Knowledge that Transforms

At the beginning of the past financial crisis sponsoring banks rescued their structured investment vehicles (SIVs) despite of lack of contractual obligation to do so. I show that this outcome may arise as the equilibrium of a signaling game between banks and their debt investors when a negative shock affects the correlated asset returns of a fraction of banks and their sponsored vehicles. The rescue is interpreted as a good signal and reduces the refinancing costs of the sponsoring bank. If banks’ leverage is high or the negative shock is sizable enough, the equilibrium is a pooling one in which all banks rescue. When the aggregate financial sector is close to insolvency, banks’ expected net worth would increase if rescues were banned. The model can be extended to discuss the circumstances in which all banks collapse after rescuing their vehicles.

We investigate whether acquiring more primary education has long-term effects on risk-taking behavior in financial markets. Using exogenous variation in education from a compulsory schooling change combined with wealth data for the Swedish population, we estimate the effect of education on stock market participation and on the share of financial wealth invested in stocks, conditional on participation. For men, an extra year of education increases market participation by two percentage points and the share of financial wealth allocated to stocks by 10%. We find suggestive evidence that greater financial wealth is a potential channel through which education increases participation, consistent with the existence of fixed costs. Lower risk aversion is a potential channel through which education increases the stock share. The reform has less effect on female schooling attainment and there is no evidence that this additional education affects women’s asset allocation. There is no evidence of spillovers to children.

We find the confluence of CEO-same industry experience makes independent directors particularly helpful in enhancing value-added growth and we identify a channel: guidance toward higher value-added R&D investments and higher quality innovations. Further corroborating these inferences, we find greater improvement in value-added growth when (1) independent directors with industry–CEO experience (IDICEs) have experience in more similar industries; (2) they create more shareholder value as CEO; and (3) they are current CEOs. In addition, IDICEs contribute to value-added growth most when firm environments and characteristics are conducive for active board-management interaction; namely, when product markets are more competitive and dynamic, when outsiders can more easily acquire firm-specific information, and when firms are younger and smaller. Consistent with our inferences on how IDICEs contribute to value-added growth, firms growing faster, less successfully innovating, and/or under strong governance tend to be matched with IDICEs.

We extend previous studies on the effect of behavioral biases on investor hold/sell decisions, and examine whether behavioral biases affect the order submission strategies. We use a unique database provided by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which contains order submissions and executions as well as trading records of all investors. We find investors are less aggressive in submitting sell orders for stocks that experienced losses, and more aggressive in submitting sell orders for stocks that experienced gains. The sell order aggressiveness is negatively related to the size of losses, but has a quadratic relationship with the size of gains. Results are consistent with the combination of the disposition and the house money effects.

Using euro conversion as the trigger, we examine what drives volume and spread changes when stock exchanges compete. Results show average trading costs on European exchanges decrease almost 9%, and turnover increases over 30%. Trading costs decline or remain unchanged on all exchanges, but volume deteriorates in some markets and improves in others. Frankfurt, Paris, London, and Milan are winners, while Madrid and Brussels lose volume. We examine the role of the spread-volume relation, firm characteristics, exchange trading rules, and country-level factors in determining these outcomes. Results suggest that euro conversion prompted competition by increasing transparency in market prices.

The standard measures of distress risk ignore the fact that firm defaults are correlated and that some defaults are more likely to occur in bad times. We use risk premium computed from corporate credit spreads to measure a firm’s exposure to systematic variation in default risk. Unlike previously used measures, the credit risk premium explicitly accounts for the non-diversifiable component of distress risk. In contrast to prior findings in the literature, we find that stocks with higher systematic default risk exposures have higher expected equity returns which are largely explained by the Fama–French risk factors. We confirm the robustness of these results by using an alternative systematic default risk factor for firms that do not have bonds outstanding.

The investigations into the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) have highlighted that it is subject to manipulation. We examine a new method for constructing LIBOR that produces an unbiased estimator of the true rate. LIBOR itself is based solely on transactions. We allow for fines when a bank’s transaction is different than a comparison rate, which depends on the set of transactions and non-manipulated rates elicited by a revealed preference mechanism. These non-manipulated rates will always be used in the fines, but transactions may not. We address how this approach applies to potential replacements for LIBOR and other financial benchmarks, and how it works even in markets in which there are few transactions.

Complex mortgages became a popular borrowing instrument during the bullish housing market of the early 2000s but vanished rapidly during the subsequent downturn. These non-traditional loans, including interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages, enable households to postpone loan repayment in contrast to fully amortizing traditional mortgages. Contrary to common perception, complex mortgages are used by households with high-income levels and prime credit scores, quite unlike the low-income population targeted by subprime mortgages. Nonetheless, we find that complex-mortgage borrowers become delinquent on their mortgages at rates twice as high as borrowers with plain-vanilla fixed-rate contracts even after controlling for household and loan characteristics. Our findings suggest a link between innovations in mortgage markets focused on prime borrowers and the financial crisis.

When a nation can finance its investments via foreign-currency denominated debt or domestic-currency claims, what is the optimal capital structure of the nation? Building on the functions of fiat money as both medium of exchange, and store of value like corporate equity, our model connects monetary economics, fiscal theory, and international finance under a unified corporate finance perspective. With frictionless capital markets both a Modigliani–Miller theorem for nations and the classical quantity theory of money hold. With capital market frictions, a nation’s optimal capital structure trades off inflation dilution costs and expected default costs on foreign-currency debt. Our framing focuses on the process by which new money claims enter the economy and the potential wealth redistribution costs of inflation.

We investigate the trading of corporate bonds (c-bonds) by an open limit order book (LOB) mechanism. To do so, we use the case of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) as a laboratory, in which both stocks and c-bonds are traded by an LOB mechanism. Contrary to the OTC market in the USA, the TASE c-bond market is liquid with narrow spreads and low price dispersion. The short-term traders (STT), who are the analog of the market makers in the LOB, have small trading rents and unconcentrated activity (a low Herfindahl index). In the cross-section of bonds, the low concentration is related to low spreads, low price dispersion, and small STT rents. The non-STT [including retail investors (RIs), whose participation is significant] competes with the STT on quotation and tends to tighter quotes. RIs’ activity contributes to narrower spreads.