There have been important methodological changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over time. These distort comparisons of inflation from different periods, which have become more prevalent as inflation has risen to 40-year highs. To better contextualize the current run-up in inflation, this article constructs new historical series for CPI headline and core inflation that are more consistent with current practices and expenditure shares for the post-war period. Using these series, we find that current inflation levels are much closer to past inflation peaks than the official series would suggest. In particular, the rate of core CPI disinflation caused by Volcker-era policies is significantly lower when measured using today’s treatment of housing: only 5 percentage points of decline instead of 11 percentage points in the official CPI statistics.

We study how the recent run-up in housing and rental prices affects the outlook for inflation in the USA. Housing held down the overall inflation in 2021. Despite record growth in private market-based measures of home prices and rents, the government-measured residential services inflation was only 4% for the 12 months ending in January 2022. After explaining the mechanical cause for this divergence, we estimate that, if past relationships hold, the residential inflation components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) are likely to move close to 7% during 2022. These findings imply that housing will make a significant contribution to overall inflation in 2022, ranging from one percentage point for headline PCE, to 2.6 percentage points for core CPI. We expect residential inflation to remain elevated in 2023.

We introduce an arbitrage-free term structure model of nominal and real yields that accounts for liquidity risk in Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). The novel feature of our model is to identify liquidity risk from individual TIPS prices by accounting for the tendency that TIPS, like most fixed-income securities, go into buy-and-hold investors’ portfolios as time passes. We find a sizable and countercyclical TIPS liquidity premium, which helps our model to match TIPS prices. Accounting for liquidity risk also improves the model’s ability to forecast inflation and match surveys of inflation expectations.

We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

The capital structure irrelevance argument of Modigliani and Miller (1958) implies that the use of debt or leases should have no impact on firm values. This classical argument leaves out several important considerations crucial for the result, in particular, counterparty credit risk. We re-examine the capital structure problem for firms that can utilize debt and leases in the presence of counterparty risk. Our numerical and empirical estimates show a negative term structure of lease rates that steepens as a function of counterparty risk. Moreover, we document numerical evidence for the complementary relationship between debt and leases in the presence of counterparty risk.

In the Australian real estate market, about a third of properties are sold at auction. Properties that fail auctions sell later for a 1.3 percent discount. Consistent with a causal channel, the effect holds with property-level fixed effects and when auction failure is instrumented by adverse weather or seller overvaluation. Prices cluster below round numbers, and the discount fades over time, inconsistent with our effects reflecting unobserved property characteristics. The evidence suggests that there are behavioral factors affecting the valuations of buyers and sellers.

Abstract …is “should I buy any?”. Under Bayesian portfolio theory, ongoing zero weights in cryptocurrency are surprisingly difficult to generate. With 10 years of prior data, equity investors would need very pessimistic priors on mean returns to never buy cryptocurrency: −10.6 percent per month for Bitcoin, and −19.6 percent for a diversified cryptocurrency portfolio. Most priors that involve never purchasing cryptocurrency imply shorting it. Optimal weights are generally small, non-trivial (1–5 percent magnitude), frequently positive, and smooth. The certainty equivalent gains from cryptocurrency are comparable to international diversification and prominent anomaly portfolios. Costs (storage and fees) would need to exceed 21–39 percent annually to deter trading.

We use an arbitrage-free term structure model with spanned stochastic volatility to determine the value of the deflation protection option embedded in Treasury inflation-protected securities. The model accurately prices the deflation protection option prior to the financial crisis when its value was near zero; at the peak of the crisis in late 2008 when deflationary concerns spiked sharply; and in the post-crisis period. During 2009, the average value of this option at the 5-year maturity was 41 basis points on a par-yield basis. The option value is shown to be closely linked to overall market uncertainty as measured by the VIX, especially during and after the 2008 financial crisis.

In common-law systems, firms’ litigation risk depends both on written laws and how courts interpret these laws. Using 321 US circuit court rulings, we introduce a novel measure capturing courts’ attitudes toward defendants in securities lawsuits. Our results confirm that financial misreporting firms in more defendant-friendly circuits face fewer lawsuits. Consistent with lower expected litigation costs, firms in these circuits face less negative market reactions when misreporting is revealed, invest less in preventing misreporting, and are more likely to engage in aggressive misreporting. We conclude that defendant-friendly precedents reduce firms’ legal liability and worsen their financial reporting quality.