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Disclosure and Choice

Review of Economic Studies 2018 85(3), 1471-1501
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient: the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk{averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff.

Uncertainty Shocks, Asset Supply and Pricing over the Business Cycle

Review of Economic Studies 2018 85(2), 810-854
This article estimates a business cycle model with endogenous financial asset supply and ambiguity averse investors. Firms’ shareholders choose not only production and investment, but also capital structure and payout policy subject to financial frictions. An increase in uncertainty about profits lowers stock prices and leads firms to substitute away from debt as well as reduce shareholder payout. This mechanism parsimoniously accounts for the postwar comovement in investment, stock prices, leverage, and payout, at both business cycle and medium term cycle frequencies. Ambiguity aversion permits a Markov-switching VAR representation of the model, while preserving the effect of uncertainty shocks on the time variation in the equity premium.