This paper presents an incentive-based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks. The paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1991), Phelan and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992). By incorporating aggregate production shocks, the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance. Further, the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985).

We analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal-agent model. Contract renegotiation offers are made by the agent. A refinement is imposed on the principal's beliefs: if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal's and the agent's contracts, the principal believes that that action has been taken. With the refinement imposed, perfect-Bayesian equilibrium allocations are identical to the second best in the classical principal-agent model without renegotiation. When renegotiation is led by the agent and when equilibria satisfy the refinement, equilibrium allocations are ex ante efficient.

Credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern Nigeria. Repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders. The paper develops two models of state-contingent loans. The first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts. The second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default. Estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state-contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk-pooling equilibrium is not achieved. The research is based on a year-long survey in Zaria, Nigeria, conducted by the author. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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In dynamic models of unemployment in which the employed consume more than the unemployed, workers are finitely lived, and jobs are lasting, employment transfers consumption from future generations to those currently alive, resulting in a social surplus. That is, these transfers allow the current generation to consume more than its share of the output produced during its lifetime, without the increased consumption coming at the expense of future generations. Moreover, due to these intergenerational transfers, the allocation that maximizes steady-state output is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation with a higher level of steady-state employment.

In this paper, the authors model a job-specific shock process in the matching model of unemployment with noncooperative wage behavior. They obtain endogenous job creation and job destruction processes and study their properties. The authors show that an aggregate shock induces negative correlation between job creation and job destruction, whereas a dispersion shock induces positive correlation. The job destruction process is shown to have more volatile dynamics than the job creation process. In simulations, the authors show that an aggregate shock process proxies reasonably well the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction in the United States. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

In this paper, we analyse the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a particular class of monopolistic rational expectations models. We show the equivalence between the Kyle (1985) model of insider trading where the insider observes the amount of noise trading and the Kyle (1989) model of informed speculation when there is one risk-neutral insider and many risk-neutral market makers. We show that in these two equivalent models: (i) There exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty; (ii) This equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the informed agent under incentive compatibility constraints. We extend our results to a class of signalling games.

In this paper we investigate the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds using the hierarchy of finance approach to corporate finance. We characterize the empirical implications of this approach for dynamic investment models and test these implications using firm-level data. The model we estimate is based on the Euler equation for optimal capital accumulation in the presence of convex adjustment costs. The theoretical model explicitly allows for debt finance and financial assets. The empirical investigation uses U.K. company panel data to estimate dynamic investment models using GMM and tests the derived implications.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the parameters of household preferences that determine the allocation of goods within the period and over the life cycle, using micro data. In doing so we are able to identify important effects of demographics, labour market status and other household characteristics on the intertemporal allocation of expenditure. We test the validity of the life-cycle model using excess sensitivity tests and find that controlling for demographics and labour market status variables can largely explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to anticipated changes in income.