Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber; Reflections on the Origins of the European Finance Association, European Finance Review, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1 January 199

We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. For causal inference, we use a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset requirement around an exogenous threshold. We show that mandated increases in liquidity cause banks to reduce credit supply. Liquidity requirements also depress banks’ profitability, though some of the regulatory costs are passed on to liability holders. We document a prudential benefit of liquidity requirements by showing that banks subject to a higher requirement just before the financial crisis had lower odds of failure.

Despite the size and importance of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and collective investment trusts, their characteristics and performance have not been studied in detail. We show that separate account performance is similar to that of index funds and superior to that of actively managed mutual funds. Management supplies a benchmark for each separate account. When the management-selected benchmark is used to measure performance, performance is significantly overstated. Despite this, investors react to differences in performance from the management-preferred benchmark in choosing among SMAs. Finally we find variables that explain both the cross section of alphas and the cross section of cash flows.

In this paper, the authors use monthly holdings to study timing ability. These data differ from holdings data used in previous studies in that the authors’ data have a higher frequency and include a full range of securities, not just traded equities. Using a one-index model, the authors find, as do two recent studies, that management appears to have positive and statistically significant timing ability. When a multiindex model is used, the authors show that timing decisions do not result in an increase in performance, whether timing is measured using conditional or unconditional sensitivities. The authors show that sector rotation decisions with respect to high-tech stocks are a major contribution to negative timing.

Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Christopher R. Blake; Common Factors in Active and Passive Portfolios, European Finance Review, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1 Janu

Benchmarking, pay for luck, and the large compensation packages given to CEOs in recent years are three major controversial compensation practices. We examine the extent to which variation in the market for CEO talent explains these practices. We find that CEO compensation is benchmarked against other firms only in industries where CEO talent is not firm-specific, and that pay for luck is more prevalent there also. These findings are consistent with theories based on the market for CEO talent. However, CEO compensation levels do not depend on whether CEO talent is firm-specific, which seems inconsistent with the talent competition argument.

To create value and reduce agency costs, firms adopt available organizational structures that match their attributes. This paper studies the characteristics of firms that choose to become master limited partnerships (MLPs). The MLP sample is dominated by firms in low-growth industries that have highly focused operations and superior profitability compared to their industry peers. After becoming an MLP, sample firms reduce capital expenditures and increase cash distributions, taking advantage of their focus, profitability, and status as non-taxable entities. A subsample of MLPs subsequently change back to corporate form. After becoming corporations, these firms reverse course by cutting cash distributions and increasing capital spending. This cycle demonstrates how firms restructure to adopt organizational forms that best fit their needs.

This paper studies the life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice problem taking account of annuity risk at retirement. The study allows for government-provided annuity income. Optimally, households allocate retirement wealth to nominal, inflation-linked and variable annuities, and condition this choice on the state of the economy. The case in which there are limitations in the types of annuities that are available is also considered and the costs of annuity market incompleteness are quantified. Subsequently, the paper determines how investors optimally anticipate annuitization before retirement. The conclusion is that ignoring annuity risk before and at retirement can be economically costly.

This article studies the optimal design of bank capital regulations when capital markets are subject to adverse selection. I show how the implementation of capital requirements can eliminate the information frictions that make raising capital costly by screening banks to reveal their private information to the market. The optimal regulations induce information revelation via recapitalization programs when the banking sector is weak and pool the banks’ private information via uniform capital requirements otherwise. Optimal capital requirements are linked to the securities issued to meet them, demonstrating potential welfare gains from incorporating more and less informationally sensitive securities into the design of capital regulations. Finally, the analysis generates insights into the joint design of equity capital requirements and additional tier 1 capital securities.

This paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty about the mean return on the risky asset on the portfolio decisions of an investor who has a long investment horizon. Building on the earlier work of Detemple (1986), Dothan and Feldman (1986), and Gennotte (1986), it is shown that the possibility of future learning about the mean return on the risky asset induces the investor to take a larger or smaller position in the risky asset than she would if there were no learning, the direction of the effect depending on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than the logarithmic investor whose portfolio decisions are unaffected by the possibility of future learning. Numerical calculations show that uncertainty about the mean return on the market portfolio has a significant effect on the portfolio decision of an investor with a 20 year horizon if her assessment of the market risk premium is based solely on the Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1995) data.