Knowledge that Transforms

We are delighted to announce that the winner of the 2010 Deutsche Bank Best Paper Award is: “Corporate Governance Externalities” by Viral Acharya and Paolo Volpin which appeared in issue 1 of Volume 14 and was voted by the editorial board as the best article published in the last four issues of the Review of Finance. The two runners-up for the award were: “Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fundamentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt” by Jens Hilscher and Yves Nosbusch and “The Limits of the Limits of Arbitrage” by Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton and Si Li The awards were presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the European Finance Association in Frankfurt on August 27th. We are grateful to the Deutsche Bank Foundation for sponsoring this award.

Abstract This paper investigates the effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on emerging market sovereign credit spreads. We find that the volatility of terms of trade in particular has a statistically and economically significant effect on spreads. This is robust to instrumenting terms of trade with a country-specific commodity price index. Our measures of country fundamentals have substantial explanatory power, even controlling for global factors and credit ratings. We also estimate default probabilities in a hazard model and find that model implied spreads capture a significant part of the variation in observed spreads out-of-sample. The fit is better for lower credit quality borrowers.

Abstract Financial intermediaries worldwide are seeking mechanisms for participating in micro lending. Using informed “local capitalists” as bank's on-lenders fails due to borrowers' incentive to default with multiple credit sources. A coalition of local capitalists may not resolve the problem in the presence of a monopoly moneylender with superior skills in lending and enforcement. A credible competitive threat to the moneylender can only arise if the local capitalist coalition also provides information sharing benefits that lower their cost of lending vis-à-vis the moneylender. Franchising allows local capitalists to form such a coalition. We analyze conditions under which welfare-enhancing franchising would obtain.

Abstract In many settings, including venture capital financing, mergers and acquisitions, and lease competition, the structure of the contracts over which firms compete differs. Furthermore, the structure of the contract affects the future incentives of the firm to engage in value-creating activities by potentially diluting effort or investment incentives. We study, both theoretically and in the lab, the performance of debt and equity auctions in the presence of both private information and hidden effort. We show that the revenues to sellers in debt and equity auctions differ systematically depending on the returns to entrepreneurial effort. Using a controlled laboratory experiments we test the model's predictions and find strong support for the theory.

Abstract Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and experiments indicate that investors exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. But a caveat is that a large bulk of financial assets is managed by investment managers whose objectives may differ substantially from those of private investors. Most importantly they manage their clients' money, not their own. In this paper we test experimentally how individuals take risk with other people's (“clients”) money. We find that subjects behave consistently with MLA over their clients' money and take less risk with their clients' money than with their own.

Abstract Nearly half of the variation in European CDS returns is captured by a novel factor that mimics economic catastrophe risk. During the financial crisis of 2007–8, this factor became more important relative to other sources of risk, leading to a shift in the correlation structure of CDS returns. Using equivalent CDS and equity portfolios, we show that while crucial for explaining temporal and cross-sectional variation in CDS returns, the factor plays a lesser role for equity. This is likely due to the limited sensitivity of the equity value at default to whether the event is of systemic or idiosyncratic nature.

Abstract We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents.

Abstract We explore the effects of fat tails on the equilibrium implications of the long-run risks model of asset pricing by introducing innovations with dampened power law to consumption and dividends growth processes. We estimate the model structural parameters by maximum likelihood. We find that the stochastic volatility model with fat tails can generate implied risk premium, expected risk free rate and their volatilities comparable to the magnitudes observed in data. The model with fat tails leads to a significant increase in implied risk premia over the benchmark Gaussian model, but similar values for other equilibrium quantities of interest.