Knowledge that Transforms

This article provides a comprehensive history of default risk for newly originated home mortgages in the USA over the past quarter century. The loan-level source data include the entire guarantee book for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We track many loan characteristics and produce a summary measure of risk. Among our many results, we show that mortgage risk had already risen in the 1990s, planting seeds of the financial crisis well before the actual event. Our results also cast doubt on explanations of the crisis that focus on borrowers with low credit scores. The aggregate series are available for download at https://www.fhfa.gov/papers/wp1902.aspx.

We integrate bank and bond financing into a two-sector neoclassical growth model and identify an automatic stabilization effect due to endogenous bank leverage adjustment. We show that although bank leverage amplifies shocks, the increase of leverage due to a decline in bank equity partially offsets the post crisis decline of bank lending and accelerates economic recovery by reducing the persistence of the bank lending channel. In this case, endogenous leverage adjustment is an automatic stabilizer. Regulatory state-independent capital limits and wage rigidities impair the re-allocation of capital between sectors and weaken this automatic stabilization. A quantitative analysis of the US during the Great Recession shows that the magnitude of automatic stabilization can be significant and informs about potentially high costs of strict capital regulation or wage rigidities during banking crises.

This article examines the strategic nature of banks’ charitable giving by studying bank donations to local nonprofit organizations. Relying on the application of antitrust rules in bank mergers as an exogenous shock to local deposit market competition, we find that local competition affects banks’ local donation decisions. Using county-level natural disaster shocks, we show that banks with disaster exposure reallocate donations away from nonshocked counties, where they operate branches, and toward shocked counties. The reallocation of donations represents an exogenous increase in the local share of donations in nonshocked counties for banks with no disaster exposure and leads to an increase in the local deposit market shares of such banks. Furthermore, banks can potentially earn greater profits from making donations and tend to donate to nonprofits that have the most social impact. Overall, our evidence suggests that banks participate in corporate philanthropy strategically to enhance performance.

Some market crashes occur because of significant imbalances in demand and supply. Conventional models fail to explain the large magnitudes of price declines. We propose a unified structural framework for explaining crashes, based on the insights of market microstructure invariance. A proper adjustment for differences in business time across markets leads to predictions which are different from conventional wisdom and consistent with observed price changes during the 1987 market crash and the 2008 sales by Société Générale. Somewhat larger-than-predicted price drops during 1987 and 2010 flash crashes may have been exacerbated by too rapid selling. Somewhat smaller-than-predicted price decline during the 1929 crash may be due to slower selling and perhaps better resiliency of less integrated markets.

In many countries, disproportionately many firms locate their headquarters in the capital city. Spatial proximity to a country’s leading politicians may be beneficial for a number of reasons. Since neither firms nor governments move randomly, the effects of firms’ co-locating with the government are normally hard to identify. I solve this problem by examining a unique event—the decision to relocate the German federal government from Bonn to Berlin in 1991. Following reunification, there was a free vote in the German parliament on the future location of the government. Berlin won by a narrow margin, an event that could not be anticipated even days before and that is free from confounding factors. Firms with corporate headquarters in Berlin experience abnormal equity returns of more than 3% following the relocation decision.

The 2020 CARES Act directed large cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using data from a Fintech nonprofit, exploring heterogeneity by income, recent income declines, and liquidity as well as linked survey responses about economic expectations. Households respond rapidly to payments, with spending increasing by about $0.14 per dollar during the first week and plateauing around 0.25–0.30 over 3 months. In contrast to previous stimulus programs, we see little response of durables spending. Households with lower incomes, greater income declines, and less liquidity display stronger responses whereas households that expect employment losses and benefit cuts display weaker responses.

This article shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from fluctuations in collateral values. The sensitivity of corporate investment to changes in real-estate collateral values is halved when the length of relationship between a bank and a firm, or its board of directors, doubles. Long relationships with board members dominate relationships with the firm in dampening the collateral channel. Moreover, lending relationships with directors in their personal capacity insulate corporate investment over and above corporate relationships. Our findings support theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle and show that lending relationships are more multi-faceted than previously thought.

Employee treatment is an important but challenging element of corporate environmental, social, and governance policies. Satisfying employee needs can increase corporate productivity, but is also costly to shareholders. Using unique data of Chinese publicly listed firms, we show that having satisfied employees is valuable to the firm. Specifically, firms with higher employee satisfaction scores withstand COVID-19 better, in terms of stock market performance. Such an effect is more pronounced for firms with more intangible assets and in knowledge-based industries. Moreover, higher employee satisfaction scores predict better operating performance. While not fully revealed in tranquil times, the effect of employee satisfaction is materialized when the firms experience negative shocks, such as COVID-19. Our findings suggest that firms can do well in crisis periods by doing good in normal times.

With capital controls, the standard financial market transactions needed for currency carry trade are hard to implement. Using detailed trade data reported by both the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong’s governments, we present evidence that indirect currency carry trade likely takes place via round-trip reimports. We also show that greater state control in terms of more state-owned firms does not reduce such “carry trade by trucks.”

This paper examines whether the presence of government-guaranteed lenders helps alleviate small business financial constraints during financial crises. The results indicate that during the 2007–09 financial crisis, areas with a greater share of Small Business Administration 7(a) lenders experienced: (1) a 2.2% increase in small business loan volume, (2) a 3.7% increase in small firm employment and 3.5% increase in establishments, and (3) lower loan default rates. Bank–county–year analysis suggests that SBA banks increase their share of lending when they are capital-constrained, and when local median income is lower. Instrumental variable analysis utilizing SBA program characteristics confirms the baseline results. The findings suggest that targeted government support can play a beneficial role in the presence of private credit market frictions, especially when bank capital is limited and small business financial constraints are severe.