Knowledge that Transforms

We identify start days of 156 episodes of social unrest from textual analysis of media reports and show a systematic negative impact of social unrest on stock market performance. Social unrest on average leads to a 1.4 percentage point drop in cumulative abnormal returns in 2 weeks, more for events that last longer and that happen in emerging markets. Stronger institutions, particularly better governance and more democratic systems, are associated with a smaller adverse impact of social unrest on stock market returns. We argue this reflects the ability of better institutions to provide a more reliable way to reconcile conflicting views and dampen uncertainty after unrest.

Under a randomized setting, this article finds workers with entrepreneurial ambitions—intended entrepreneurs—are (1) far more common than workers with past entrepreneurial experience and (2) increase the rate of entrepreneurship among their peers. Peer effects are persistent, stronger for tighter networks, and extend to the decision to join a startup. As intended peers explain half of the variation in entrepreneurship rates in our sample, our results demonstrate that intended entrepreneurs, even those that never personally start a firm, represent a vital component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

We assemble a property-level panel of appraiser-reported attributes associated with 4.6 million loan applications from 2013 to 2017 to test whether attributes were consistently reported. Appraisers have an incentive to misreport property attributes to justify higher appraised values to ensure that associated mortgage loans are approved. We focus on property transactions with multiple sets of attributes reported by the same appraiser within four quarters and find evidence consistent with an intent to inflate valuations through attribute misreporting. We find that strategic misreporting of attributes is prevalent across markets, and that highly leveraged borrowers whose appraisals had inconsistently reported attributes were 9.8 percent more likely to become seriously delinquent in their loan payments.

We study a model for portfolio selection under uncertainty along with market equilibria that are associated with the optimal positions. Allowing for both ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-averse market participants, model-implied demand functions resemble observed bid–ask spreads, and are consistent with extant limited-participation results based on more specialized ambiguity settings. A Pareto-efficient second-best equilibrium arises from constraining the portfolio allocations of ambiguity seekers. It implies that heterogeneity in ambiguity preferences is sufficient for mutually beneficial transactions even among all else homogeneous traders. Our results reconcile many observed phenomena in liquid high-information financial markets, such as portfolio inertia and negative risk premia.

The decrease in companies going public has received widespread attention, and the associated costs are widely debated. We document that high local initial public offering (IPO) activity leads to increases in stock market participation of 5–6 percent. This is striking, given that such participation represents a key factor toward building wealth. Local IPOs increase both households’ propensity to own stock and their percent equity holdings. The attention channel drives effects: local IPOs attract attention to the market, through increased information production and publicity. The wealth channel has little influence, consistent with local IPOs not generating wealth shocks for most households.

We evaluate the impact of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, which allowed some existing venture-capital-backed startups to monetize their research and development (R&D) tax credits against payroll taxes in the United States. We show that marginally eligible startups increase their demand for R&D workers more than marginally ineligible startups after the PATH Act’s enactment. These effects are stronger among startups that are financially constrained. Marginally eligible startups subsequently recruit workers with more education and experience and file more patents with new inventors. Our findings suggest payroll tax credits are effective in scaling startups and stimulating R&D activities through skilled labor recruitment.

We develop a stylized model that generates the following empirical predictions: the less (more) accessible the underlying market is ex ante, the more its liquidity improves (deteriorates) when basket trading becomes available. We empirically test these predictions using corporate bonds before and after the introduction of exchange-traded funds. Consistent with the model’s prediction, liquidity improvement is larger for highly arbitraged, low-volume, and high-yield bonds, and for 144A bonds to which retail investor access is prohibited by law. Our article leads to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of basket security introduction than previous research suggested.

Before regulations were enacted to prevent such practices, information leaked through selective disclosure was incorporated into markets prior to the public release of news. “News days” did not deliver news to markets; now they do. We provide novel evidence of changes in returns and turnover behavior around the enactment of regulations barring selective disclosure practices in the United States and the EU. We conversely document lack of such changes in Australia and Japan, which did not implement similar measures. We conclude that selective disclosure resolves Roll’s R2 puzzle.

The corporate bond market is larger, more illiquid, and presumably less efficient than the equity market. These features provide numerous profit opportunities for corporate bond mutual funds that are unique to the corporate bond market. However, whether corporate bond mutual funds have the valuation skills needed to take advantage of these opportunities is unclear. We introduce a novel measure to assess the valuation skills of investment-grade corporate bond mutual funds, which we refer to as the valuation accuracy score (VAS). VAS recognizes funds holding more underpriced and less overpriced corporate bonds as ex-ante having better valuation skills. It predicts future fund performance, is stable over time, and is unrelated to other sources of skill. Investors chase the performance of higher-VAS funds more aggressively and exhibit a convex flow–performance relation among these funds.

We investigate the puzzle of widespread participation in cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulation schemes. Unlike stock market manipulators, cryptocurrency manipulators openly declare their intentions to pump specific coins, rather than trying to deceive investors. Puzzlingly, people join in despite negative expected returns. In a simple framework, we demonstrate how overconfidence and gambling preferences can explain participation in these schemes. Analyzing a sample of 355 cases in 6 months, we find strong empirical support for both mechanisms. Pumps generate extreme price distortions of 65% on average, abnormal trading volumes in the millions of dollars, and large wealth transfers between participants.