Knowledge that Transforms

This article shows that individual-level heterogeneity in survival expectations derived from subjective survey information improves the out-of-sample predictions of a dynamic model of retirement and saving. We consider three approaches to modelling survival: life tables, average subjective expectations, and individual-specific estimates based on reported survival probabilities. The models are estimated using Dutch data from the 1990s, a period during which workers could retire from age 59 at no penalty to pension benefits. Actuarial adjustments were introduced in the early 2000s, and we use data from the period 2006–16 to evaluate the accuracy of the counterfactual predictions. While the three models yield different preference estimates, their within-sample fit is similar. Out-of-sample forecasts do differ markedly. The models with homogeneous expectations anticipate a 4- or 5-year increase in the average retirement age in the new regime, compared with an observed increase of 2.6 years. The model with heterogeneous expectations predicts a more realistic increase of 2.7 years. Expectations matter when it comes to counterfactual predictions, even if different combinations of preferences and expectations appear equivalent within a given institutional setting.

We propose that a person’s desire to consume an object or possess an attribute increases in how much others want but cannot have it. We term this motive imitative superiority-seeking and show that it generates preferences for exclusion that help explain a host of market anomalies and make novel predictions in a variety of domains. In bilateral exchange, trade becomes more zero-sum, leading to an endowment effect. People’s value of consuming a good increases in its scarcity, which generates a motive for firms and organizations to engage in exclusionary policies. A monopolist producing at constant marginal cost can increase profits by randomly excluding buyers relative to the standard optimal mechanism of posting a common price. In the context of auctions, a seller can extract greater revenues by randomly barring a subset of consumers from bidding. Moreover, such non-price-based exclusion leads to higher revenues than the classic optimal sales mechanism. A series of experiments provides direct support for these predictions. In basic exchange, a person’s willingness to pay for a good increases as more people are explicitly barred from the opportunity to acquire it. In auctions, randomly excluding people from the opportunity to bid substantially increases bids amongst those who retain this option. Consistent with our predictions, exclusion leads to bigger gains in expected revenue than increasing competition through inclusion. Our model of superiority-seeking generates “Veblen effects,” rationalizes attitudes against redistribution and provides a novel motive for social exclusion and discrimination.

We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.

A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type vector is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known prior distribution. The seller chooses a mechanism to maximize her worst-case profits against all possible signals from which the buyer can learn about his values for the goods. We show that it is robustly optimal for the seller to bundle goods with identical demands (these are goods that can be permuted without changing the buyer’s prior type distribution). Consequently, pure bundling is robustly optimal for exchangeable prior distributions. For exchangeable priors, pure bundling is also optimal for the seller in the information environment (with the reverse timing) where an information designer, with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus, first selects a signal for the buyer, and then the seller chooses an optimal mechanism in response. We derive a formal relationship between the seller’s problem in both information environments.

This paper develops a method to estimate workers’ outside employment opportunities. We outline a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, from which we derive a sufficient statistic, the “outside options index” (OOI), for the effect of outside options on earnings, holding worker productivity constant. The OOI uses the cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across job types to quantify workers’ outside options as a function of workers’ commuting costs, preferences, and skills. Using German micro-data, we find that differences in options explain 20% of the gender earnings gap, and that gender gaps in options are mostly due to differences in the implicit costs of commuting and moving.

We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children's long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001-13 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration's NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975. We find that children with access to greater economic resources before age five have better outcomes as adults. The treatment-on-the-treated effects show a 6% of a standard deviation improvement in human capital, 3% of a standard deviation increase in economic self-sufficiency, 8% of a standard deviation increase in the quality of neighbourhood of residence, a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy, and a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in likelihood of being incarcerated. These estimates suggest that Food Stamps' transfer of resources to families is a highly cost-effective investment in young children, yielding a marginal value of public funds of approximately sixty-two.

We use customs data for Irish firms to show that in successful episodes of export market entry, there are statistically and economically significant post-entry dynamics of quantities, but not of mark-ups. To match these moments, we structurally estimate a model where firms can invest in future customer base through two channels: by selling more today, and by spending on marketing and advertising. Our estimates suggest that customer base is insensitive to lagged sales, so firms have no incentive to engage in dynamic pricing to accumulate customers. Instead, investment in customer base through marketing and advertising explains the dynamics of quantities. The ratio of advertising and marketing expenditures to sales implied by the model is consistent with data from other sources. Our estimated model generates long-run export responses to permanent tariff changes that are bigger than short run responses, as well as responses that are increasing in the expected persistence of tariff shocks, contributing to our understanding of the International Elasticity Puzzle.

This paper examines whether monetary policy pass-through to mortgage interest rates affects household fertility decisions. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in households’ eligibility for a rate adjustment, coupled with the large reductions in the monetary policy rate that occurred during the Great Recession in the U.K. and U.S. We estimate that each one percentage point drop in the policy rate increased birth rates amongst households eligible for a rate adjustment by 3%. Our results provide new evidence on the nature of monetary policy transmission to households and suggest a new mechanism via which mortgage contract structures can affect both aggregate demand and supply.

We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contracts are never part of equilibrium; (2) mispricing of claims faced by the seller is always greater than in exclusive markets; (3) there is always a semi-pooling equilibrium where all sellers issue the same debt contract priced at average-valuation, and sellers of low-quality assets issue remaining cash flows at low-valuation; (4) market liquidity can be higher or lower than in exclusive markets, but (5) the average quality of originated assets is always lower. Our model’s predictions are consistent with empirical evidence on the issuance and pricing of mortgage-backed securities, and we use the theory to evaluate recent reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and exclusivity in markets.

We examine two key channels through which commodity price super-cycles affect the economy: a wealth channel, through which higher commodity prices increase domestic demand, and a cost channel, through which they induce wage increases. By exploiting regional variation in exposure to commodity price shocks and administrative firm-level data from Brazil, we empirically disentangle these transmission channels. We introduce a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and workers to further quantify the mechanisms and evaluate welfare. A counterfactual economy in which commodity booms are purely endowment shocks experiences only 30% of the intersectoral labour reallocation between tradables and nontradables, and 40% of the within-tradable labour reallocation between domestic and exported production. Finally, the consumption-equivalent welfare gain of a commodity super-cycle is twice as large in the counterfactual economy.