Knowledge that Transforms

Previous work shows large differences in fees for S&P 500 index funds and other funds and suggests that investors suffer wealth losses investing in high-fee funds when similar low-fee funds are available. In contrast, the neoclassical model of mutual funds (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015, J. Financ. Econ., 118, 1–20) argues that percentage fees are irrelevant, as fund size will adjust in equilibrium such that net alphas are equal to zero. We show that fees matter from an investor perspective. We document (i) a strong negative association between net-of-fee fund performance and fees in a sample of all US and international equity funds, (ii) economically large, robust, persistent, and pervasive fee dispersion in the mutual fund industry, and (iii) important economic effects for investors. During the sample period, the mutual fund industry has generated a total value lost (i.e., a negative net value added) of 125 billion USD, coming predominantly from high-fee funds.

This article establishes four key findings of the growing literature on experience effects in finance: (i) the long-lasting imprint of past experiences on beliefs and risk taking; (ii) recency effects; (iii) the domain-specificity of experience effects; and (iv) imperviousness to information that is not experience-based. I first discuss the neuroscientific foundations of experience-based learning and sketch a simple model of its role in the stock market based on Malmendier et al. (2020a, b). I then distill the empirical findings on experience effects in stock-market investment, trade dynamics, and international capital flows, highlighting these four key features. Finally, I contrast models of belief formation that rely on “learned information” with models accounting for the neuroscience evidence on synaptic tagging and memory formation, and provide directions for future research.

Financial market imperfections can have significant impact on employment decisions of firms. We illustrate the economic importance of this channel by showing that employment decisions are constrained by firms’ financial health and liquidity. Our main analysis uses a collage of three “quasi-experiments” to trace the effects of finance on employment. The results suggest that financial constraints and the availability of credit play an important role in firm-level employment decisions, as well as aggregate unemployment outcomes.

Taking advantage of the different trading behaviors of investors on same-issuer bonds, we show that informed trading lies at the core of the momentum effect for corporate bonds. We split the firm-level bond cross-section into top (nontop) bonds that are characterized by higher (lower) volumes of institution-sized trades. We show that top bonds attract more informed trading and transmit information faster than nontop bonds. We design specific top and nontop bond momentum strategies to capitalize on this informational heterogeneity. The results indicate that fast news spreading yields short-lived momentum in top bonds, whereas momentum in nontop bonds is strong and drawn-out due to slow information diffusion. These differences are concentrated in bond-level information-intensive periods and are not explained by differences in liquidity levels, systematic risk (including liquidity risk), bond characteristics, and market states. In particular, bond-level liquidity affects the momentum effect only by altering the rate at which news spreads.

While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier.

This article provides insights into the inner workings of internal corporate M&A teams using survey evidence from sixty-five firms from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We find that internal teams create value, especially relative to external advisors, by directing transaction rationales, screening targets, and employing performance metrics to assess post-merger success. Teams emphasizing economic rationales as a merger motive are associated with higher returns than those teams more apt to consider behavioral motives. We consider several team characteristics and find that financial experience is the most persistent and significant attribute in explaining the outcomes across various deal stages. Another key result from our survey-based evidence is that latent M&A team factors explain ∼54% of the acquirer fixed effects in announcement return regressions.

We examine how an M&A advisor’s position in the network of investment banks affects its ability to create value for acquirers in takeover transactions. We show that acquirers enlisting the services of more centrally positioned M&A advisors enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns and pay lower takeover premiums. Consistent with the idea that central network positions convey an information advantage, we find that the effects are stronger for acquirers facing greater target information asymmetry and for M&A advisors depending more on networks for target-specific information. The information advantage primarily comes from network contacts that had previously assisted the targets in equity issuance. Centrally positioned advisors charge premium fees; network banks appear to enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for future co-advisory appointments.

We analyze how the ECB’s purchases of corporate bonds under its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) affected the financing of Spanish firms. We first document that the announcement of the CSPP in March 2016 raised firms’ propensity to issue bonds. The flipside was a drop in the demand for bank loans by bond issuers. Around 75% of the drop in loans previously made to debt issuers was redirected to other, smaller nonbond issuing firms. This reallocation process was led by banks with weaker liquidity positions experiencing credit outflows, which extended credit to the same firms they were rationing prior to the CSPP. This positive credit supply shock raised the real investment of nonissuing firms. The concomitant ECB’s Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO-II) is estimated to have contributed to amplifying the credit-reallocation effect triggered by the CSPP.

The article studies liquidity provision by institutional investors using trade-level data. We find that hedge fund trades are a more important predictor of stock-level liquidity than mutual fund trades. However, hedge funds’ liquidity provision is more exposed to financial conditions than that of mutual funds. Hedge funds that are more constrained in terms of leverage, age, asset illiquidity, and past performance exhibit a stronger shift toward liquidity consumption when funding condition tighten. Stocks with more exposure to constrained liquidity providing hedge funds suffered more during the financial crisis.

Exploiting the unique institutional setting of Hong Kong’s real estate market, we uncover a curious ripple effect of haunted houses on the prices of nearby houses. Prices drop on average 20% for units that become haunted, 10% for units on the same floor, 7% for units in the same block, and 1% for units in the same estate. Our study makes two contributions. First, we provide an estimate of a large negative spillover on prices caused by a quality shock. Second, we find that the demand shock rather than the fire sale supply shock explains most of the spillover.