Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Although momentum exists in many markets throughout the world, explanations for momentum have largely been tested using US data. We investigate the extent to which US-based momentum explanations extend to the international context, using regression-based and portfolio approaches. Among the several hypotheses we consider, we find reliable support for the hypothesis that due to limited attention, investors underreact to information arriving in small bits rather than in large chunks, which results in momentum. We also find secondary support for the overconfidence hypothesis for momentum. Finally, we find that momentum is stronger in up-markets and less-volatile markets in the international context just as in the USA. This finding also accords with the investor overconfidence hypothesis, under the proviso that investors are more confident in rising, low-volatility markets.

Abstract In the USA, state-level exemptions determine the amount of property that individuals can protect from creditor liquidation during the debt settlement process. We exploit within-metropolitan statistical area variation in personal bankruptcy exemptions created by state borders and a stacked regression approach to identify the spillover effects of these laws on business credit extended to small firms. Subsequent to exemption increases, we find a reduction of 1–2 percent in originations of business credit. The effect is strongest for the smallest firms, which are more financially constrained. We provide household-level evidence that both business debt and personal debt decline for borrowers whose home equity becomes covered by the exemption, suggesting an overall decrease in credit availability for small businesses. As a result, increases in exemptions lead to fewer small establishments and lower employment, especially in industries dependent on external finance, suggesting that negative real economic effects occur via a credit market channel.

Abstract I study the effects of regulatory policy changes on interest rate option prices: margin tightening from the introduction of mandatory interest rate swap clearing by the Dodd–Frank Act in 2010 and margin loosening from the counterbalance of voluntary swaption clearing and synthetic derivatives to the uncleared margin rule in 2016. Employing these variations as exogenous shocks for a quasi-experimental design, I show that swaption prices consistently respond to changes in margin requirements. The results are consistent with theories on the expected margin premium, where the constrained agent holds short positions in zero net supply.

Abstract We document that firms experience large negative stock returns during, and positive returns following, the first informational events after forced CEO turnovers. This V-shaped return pattern is driven by the strategic sequential disclosure of bad news and good news, aligned with incoming CEOs’ incentives to manage expectations. The pattern is more pronounced when these incentives are stronger, such as when firms earn higher stock returns and have higher valuation uncertainty leading up to the informational events. Evidence from firms’ earnings surprises, analysts’ forecast revisions, and large language model-based measures of disclosure behavior indicates that incoming CEOs often initially release bad news about realized and short-term earnings, projecting a broadly pessimistic outlook for the firm’s future performance, and subsequently disclose favorable news about longer-term earnings prospects. Our findings suggest that investors make the costly mistake of failing to discern the incentives behind managers’ disclosure.

Abstract We study the causal effects of precommitment framing, motivational deadlines, and semi-personalized information on military servicemembers’ retirement savings using a randomized field experiment. Low-cost emails highlighting a motivational deadline or semi-personalized salary information increased participation by about 1 percentage point (control mean is 1.25 percent) and contribution rates by about 0.05 percentage points (control mean is 3.92 percent) among previous non-participants. These programs demonstrate a cost-effective and scalable tool by which managers can increase employees’ retirement savings.

Abstract We model the execution of a large uninformed sell order in the presence of strategic competitive market makers. We solve for the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model in closed form. Analysis of this equilibrium reveals that large orders unequivocally benefit market makers, while smaller investors stand to benefit only if the order trades with a sufficiently high intensity. The equilibrium results further provide a rationale for the empirically observed patterns of (1) shorter orders trading at higher intensities and (2) price pressures potentially subsiding before large orders stop executing.

Abstract A long-standing question in finance is why companies donate to charity, often attributing it to either managerial agency problems or strategic behavior. Based on a global sample of donation announcements by firms providing relief to disaster-affected communities, we test the relative importance of these two motives and the conditions under which each dominates. We exploit disaster-specific factors in an event study setting around corporate donation announcement dates to show that, on average, relief donations decrease returns. However, the strategic benefits of donating around salient events can mitigate these negative effects. To account for firms’ donation decisions, we rely on exogenous variation in the availability of corporate charitable funds due to the timing of disasters relative to firms’ financial years. We show that donations provide new information to the market and that negative returns are primarily driven by cash donations made via corporate foundations.

Abstract Firms may pursue non-meritocratic promotion policies at the cost of lower profitability, if they yield private benefits of control. Corporate governance standards that limit these private benefits favor meritocratic promotions and therefore encourage workers’ skill acquisition. Managerial incentive pay has ambiguous effects on workers’ skill acquisition: it fosters the supply of skilled labor, while reducing firms’ willingness to promote skilled workers to managerial positions. Social welfare increases with the share of meritocratic firms, but not necessarily with governance standards: small reforms generate losers and gainers, and may on balance lower welfare, while drastic enough reforms can generate Pareto improvements.

Abstract It is a long-standing fact that households mostly consume and rarely reinvest dividends. Among representative brokerage clients of one of Germany’s largest banks, we find the opposite: 80 percent reinvestments and 12 percent consumption. Of these reinvestments, the majority occurs with a delay after dividends are initially parked as brokerage cash. Motivated by this finding, we study payout modalities (deposits into brokerage accounts, checking accounts, or checks) as a novel mechanism that nudges investors toward reinvesting or consuming dividends. Consistent with a transition from checks to brokerage deposits, we find that the dividend consumption rate in the Consumer Expenditure Survey has decreased substantially over time.

Abstract Using survey data on secured funding arrangements provided by broker–dealers for their clients—a class of contracts that includes bilateral repo—we document that financing rates, collateral haircuts, lending maturities, and position limits move strongly together over time and across asset classes. Liquidity of the underlying securities, as opposed to their volatility or credit risk, is the main driver of this behavior, with dealer balance-sheet constraints also playing a role in the funding of less-liquid security types. A simple model of dealer–client interaction rationalizes these findings. Instrumenting with changes in market conventions, we find that funding conditions had little effect on cash securities markets between 2011 and 2019, but the tightening of terms during the market stress of early 2020 likely impaired liquidity and reduced asset returns to some degree.