Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We show that the creation of the first integrated multi-modal pan-European transport network during Roman times influences economic integration over two millennia. Drawing on spatially highly disaggregated data on excavated Roman ceramics, we document that contemporary interregional trade was influenced by connectivity within the network. Today, these connectivity differentials continue to influence integration as approximated by cross-regional firm investment behaviour. Continuity is partly explained by selective infrastructure routing and cultural integration due to bilateral convergence in preferences and values. We show that our results are Roman-connectivity specific and do not reflect pre-existing patterns of exchange using pre-Roman trade data.

Abstract We revisit the question of why shifts in aggregate demand drive business cycles. Our theory combines intertemporal substitution in production with rational confusion, or bounded rationality, in consumption and investment. The first element allows aggregate supply to respond to shifts in aggregate demand without nominal rigidity. The second introduces a “confidence multiplier,” that is, a positive feedback loop between real economic activity, consumer expectations of permanent income, and investor expectations of returns. This mechanism amplifies the business-cycle fluctuations triggered by demand shocks (but not necessarily those triggered by supply shocks); it helps investment to comove with consumption; and it allows front-loaded fiscal stimuli to crowd in private spending.

Abstract We develop a simple flexible-price model of business cycles driven by spikes in risk premiums. Aggregate shocks increase firms’ uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and raise risk premiums. We show that risk shocks can create quantitatively plausible recessions, with contractions in employment, consumption, and investment. Business cycles are inefficient—output, employment, and consumption fall too much during recessions, compared to the constrained-efficient allocation. Optimal policy involves stimulating employment and consumption during recessions.

Abstract Banks in low-income countries face severe liquidity risk due to volatile deposits, which destabilize their funding, and dysfunctional liquidity markets, which induce expensive interbank and central bank lending. Such liquidity risk dissuades the transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans and deters long-term investment. To validate this mechanism, we exploit a Sharia-compliant levy in Pakistan, which generates unintended and quasi-experimental variation in liquidity risk, with data from the credit registry and firm imports. We find that banks with a stronger exposure to liquidity risk lower their supply of long-term finance, which reduces the long-term investment of connected firms.

Abstract We construct and calibrate a monetary model of corporate finance with endogenous formation of lending relationships. The equilibrium features money demands by firms that depend on their access to credit and a pecking order of financing means. We describe the mechanism through which monetary policy affects the creation of relationships and firms’ incentives to use internal or external finance. We study optimal monetary policy following an unanticipated destruction of relationships under different commitment assumptions. The Ramsey solution uses forward guidance to expedite creation of new relationships by committing to raise the user cost of cash gradually above its long-run value. Absent commitment, the user cost is kept low, delaying recovery.

Abstract China’s economic model involves regular and intensive government interventions in financial markets, while Western policymakers often refrain from substantial interventions outside crisis periods. We develop a theoretical framework to rationalize the approaches of both China and the West to managing the financial system as being optimal given the differences in their respective economies. In this framework, a government leans against trading of noise traders but at the expense of introducing policy noise to the market. Our welfare analysis shows that under certain underlying economic conditions, the optimal government policy induces a government-centric equilibrium, in which government intervention is so intensive that all investors choose to acquire private information about policy noise rather than fundamentals. This policy regime characterizes China’s approach with financial stability prioritized over other policy objectives.

Abstract Time series methods for identifying structural economic disturbances often require disturbances to satisfy technical conditions that can be inconsistent with economic theory. We propose replacing these conditions with a less restrictive condition called recoverability, which only requires that the disturbances can be inferred from the observable variables. As an application, we show how shifting attention to recoverability makes it possible to construct new identifying restrictions for technological and expectational disturbances. In a vector autoregressive example using post-war U.S. data, these restrictions imply that independent disturbances to expectations about future technology are a major driver of business cycles.

Abstract We build a theory of financial intermediation based on the premise that some investors are better able to figure out the trade motives of their counterparties in bilateral meetings—screening experts. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and study how information asymmetries stemming from heterogeneity in screening expertise shape up the core–periphery trade structure. In particular, the core of the market is populated by screening experts: they have the largest share of trade volume, they are actively engaged in middleman activity, and trade with the most counterparties. Using transaction-level micro-data and information disclosure requirements, we provide extensive evidence consistent only with our theory of financial intermediation.

Abstract We study rules based on instruments versus targets. Our application is a New Keynesian economy where the central bank has non-contractible information about aggregate demand shocks and cannot commit to policy. Incentives are provided to the central bank via punishment which is socially costly. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the central bank’s observable choice of policy, whereas target-based rules condition incentives on the outcomes of policy, such as inflation, which depend on both the policy choice and realized shocks. We show that the optimal rule within each class takes a threshold form, imposing the worst punishment upon violation. Target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if and only if the central bank’s information is sufficiently precise, and they are relatively more attractive the less severe the central bank’s commitment problem. The optimal unconstrained rule relaxes the instrument threshold whenever the target threshold is satisfied.

Abstract We develop a model where risk-averse workers can costly invest in their skills before matching with heterogenous firms. At the investment stage, workers face multiple sources of risk. They are uncertain about how skilled they will turn out and also about their income shock realizations at the time of employment. We analyse the equilibria of two versions of the model that depend on when uncertainty resolves, which determines the available risk-sharing possibilities between workers and firms. We provide a thorough analysis of equilibrium comparative statics regarding changes in risk, worker and firm heterogeneity, and technology. We derive conditions on the match output function and risk attitudes under which these shifts lead to more investment and show how this affects matching and wages. To illustrate the applied relevance of our theory, we provide a stylized quantitative assessment of the model and analyse the sources (risk, heterogeneity, or technology) of rising U.S. wage inequality. We find that changes in risk were the most important driver behind the surge in inequality, followed by technological change. We show that these conclusions are significantly altered if one neglects the key feature of our model, which is that educational investment is endogenous.