Knowledge that Transforms

To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
2255 results ✕ Clear filters

Confident Risk Premiums and Investments Using Machine Learning Uncertainties

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(5), 1463-1505
Abstract This paper derives ex-ante confidence intervals for stock risk premium forecasts that are based on a wide range of linear and machine learning models. Exploiting the cross-sectional variation in the precision of risk premium forecasts, I provide improved investment strategies. The confident-high-low strategies that take long-short positions exclusively on stocks with precise risk premium forecasts outperform traditional high-low strategies in delivering superior out-of-sample returns and Sharpe ratios across all models. The outperformance increases (decreases) with the model complexity (bias). The confident-high-low strategies are economically interpretable as trading strategies of ambiguity-averse investors who account for confidence intervals around risk premium forecasts.

Why Do Traditional and Shadow Banks Coexist?

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(4), 1015-1053
Abstract Traditional and shadow banks interacted in similar ways in the 2007 and COVID-19 crises, when both assets and liabilities flew out of shadow banks and into traditional banks. We explain these facts in a model of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks in which liabilities and assets flow from the former to the latter in good times, avoiding regulation, and move the other way in a crisis, alleviating fire sales. The model sheds light on how regulations for traditional banks have (unintended) consequences on the shadow banking sector.

Fragility of Safe Asset Markets

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(5), 1310-1361
Abstract In March 2020, safe asset markets experienced surprising and unprecedented price crashes. We explain how strategic investor behavior can create such market fragility in a model with investors valuing safety, investors valuing liquidity, and constrained dealers. While safety investors and liquidity investors can form a symbiotic relationship with offsetting trades during times of stress, strategic interactions among liquidity investors harbor the potential for self-fulfilling fragility. When the market is fragile, standard flight-to-safety can have a destabilizing effect and trigger a “dash-for-cash” by liquidity investors. Well-designed policy interventions can reduce market fragility ex ante and restore orderly functioning ex post.

Dividend Momentum and Stock Return Predictability: A Bayesian Approach

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(5), 1506-1554
Abstract A long tradition in macro-finance studies the dynamics of aggregate stock returns and dividends using vector autoregressions, imposing the restrictions implied by the Campbell-Shiller (CS) identity to sharpen inference. We develop Bayesian methods that encode a priori skepticism about return predictability while imposing the restrictions. We highlight that persistence in dividend growth induces “dividend momentum,” a previously overlooked channel for return predictability. By combining Bayesian shrinkage and the CS restrictions, we obtain more plausible degrees of return predictability, superior out-of-sample forecasts, and Sharpe ratios, which cannot be obtained by using either shrinkage or the CS restrictions on their own.

Bank Risk-Taking and the Real Economy: Evidence from the Housing Boom and Its Aftermath

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(2), 427-458
Abstract During the U.S. housing credit boom, publicly traded banks increased mortgage lending activity and relaxed standards much more than privately held banks. The increase in risk had real effects for a variety of county-level aggregates including employment and consumption. Cross-sectional evidence and a quasi-experiment indicate that the increase in risk stemmed from the institutional ownership and the equity compensation of publicly traded banks, in turn leading banks to place greater weight on short-term equity performance. These results are consistent with the view that a focus on short-term earnings and stock prices amplifies boom–bust credit cycles, in turn leading to real cycles for the aggregate economy.

Dynamics of Asset Demands with Confidence Heterogeneity

Review of Financial Studies 2026
Abstract To understand the dynamics of investors’ asset demands, we develop a general-equilibrium model driven by a single latent variable: heterogeneity in investors’ confidence about mean endowment growth. The model predicts persistent heterogeneity in asset demands and concentrated portfolios. Consistent with the data, limited confidence reduces investors’ demand elasticities and makes stock prices excessively volatile—driven by latent demand rather than observable characteristics. The underlying economic mechanisms are driven primarily by investors’ desire to hedge changes in future beliefs instead of current disagreement. Finally, consistent with survey data, investors’ expectations correlate positively with past returns and negatively with future returns.

Too Good to Be True: Look-Ahead Bias in Empirical Options Research

Review of Financial Studies 2026
Abstract Numerous trading strategies examined in options research exhibit remarkably high mean returns and Sharpe ratios. We show some of these seemingly “good deals” are due to look-ahead biases. These biases stem from using information unavailable at the portfolio formation time to filter out observations suspected of being noisy or erroneous. Our results suggest that elevated Sharpe ratios may serve as potential indicators of such look-ahead biases. Furthermore, deviating from previous literature findings, we show that illiquidity is not strongly priced in stock options and that only a small set of stock characteristics are in fact associated with option expected returns. (JEL G12, G14, G17)

Portfolio Regulation of Financial Institutions with Market Power

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(4), 1177-1226
Abstract We examine how portfolio regulations affect risk sharing between financial institutions with market power. Unconstrained access to complete markets permits flexible exploitation of market power and induces inefficient risk sharing. Appropriate portfolio restrictions counteract this, improving liquidity and risk sharing by bundling securities with offsetting strategic incentives. However, excessive regulation can be counterproductive, destroying gains from trade. An application of our theory shows that cross-asset spillovers are critical for policy evaluation: in general equilibrium, risk sharing can improve even if certain asset-specific liquidity measures deteriorate. We also discuss the effects of asymmetric regulation for different institutions.

What Problem Do Intermediaries Solve? Evidence From Real Estate Markets

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(2), 562-604
Abstract We study intermediation in the housing market. Using data from an online platform utilized by real estate agents to generate leads, we identify exogenous intermediary attention arising from the quasi-randomized ordering of potential listings. Greater intermediary attention leads to an increased probability of listing with an agent and selling quickly, and a higher transaction price. The listing and transaction probabilities of neighboring properties decrease in intermediary attention. These results contrast sharply with endogenous correlations and provide causal evidence that intermediaries resolve property-level frictions deriving from search, information, or behavioral considerations but do not mitigate neighborhood-level information asymmetries.

Dynamic Coordination and Bankruptcy Regulations

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(4), 1116-1176
Abstract Many regulations aim to promote coordination among creditors in bankruptcy by ex post restricting their ability to exit distressed firms. However, such restrictions may harm creditors’ ex ante incentives to stay invested, thereby worsening coordination outcomes. We build a dynamic coordination model to show how this force shapes creditor runs, bankruptcy filings, and regulation designs. Intriguingly, filing for bankruptcy early, thereby preserving more assets for latecomers, can prolong firm life. Furthermore, regulators’ clawbacks on prebankruptcy repayments can be superior to firms’ commitment to early bankruptcy filing. Our analysis generates implications for automatic stay, avoidable preference, bank failures, and seniority structure.