We show that queue rationing under price controls is one driver of high-frequency trading. Uniform tick sizes constrain price competition and create rents for liquidity provision, particularly for securities with lower prices. The time priority rule allocates rents to high-frequency traders (HFTs) because of their speed advantage. An increase in relative tick size, defined as uniform tick sizes divided by security prices, increases the fraction of liquidity provided by HFTs but harms liquidity. We find that the message-to-trade ratio is a poor cross-sectional proxy for HFTs’ liquidity provision: stocks with more liquidity provided by HFTs have lower message-to-trade ratios. Received September 15, 2015; editorial decision October 7, 2017 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

Proxy advisory firms have become important players in corporate governance, but the extent of their influence over shareholder votes is debated. We estimate the effect of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations on voting outcomes by exploiting exogenous variation in ISS recommendations generated by a cutoff rule in ISS voting guidelines. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that from 2010 to 2011, a negative ISS recommendation on a say-on-pay proposal leads to a 25 percentage point reduction in say-on-pay voting support, suggesting a strong influence over shareholder votes. We also use our setting to examine the informational role of ISS recommendations. Received April 13, 2015; editorial decision June 13, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We develop a stock return-predictive measure based on an efficient aggregation of the portfolio holdings of all actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, and use this model to study the source of fund managers' stock-selection abilities. This generalized-inverse alpha (GIA) approach reveals differences in the ability of managers to predict firms' future earnings from fundamental research. Notably, the GIA's return-forecasting power is not subsumed by publicly available quantitative predictors, such as momentum, value, and earnings quality, nor is it subsumed by methods shown in past research to forecast stock returns using fund holdings or trades.

We propose a theory of security design in financing entrepreneurial production, positing that the investor can acquire costly information on the entrepreneur’s project before making the financing decision. When the entrepreneur has enough bargaining power in security design, the optimal security helps incentivize both efficient information acquisition and efficient financing. Debt is optimal when information is not very valuable for production, whereas the combination of debt and equity is optimal when information is valuable. If, instead, the investor has sufficiently strong bargaining power in security design or can acquire information only after financing, equity is optimal

Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes and also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades off these two forces. As the platform develops, it optimally increases platform prescreening intensity but decreases information provision to investors. Using novel investor-level data, we find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and this outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors. Our findings shed light on the optimal distribution of information production in this new lending model.Received August 29, 2018; editorial decision July 1, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We examine the optimal dynamic portfolio decisions for investors who acquire housing services from either renting or owning a house. Our results show that when indifferent between owning and renting, investors owning a house hold a lower equity proportion in their net worth (bonds, stocks, and home equity), reflecting the substitution effect, yet hold a higher equity proportion in their liquid portfolios (bonds and stocks), reflecting the diversification effect. Furthermore, following the suboptimal policy of always renting leads investors to overweigh in stocks, while following the suboptimal policy of always owning a house causes investors to underweigh in stocks.

Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are typically viewed as passive index trackers. In contrast, we show that corporate bond ETFs actively manage their portfolios, trading off index tracking against liquidity transformation. In our model, ETFs optimally choose creation and redemption baskets that include cash and only a subset of index assets, especially if those assets are illiquid. Our evidence supports the model. We find that ETFs dynamically adjust their baskets to correct portfolio imbalances while facilitating ETF arbitrage. Basket inclusion improves bond liquidity in general, but worsens it in periods of large imbalance between creations and redemptions, such as the COVID-19 crisis.

We identify fixed-income mutual funds as an important contributor to the unusually high selling pressure in liquid asset markets during the COVID-19 crisis. We show that mutual funds experienced pronounced investor outflows amplified by their liquidity transformation. In meeting redemptions, funds followed a pecking order by first selling their liquid assets, including Treasuries and high-quality corporate bonds, which generated the most concentrated selling pressure in these markets. Overall, the estimated price impact of mutual funds was sizable at a third of the increase in Treasury yields and a quarter of the increase in corporate bond yields during the COVID-19 crisis.

“Founder-friendly” venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.

We study how firms allocate cash flow by estimating the cash-flow sensitivities of various uses of cash flow. We decompose cash flow into a transitory and a permanent component and focus on the allocation of the transitory component, which by construction contains little information about future growth opportunities. We find that more financially constrained firms allocate more transitory cash flow to cash savings and direct less toward investment than do less constrained firms, consistent with constrained firms accumulating liquidity to buffer against future financial constraints. We also illustrate several methodological advantages of our approach over alternative methods in previous studies.