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Structure of the Correspondence Principle at an Extremum Point

Review of Economic Studies 1980 47(5), 987-997
Journal Article Structure of the Correspondence Principle at an Extremum Point Get access Tatsuo Hatta Tatsuo Hatta Johns Hopkins University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 47, Issue 5, October 1980, Pages 987–997, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296928 Published: 01 October 1980 Article history Received: 01 January 1978 Accepted: 01 February 1980 Published: 01 October 1980

On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy

Review of Economic Studies 1971 38(1), 23 open access
A famous paper by Conrad and Meyer calculates that on the eve of the American Civil War, slave prices were about equal to the present values of the slaves' labor services. They argue that this is evidence for the proposition that ordinary economic forces, without political intervention were not likely to put an end to slavery.I wrote this paper when pretty much the only economics that I knew was 1) how to prove the existence of competitive general equilibrium. 2) how to calculate present values. So the paper does two things. It shows how to apply Arrow-Debreu type existence theory to an economy with slavery. (this involved some technical wrinkles that were not in the existing existence literature.) More importantly, it argues that the calculations of Conrad and Meyer showed only that capital markets for slaves were working pretty well, but were not direcly relevant to the question of whether slavery as an institution was economically viable. To answer the latter question, we need to calculate two things. 1) Does an infant slave have positive present value? [If not, reproduction would be discouraged.] 2) Would a freed adult slave, perhaps because of the better incentives and opportunities for free people, be able to earn more than enough on the labor market to repay his or her market price to a slaveowner. I investigate the latter two questions empirically. The answer to the first question is "Yes". Spotty evidence suggests that the answer to the second question was also often "Yes."

A Note on a Covariance Matrix with Its Application to the Two-Parameter Hypothesis on Risky-Asset Choice

Review of Economic Studies 1969 36(2), 254
Journal Article A Note on a Covariance Matrix with its Application to the Two-Parameter Hypothesis on Risky-Asset Choice Get access T. Ichiishi T. Ichiishi Keio University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 2, April 1969, Pages 254–256, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296842 Published: 01 April 1969 Article history Received: 29 February 1968 Revision received: 31 October 1968 Published: 01 April 1969

A Note on the Economics of Retaliation

Review of Economic Studies 1944 11(2), 86
A Note on the Economics of Retaliation Get access T. Balogh T. Balogh Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1944, Pages 86–90, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295969 Published: 01 January 1944

The Burden of Death Duties in Terms of an Annual Tax

Review of Economic Studies 1941 9(1), 28-39
Journal Article The Burden of Death Duties in Terms of an Annual Tax Get access Tibor Barna Tibor Barna Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, November 1941, Pages 28–39, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967636 Published: 01 November 1941

Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility

Review of Economic Studies 2014 81(4), 1668-1707
We provide a solution to the informed-principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation. We show that there is no distortion: all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante, before he/she learns his/her type. As an application, we consider settings with linear utility. For bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders, the solution is a combination of a participation fee, a buy-out option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices.

Import Substitution Policies: A Two-Sector, Fix-Price Model

Review of Economic Studies 1981 48(2), 327
Journal Article Import Substitution Policies: A Two-Sector, Fix-Price Model Get access John T. Cuddington John T. Cuddington Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 2, April 1981, Pages 327–342, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296889 Published: 01 April 1981 Article history Received: 01 November 1979 Accepted: 01 September 1980 Published: 01 April 1981

The Aggregate Excess Demand Correspondence and the Structure of Economies with Externalities

Review of Economic Studies 1975 42(4), 597
Journal Article The Aggregate Excess Demand Correspondence and the Structure of Economies with Externalities Get access D. T. Scheffman D. T. Scheffman University of Western Ontario Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 42, Issue 4, October 1975, Pages 597–604, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296796 Published: 01 October 1975