issues an ultimatum for resolution whenever possible, but an unjustified party strategically bluffs with an ultimatum to establish a reputation for being justified. We show that the availability of external resolution opportunities can benefit or hurt an unjustified party in equilibrium. When the chances of being justified become negligible, agreement is immediate and efficient; and if the set of justifiable demands is rich, our solution modifies the Nash–Rubinstein bargaining solution of Abreu and Gul ((2000), Econometrica, 68, 85–117) in a simple way.

Neither theory nor existing empirical evidence support the notion that wealth taxation reduces saving. Theoretically, the effect is ambiguous due to opposing income and substitution effects. Empirically, the effect may be masked by misreporting responses. Using geographic discontinuities in the Norwegian annual net-wealth tax and third-party-reported data on savings, I find that wealth taxation causes households to save more. Each additional NOK of wealth tax increases annual net financial saving by 3.76, implying that households increase saving enough to offset both current and future wealth taxes. This positive effect on saving is primarily financed by increases in labour earnings. These responses are the combination of small negative effects of increasing the marginal tax rates and larger positive effects of increasing average rates. My findings imply that income effects may dominate substitution effects in household responses to rate-of-return shocks, which has implications for both optimal taxation and macroeconomic modelling.

An information-based model is developed where traditional and digital advertising finance the provision of free media goods and affect price competition. Digital advertising is directed toward specific consumers while traditional advertising is undirected. The equilibrium is suboptimal. Media goods, if valued by the consumer, are under provided with both types of advertising. Additionally, traditional advertising is excessive because it is undirected. The tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these inefficiencies is characterized. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Through the lens of the calibrated model, digital advertising increases welfare significantly. The welfare gain from the optimal policy is much smaller than the gain from digital advertising.