Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract If regulation fails to differentiate between priced and idiosyncratic risk, it incentivizes investors to reach for yield. Studying securitization exposures on the balance sheets of German banks, I show evidence consistent with this prediction. Banks with tight regulatory constraints (low capital adequacy ratios) invest more in higher yielding ABSs conditionally on rating-implied regulatory risk weights. ABS investments of constrained banks tend to perform worse ex post in terms of collateral delinquency and lose value. Differences in bank sophistication, market power, or incentives to retain securitizations are unlikely to explain the riskier ABS investments of constrained banks.

Abstract We study active investment skills in relation to returns to scale in the active mutual fund industry. Using a sample of 13,807 funds from sixteen domicile countries investing in forty-two equity markets from 2001 to 2014, we find that they achieve negative trading performance on average, driven mainly by particularly low returns to their trades in US equities. Exploring their investment environment, we find convincing evidence of decreasing returns to scale around the world, especially for the US market. Based on theory of optimal fund size, we estimate the optimal size of the active mutual fund industry. We find that the active mutual fund industry in USA has exceeded the optimal level, whereas in the international markets, there may still be room for further expansion. Consistent with this view, we find that mutual fund managers have been gradually reallocating their assets away from the USA and more into international equity markets.

Abstract We analyze how firm-level shocks to collateral values influence employment outcomes among US corporations. Using comprehensive employment data from the US Census Bureau, we estimate that employment expenditures increase by $0.10 per $1 increase in firms’ real estate collateral values. These effects are stronger among financially constrained firms, and additional hiring is funded through debt issuance, consistent with a collateral channel. This relation holds among firms in tradable goods sectors, alleviating concerns about local demand shocks. Thus, through a collateral lending channel, fluctuations in the US commercial real estate market are an important driver of corporate labor demand.

Abstract Firms affiliated with business groups survive the stress of the global financial and euro crises better than unaffiliated firms. Using granular data from Italy, we show that better performance stems partly from access to an internal capital market, as the survival value of group-affiliated firms increases with group-wide cash flow. Internal cash transfers increase when banks’ health deteriorates, with funds moving from cash-rich to cash-poor firms and, some evidence suggests, to firms with favorable investment opportunities. Internal capital markets’ role thus increases when external markets (banks) are distressed.

Abstract This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

Abstract We test the proposition that investors’ ability to cope with financial losses is much better than they expect. In a panel survey of investors from a large bank in the UK, we ask for their subjective ratings of anticipated returns and experienced returns. The time period covered by the panel (2008–10) is one where investors experienced frequent losses and gains in their portfolios. This period offers a unique setting to evaluate investors’ hedonic experiences. We examine how the subjective ratings behave relative to expected portfolio returns and experienced portfolio returns. Loss aversion is strong for anticipated outcomes; investors are twice as sensitive to negative expected returns as to positive expected returns. However, when evaluating experienced returns, the effect diminishes by more than half and is well below commonly found loss aversion coefficients. This suggests that a large part of investors’ financial loss aversion results from an affective forecasting error.

Abstract We use credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles as a laboratory to empirically examine financial institutions’ motivations to take bad-tail systematic risk. By comparing the characteristics of global banks that sponsored credit-arbitrage vehicles prior to the global financial crisis to those that did not, we show that owner–manager agency problems, government safety nets, and government ownership of banks are associated with bad-tail systematic risk-taking. Although good governance is associated with less risk-taking on average, well-governed banks that also have a high ex ante expectation of being bailed out by the government take more risk. Lastly, we find mixed evidence that tougher bank capital regulation deters bad-tail risk-taking.

Abstract We identify all return leader–follower pairs among individual stocks using Granger causality regressions. Thus-identified leaders reliably predict their followers’ returns out of sample, and the return predictability works at the level of individual stocks rather than industries. Our results indicate that, independent of its size, any firm may emerge as a return leader by being at the center of an important news development that has ramifications for other firms. Indeed, stocks undergoing news-generating developments see an increase in the number of stocks whose returns they lead.

Abstract Margin capacity, defined as the aggregate excess debt capacity of investors buying securities on margin, strongly predicts (i) lower S&P 500 returns, (ii) lower growth in aggregate earnings, dividends, employment, and overall economic activity, (iii) higher macro, financial, and policy uncertainty, (iv) lower interest rates, (v) tighter lending standards by banks, and (vi) lower intermediary equity capital. High margin capacity is a precursor, not a response, to borrowing and intermediary constraints and higher volatility. It typically arises when levered investors with profitable past positions limit their leverage. We interpret that it reflects informed investors’ conservatism ahead of bad times.

Abstract While global stock markets enjoy high returns on days surrounding Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, there is no comparable result for other central banks either internationally or, more surprisingly, domestically. Neither announcement surprises nor currency moves drive these findings, which hold even for stocks with a domestic focus. The difference in announcement premia is not explained by economy size, exposure to multinationals, or policy activism. We conclude that the Fed exerts a unique impact on global equities. Consistent with this hypothesis, uncertainty drops across global markets following FOMC announcements but not those of other central banks. Furthermore, the Fed is generally the leader among central banks in setting monetary policy.