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Do private firms (mis)learn from the stock market?

Review of Finance 2024 28(5), 1483-1511 open access
This article examines whether and to what extent private firms learn from the stock market. Using a large panel data set for the UK, I find that private firms’ investment responds positively to the valuation of public firms in the same industry. The sensitivity increases with price informativeness. To further pin down the information channel, I construct a price noise measure based on public firms’ unrelated minor segments and show that it positively affects the investment of private firms in the major-segment industry. The results are consistent with models featuring learning from noisy signals and are not driven by alternative channels in the absence of learning. My findings suggest that the stock market can have real effects on private firms through an information-spillover channel, even when these firms do not list their shares on the stock exchanges.

Sectoral comovement and conglomerate networks

Review of Finance 2026 open access
We study the influence of multi-sector conglomerate firms on sectoral comovement. Using an innovative network model of firms and industries, we derive a novel measure of the co-concentration of industries in which two industries are more co-concentrated if they share greater exposure to the same conglomerate firms. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and longitudinal tests on establishment-level data from nearly all US firms over 1991 to 2019, we find that industries with higher co-concentration exhibit stronger comovement in employment, sales, and asset growth. Controlling for alternative explanations, a one-standard deviation increase in co-concentration corresponds to a 0.32-standard deviation increase in the comovement of employment growth. In variance-covariance decompositions, we find that firm-specific shocks explain nearly half of aggregate volatility and industry comovement and that conglomerates play a significant role in sectoral comovement. Our framework helps explain how idiosyncratic, firm-level shocks contribute to aggregate fluctuations and influence business cycles.

What Does Stock Ownership Breadth Measure?

Review of Finance 2013 17(4), 1239-1278 open access
Using holdings data on a representative sample of all Shanghai Stock Exchange investors, we show that increases in ownership breadth (the fraction of market participants who own a stock) predict low returns: highest change quintile stocks underperform lowest quintile stocks by 23% per year. Small retail investors drive this result. Retail ownership breadth increases appear to be correlated with overpricing. Among institutional investors, however, the opposite holds: stocks in the top decile of wealth-weighted institutional breadth change outperform the bottom decile by 8% per year, consistent with prior work that interprets breadth as a measure of short-sales constraints.

Credit risk, debt overhang, and the life cycle of callable bonds

Review of Finance 2024 28(3), 945-985 open access
We show that callable bonds have both higher yields and lower market prices than matched non-callable bonds of the same issuer-time, reflecting the value of call features to issuers and investors. This “value of callability” as well as the inclusion and the exercise of call rights are jointly determined by issuer credit quality. Critically, our agency-based theoretical and empirical analyses show that callability reduces debt overhang in corporate mergers. Our results help explain the value and increasing prevalence of callable bonds in credit markets.

Property rights, political connections, and corporate investment

Review of Finance 2024 28(2), 593-619 open access
We study the impact of an urban land titling program on firm investment in Shenzhen, China. We find that this program increased the investment rate for titling firms, but this positive effect only holds for politically connected firms. Further analysis suggests that the titling effect is more pronounced for those titling firms associated with greater expropriation risk. During program implementation, the connected titling firms increased their investment perhaps because, as observed, they experienced fewer disputes than non-connected titling firms.

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms

Review of Finance 2010 14(4), 669-694 open access
We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents.

Credit Default Swaps and Bank Regulatory Capital

Review of Finance 2021 25(1), 121-152 open access
While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier.

Firms and Local Governments: Relationship Building during Political Turnovers

Review of Finance 2023 27(2), 739-762 open access
We study how firms build relations with local governments in emerging markets without established rules of political lobbying. We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially privately owned enterprises, POEs hereafter) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending,” for example, expenses for travel and entertainment among others. Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. In addition, we find that local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of the Chairmen or the CEOs of state-owned enterprises that are controlled by the local government. We also discuss and rule out several alternative explanations for the above findings.