Some market crashes occur because of significant imbalances in demand and supply. Conventional models fail to explain the large magnitudes of price declines. We propose a unified structural framework for explaining crashes, based on the insights of market microstructure invariance. A proper adjustment for differences in business time across markets leads to predictions which are different from conventional wisdom and consistent with observed price changes during the 1987 market crash and the 2008 sales by Société Générale. Somewhat larger-than-predicted price drops during 1987 and 2010 flash crashes may have been exacerbated by too rapid selling. Somewhat smaller-than-predicted price decline during the 1929 crash may be due to slower selling and perhaps better resiliency of less integrated markets.

In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D, in general, not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects.

As argued by Jensen (1993), the primary tasks of a firm’s board of directors are to advise, hire, fire and determine the level and form of managerial compensation. Managerial pay can be structured as part cash and in part be tied to a performance index, such as corporate earnings or the firm’s stock price. The latter effectively aligns the interest of managers with those of stockholders, which in turn reduces agency problems related to free cash flow, managerial time horizons and effort levels. At the same time, stock-based compensation increases managerial exposure to non-diversifiable risk, which may cause risk-averse managers to underinvest in risky projects. The trade-off between the benefits of managerial incentive alignment and the cost of underinvestment is largely an empirical issue, and the widespread observation that managerial compensation is primarily paid in cash 1 suggests that managerial risk aversion weighs heavily or that boards generally resort to substitute monitoring mechanisms. The paper by Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) is part of a rapidly growing empirical literature attempting to identify important cross-sectional determinants

We investigate the joint optimal risk management and capital structure decisions of banks when they use contingent-convertible (CoCo) futures contracts to hedge financial-sector risk. In spite of banks choosing significantly higher leverage ratios, their default probabilities drop appreciably while their equity values increase, allowing banks to compete more favorably with the shadow-banking system. Banks’ value-maximizing decision to hedge financial-sector risk unintentionally leads to an economy with extremely low aggregate bank default rates across all future states of nature. Thus, CoCo futures offer a powerful microprudential and macroprudential policy tool. That banks choose not to hedge financial-sector risk in practice is consistent with managers internalizing bank bailouts.

Motivated by the rising importance of international sourcing by US firms in recent decades, we study the influence of international sourcing on capital structure. We find that international sourcing has a significant negative influence on financial leverage. The negative influence is stronger in industries that have high R&D intensities and are financially constrained. However, the negative relation is mitigated when suppliers are from countries with strong legal environments and when the supplier markets are more competitive. Overall, our findings suggest that relationship-specific investments, supplier market characteristics, and financial market conditions are key determinants of the sourcing–leverage relation.

We evaluate financial assets with payoffs linked to individual labor income, as conceived by Shiller (2003) and others. Using a realistically calibrated life-cycle model, we find that such assets can generate nontrivial welfare benefits, depending on the precise structure of the instrument. However, the assets we consider can only eliminate a relatively small fraction of the welfare costs of labor income risk over the life cycle. We highlight the fact that although the purpose of such assets is to smooth consumption across states of nature, one must also consider the assets' effects on households' ability to smooth consumption over time.

This paper provides an in depth analysis of an investor's reluctance to realize losses and his propensity to realize gains – a behavior known as the disposition effect. Together, sophistication (static differences across investors) and trading experience (evolving behavior of a single investor) eliminate the reluctance to realize losses. However, an asymmetry exists as sophistication and trading experience reduce the propensity to realize gains by 37% (but fail to eliminate this part of the behavior.) Our research design allows us to follow an individual's behavior from the start of his investing life/career. This ability makes it possible to track the evolution of the disposition effect as it is reduced and/or disappears.Our results are robust to alternative explanations including feedback trading, calendar effects, and frequency of observation.

Repudiations rarely occur due to their extreme nature. This paper provides an empirical study based on an original database: prices of a Tsarist bond traded in Paris before and after its repudiation by the Soviets. A structural VAR is used to disentangle French market shocks from repudiation specific ones. After the repudiation, we identify shocks that are related with bailouts, hopes of partial bailouts, negotiations with the Soviets and the Russian civil war. We argue that bond prices essentially reflected expected extreme events that never took place and were thus subject to a “Peso problem”.

This article examines the contribution of hedging to firm value and the cost of hedging in a unified framework. Optimal hedging and firm value are explicitly linked to firm risk, the type of debt covenants and the relative priority of the hedging contract. It is shown that in some cases hedging is possible only if the counterparty to the forward contract also holds a significant portion of the debt. Also, the spread in the hedging contract reduces the optimal amount of hedging to less than the minimum-variance hedge ratio. Among other results this article elucidates why some firms hedge using forward contracts while other firms hedge in the futures markets, as well as why higher priority forward contracts are more efficient hedging vehicles.

This paper focuses on pricing and hedging options on a zero-coupon bond in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) framework when the value and/or functional form of forward interest rates volatility is unknown, but is assumed to lie between two fixed values. Due to the link existing between the drift and the diffusion coefficients of the forward rates in the Heath, Jarrow and Morton framework, this is equivalent to hedging and pricing the option when the underlying interest rate model is unknown. We show that a continuous range of option prices consistent with no arbitrage exist. This range is bounded by the smallest upper-hedging strategy and the largest lower-hedging strategy prices, which are characterized as the solutions of two non-linear partial differential equations. We also discuss several pricing and hedging illustrations.