Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Exploiting regional holidays in Germany as a source of exogenous cross-sectional variation in investor attention, we provide evidence that the well-known local bias at the individual level materially affects stock turnover at the firm level. Stocks of firms located in holiday regions are temporarily strikingly less traded than otherwise very similar stocks in non-holiday regions. This negative turnover shock survives comprehensive tests for differences in information release. It appears particularly pronounced in stocks less visible to nonlocal investors and for smaller stocks disproportionately driven by retail investors. Our findings contribute to research on local bias, trading activity, and investor distraction.

Abstract We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance.

Abstract This article examines competition and investor behavior in the mutual fund industry for the universe of US mutual funds during 1976–2009. Over this period, industry assets increased by a factor of 200, the number of active fund families quadrupled, and the average market share of a family declined by four-fifths. We find that price competition and product differentiation are both effective strategies in obtaining market share. Families that pass along economies of scale to investors and those that charge lower fees than the competition gain market share, but only if these fees are above average to begin with. Loads and 12b-1 fees, however, have a positive effect on market share, consistent with the use of these types of fees for marketing and distribution. Families that perform better, offer a wider range of products, and start more funds relative to the competition (a measure of innovation) also have a higher market share. Innovation is rewarded more if the new fund is more differentiated from existing offerings. Overall, our evidence suggests that mutual fund families compete effectively along both price and non-price dimensions.

Abstract This paper examines the tying of lending to investment banking business by universal banks. Tying may alleviate credit rationing by assuring the lender of an adequate share of the social surplus that its lending generates; however, tying raises the profitability of loans to troubled entrepreneurs, softening entrepreneurial budget constraints and reducing effort levels. When investment banking is uncompetitive, the former effect dominates, and there is too little tying; when investment banking is competitive, there is too much tying. We relate our results to the authority structure of the universal bank, which we argue is the appropriate focus for regulation.

Abstract During 2004 and 2005, long-horizon interest rates fell sharply in major international government bond markets (Greenspan's “conundrum”). This common fall mainly reflected lower long real rates. To investigate possible causes, the authors apply a no-arbitrage affine modeling framework to understanding the UK real term structure. The authors find that time-varying term premia are important in explaining movements in long real forward rates. And, although there is evidence that long-horizon expected short real rates declined over the conundrum period, the authors’ results suggest that lower term premia played the dominant role. This could be consistent with the so-called “search for yield” and excess liquidity explanations for the conundrum.

Abstract Better measurement of the output produced and capital employed by firms substantially improves the ability to explain capital structure variation in the cross section. For every firm, we construct the set of other firms producing the same output using the set of product market competitors listed in the firm’s public Securities and Exchange Commission filings. In addition, we improve measurement of capital structure by explicitly accounting for leased capital. These two steps increase the explanatory power of the average capital structure of other firms producing similar output on a firm’s capital structure by 50% compared to using only the average unadjusted debt ratio of other firms in the same three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We provide evidence that the large explanatory power of the capital structure of other firms producing similar output is related to the assets used in the production process. Our findings suggest that what a firm produces and the assets used in production are the most important determinants of capital structure in the cross section.

Abstract The authors use proprietary loan contracts and financial information negotiated between banks and private equity sponsors to explore the financial covenant structure and the determinants of covenant restrictiveness in a large set of leveraged buyouts. With respect to the covenant structure, we analyze the utilized types of financial covenants in sponsored loans and in comparable nonsponsored loans, such as highly levered term loans or loans used toward M&A. The authors find that sponsored loans show less variation in the included types and combinations of covenants and include more financial covenants than the comparable nonsponsored loans. With respect to covenant restrictiveness, the authors measure precisely the distance between threshold and financial forecast. They show that two competing mechanisms, reduced information asymmetry costs and increased financial risk, affect the restrictiveness in sponsored loans.

Abstract The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.

Abstract I examine the effects of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of the entrepreneurial firm at the time of transition from private to public ownership. Using a selection model framework that instruments for venture backing with variations in the supply of venture capital, I conduct three sets of tests comparing corporate governance in venture- and non–venture-backed initial public offering (IPO) firms. Venture-backed firms have lower levels of earnings management, more positive reactions to the adoption of shareholder rights agreements, and more independent board structures than similar non–venture-backed firms, consistent with better governance. These effects are not common to all pre-IPO large shareholders.

Abstract This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economy when investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investors may differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion, and in their time preference rate. The authors study the impact of investors’ heterogeneity on equilibrium properties and, in particular, on the consumption shares, the market price of risk, the risk-free rate, the bond prices at different maturities, the stock price and volatility as well as on the stock's cumulative returns, and optimal portfolio strategies. The authors relate the heterogeneous economy with the family of associated homogeneous economies with only one class of investors. Cross-sectional as well as long-run properties are analyzed.