Covariances between aggregate stock returns and changes in bond yields change sign over time. Existing theories emphasize either time-varying properties of expected inflation or time-varying properties of real yields. Using revisions in survey forecasts as proxies for macroeconomic news, neither approach succeeds empirically. Inflation-centric models require much more news about expected future inflation than we observe from surveys. Real-centric models posit signs of covariances among macroeconomic news, changes in yields, and stock returns that do not match those in the data. In a nutshell, macroeconomic news appears to drive a substantial part of stock–bond comovement, but not in ways consistent with our theories.

In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D, in general, not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects.

In many countries, disproportionately many firms locate their headquarters in the capital city. Spatial proximity to a country’s leading politicians may be beneficial for a number of reasons. Since neither firms nor governments move randomly, the effects of firms’ co-locating with the government are normally hard to identify. I solve this problem by examining a unique event—the decision to relocate the German federal government from Bonn to Berlin in 1991. Following reunification, there was a free vote in the German parliament on the future location of the government. Berlin won by a narrow margin, an event that could not be anticipated even days before and that is free from confounding factors. Firms with corporate headquarters in Berlin experience abnormal equity returns of more than 3% following the relocation decision.

This study investigates if the use of derivatives by corporations is likely to affect their financing strategies. I find a strong positive relation between the minimum revenue guaranteed by hedging and investment expenditure. This result implies that hedging increases the likelihood that investments can be financed internally. I also find that firms tend to finance their investment expenditures externally rather than internally. If external capital is more costly than internal capital it would clearly be in a firm's interestto reduce its dependence on external capital. Consistent with this result, Ifind that the median firm that does not hedge finances 100% of its investment expenditures externally, while the median firm that hedges finances only 86% of investments externally.

We use a unique data set to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment-grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, investment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in “market-based economies”), but commitment fees remained unchanged. Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional contraction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.

In this paper I assess the degree of similarity in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet stocks during the tumultuous year of 2000. Despite large differences in their economic fundamentals, I find that the equity market values of Internet firms with immaterial web traffic, firms that are randomly selected, and firms that went public at the same time as Internet firms are similarly related to analysts' forecasts of earnings in 2001 and the long-term rate of growth in earnings. This is not the case for firms with intensive web traffic. I also find that at the peak of Internet prices in March 2000 the market rewarded losses of web-traffic-intensive firms but did not reward profits, while after the peak the market reversed its view, rewarding profits but not losses. Beyond earnings, web traffic is significantly positively priced both at and after the Internet peak. However, I find no evidence that two proxies for supply and demand forces – the degree of public float and short interest – are value-relevant for Internet firms. Overall, I argue that there are enough similarities in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet firms to make it unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks during 2000 was entirely irrational. Moreover, any irrationality in the prices of Internet stocks cannot be linked to public float and short interest.

Mutual funds typically invest a disproportionately large portion of their portfolio in one industry (main industry). We present a simple theoretical model to demonstrate that better mutual fund managers make larger investments in the important supplier/customer industries related to the main industry. Consistent with our theory, empirical tests on a large sample of mutual funds show that investment in related industries is positively associated with fund performance and plays a more significant role in explaining fund performance than investment in the main industry. Furthermore, the positive relation between main investment and fund performance obtains only when related investment is high.

Under the assumptions of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM), Pareto optimal consumption allocations are characterized by each agent's consumption process being adapted to the filtration generated by the aggregate consumption process of the economy. The wealth processes of the agents, however, are adapted to the finer filtration generated by aggregate consumption and the conditional distribution of future aggregate consumption. Therefore, in order to achieve pareto optimal consumption allocations, a sufficiently varied set of assets must exist such that any wealth process adapted to this finer filtration can be implemented by dynamically trading in that set of assets. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of such a set of assets based on dynamically trading contingent claims on aggregate consumption. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in a dynamically effectively complete market in which agents are only able to trade in contingent claims on aggregate consumption, the market portfolio of firms, and a (numeraire) zero-coupon bond. We demonstrate the role of short- and long-term contingent claims on aggregate consumption for the implementation of Pareto optimal allocations inthe presence of short- and long-term risks. In addition, in the presence of personal risks, we demonstrate the role of insurance contracts.

We design a compound real options model, which determines the timing of takeovers and characterizes the distribution of the associated surplus. We delineate a relation between the bargaining power of the acquiring firm and the takeover incentives. The takeover threshold is decreasing as a function of the expected primary takeover gain and the embedded divestment gain. Decreased implementation uncertainty stimulates takeover activity. This uncertainty concerns the delay until either primary takeover synergies or subsequent divestment gains are realized. We demonstrate how the relation between volatility and takeover timing depends on the functional form of the profit flow with implementation uncertainty.

Market discipline is an article of faith among financial economists, and the use of market discipline as a regulatory tool is gaining credibility. Effective market discipline involves two distinct components: security holders' ability to accurately assess the condition of a firm (monitoring) and their ability to cause subsequent managerial actions to reflect those assessments (influence). Substantial evidence supports the existence of market monitoring. However, the existing evidence about market influence involves relatively rare events such as management turnover. This paper seeks evidence that U.S. bank holding companies' security price changes reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. Although we identify some patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, our methodology does not provide strong evidence that stock or (especially) bond investors regularly influence managerial actions. Day-to-day market influence remains, for the moment, more a matter of faith than of empirical evidence.