Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We study the strategic impact of players’ higher-order uncertainty over the observability of actions in general two-player games. More specifically, we consider the space of all belief hierarchies generated by the uncertainty over whether the game will be played as a static game or with perfect information. Over this space, we characterize the correspondence of a solution concept which captures the behavioural implications of Rationality and Common Belief in Rationality (RCBR), where “rationality” is understood as sequential whenever the game is dynamic. We show that such a correspondence is generically single-valued, and that its structure supports a robust refinement of rationalizability, which often has very sharp implications. For instance, (1) in a class of games which includes both zero-sum games with a pure equilibrium and coordination games with a unique efficient equilibrium, RCBR generically ensures efficient equilibrium outcomes (eductive coordination); (2) in a class of games which also includes other well-known families of coordination games, RCBR generically selects components of the Stackelberg profiles (Stackelberg selection); (3) if it is commonly known that player 2’s action is not observable (e.g. because 1 is commonly known to move earlier, etc.), in a class of games which includes all of the above RCBR generically selects the equilibrium of the static game most favourable to player 1 (pervasiveness of first-mover advantage).

Abstract We study the interaction between the currency choice of private domestic contracts and optimal monetary policy. The optimal currency choice depends on the price risk of each currency, as well as on the covariance of its price and the relative consumption needs of the agents signing the contract. When a larger share of contracts is denominated in local currency, the government can use inflation more effectively to either redistribute resources or reduce default costs, which makes local currency more attractive for private contracts. When governments lack commitment, competitive equilibria can be constrained inefficient, thus providing a reason to regulate the currency choice of private contracts. We show that both the equilibrium use of local currency and the implications for regulation depend on the level of domestic policy risk. Our model can explain the wide use of the US dollar in international trade contracts and the observed hysteresis in dollarization.

Abstract Theory predicts that central-bank lending programs put ceilings on private domestic lending rates, reduce ex post financing risk, and encourage ex ante investment. This article shows that with global banks and integrated financial markets, but domestic central banks, then lending of last resort can be achieved using swap lines. Through them, a source central bank provides source-currency credit to recipient-country banks using the recipient central bank as the monitor and as the bearer of the credit risk. In theory, the swap lines should put a ceiling on deviations from covered interest parity, lower average ex post bank borrowing costs, and increase ex ante inflows from recipient-country banks into privately issued assets denominated in the source-country’s currency. Empirically, these three predictions are tested using variation in the terms of the swap line over time, variation in the central banks that have access to the swap line, variation in the days of the week in which the swap line is open, variation in the exposure of different securities to foreign investment, and variation in banks’ exposure to dollar funding risk. The evidence suggests that the international lender of last resort is very effective.

Abstract We propose a model in which the emergence of a single dominant currency is driven by the need to finance international trade. The model generates multiple stable steady states, each characterized by a different dominant asset, consistent with the historical durability of real-world currency regimes. The persistence of regimes is caused by a positive interaction between the returns to saving in an asset and the use of that asset for financing trade. A calibrated version of the model shows that the welfare gains of dominance are substantial, but accrue primarily during the transition to dominance. We perform several counterfactual experiments to assess potential threats to the dollar’s continued dominance.

Abstract What happens when immigrant girls are given increased opportunities to integrate into the workplace and society, but their parents value more traditional cultural outcomes? We answer this question in the context of a reform which granted automatic birthright citizenship to eligible immigrant children born in Germany after 1 January 2000. Using survey data, we collected from students in 57 schools and comparing those born in the months before vs. after the reform, we find the introduction of birthright citizenship lowers measures of life satisfaction and self-esteem for immigrant girls by 0.32 and 0.25 standard deviations, respectively. This is especially true for Muslims, where parents are likely to prefer more traditional cultural outcomes than their daughters. Moreover, we find that Muslim girls granted birthright citizenship are less integrated into German society: they are both more socially isolated and less likely to self-identify as German. Exploring mechanisms for these unintended drops in well-being and assimilation, we find that immigrant Muslim parents invest less in their daughters’ schooling and that these daughters receive worse grades in school if they are born after the reform. Parents are also less likely to speak German with these daughters. Consistent with a rise in intra-family conflict, birthright citizenship results in disillusionment where immigrant Muslim girls believe their chances of achieving their educational goals are lower and the perceived odds of having to forgo a career for a family rise. In contrast, immigrant boys experience, if anything, an improvement in well-being, integration, and schooling outcomes. Taken together, the findings point towards immigrant girls being pushed by parents to conform to a role within traditional culture, whereas boys are allowed to take advantage of the opportunities that come with citizenship. To explain these findings, we construct a simple game-theoretic model which builds on Akerlof and Kranton (2000), where identity-concerned parents constrain their daughter’s choices, and hence lower their daughter’s well-being, when faced with the threat of integration. Alternative models can explain some of the findings in isolation.

Abstract We study the effects of parameter uncertainty prompted by structural breaks. In our model, agents respond differently to uncertainty prompted by regime shifts in shock processes than they react to comparable perceived increases in shock volatility. The magnitude of the response to an increase in uncertainty about TFP associated with a structural break is greater than that of a response to a comparable perceived rise in volatility. This is because lifetime utility varies more when shocks shift beliefs and perceived wealth.

Abstract This article considers a class of experimentation games with Lévy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999, Econometrica, 67, 349–374) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005, Econometrica, 73, 39–68). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever players’ payoffs have a diffusion component. Hence, the trade-offs emphasized in the literature do not rely on the intrinsic nature of bandit models but on the commonly adopted solution concept (Markov perfect equilibrium). This is not an artefact of continuous time: we prove that efficient equilibria arise as limits of equilibria in the discrete-time game. Furthermore, it suffices to relax the solution concept to strongly symmetric equilibrium.

Abstract The discovery of massive deposits of precious metals in America during the early modern period caused an exogenous monetary injection to Europe’s money supply. I use this episode to identify the causal effects of money. Using a panel of six European countries, I find that monetary expansions had a material impact on real economic activity. The magnitudes are substantial and persist for a long time: an exogenous 10% increase in the production of precious metals in America measured relative to the European stock leads to a front-loaded response of output and, to a lesser extent, inflation. There was a positive hump-shaped response of real GDP, with a cumulative increase up to 0.9% six to nine years later. The evidence suggests that this is because prices responded to monetary injections with considerable lags.

Abstract We devise a tractable model of firm dynamics with on-the-job search. The model admits analytical solutions for equilibrium outcomes, including quit, layoff, hiring, and vacancy-filling rates, as well as the distributions of job values, a fundamental challenge posed by the environment. Optimal labor demand takes a novel form whereby hiring firms allow their marginal product to diffuse over an interval. The evolution of the marginal product over this interval endogenously exhibits gradual mean reversion, evoking a notion of imperfect labor market competition. This in turn contributes to dispersion in marginal products, giving rise to endogenous misallocation. Quantitatively, the model provides a parsimonious reconciliation of leading estimates of rent sharing, the negative association between wages and quits, the link between job and worker flows, and the cyclicality of labor market quantities and prices.

Abstract In many centralized matching markets, agents’ property rights over objects are derived from a coarse transformation of an underlying score. Prominent examples include the distance-based system employed by Boston Public Schools, where students who lived within a certain radius of each school were prioritized over all others, and the income-based system used in New York public housing allocation, where eligibility is determined by a sharp income cutoff. Motivated by this, we study how to optimally coarsen an underlying score. Our main result is that, for any continuous objective function and under stable matching mechanisms, the optimal design can be attained by splitting agents into at most three indifference classes for each object. We provide insights into this design problem in three applications: distance-based scores in Boston Public Schools, test-based scores for Chicago exam schools, and income-based scores in New York public housing allocation.