Knowledge that Transforms

I analyze the inter vivo transfers and bequest decisions of 700,000 individuals during a period when the decision maker receives negative news regarding their life expectancy. The event that initiates the news is a health outcome. Expected mortality increases both the likelihood of transferring wealth to the next generation and the amount transferred. The size of the inter vivo transfer and bequest are positively related to the wealth of the parent and the severity of the diagnosis, regardless of diagnosis-specific demand for informal care. Using a structural life cycle model, I estimate the bequest parameters that are consistent with the causal effect estimates.

We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings.

Following the onset of COVID-19, research production in economics and finance (measured by the posting of working papers) increased by 29%. Production increases were widespread across geographies, job titles, departments, and ages with larger increases in top departments and for people under the age of 35. Men and women both experienced production increases with the exception of women between the age of 35 and 49, who experienced no production gains despite large increases for men in the same age group. COVID-19 increased reliance on past coauthorship networks, with larger production gains for authors that are more central to the network.

A repurchase agreement (repo) is a source of cash and collateral. We document that the money market is more segmented when the collateral motive prevails. Two crucial aspects of the central bank framework lead to this disconnect: banks’ access to the central bank’s deposit facility and assets’ eligibility for quantitative easing (QE). We show that repo rates lent by banks with access to the deposit facility and secured by QE eligible assets are more collateral-driven and disconnected from funding-based money market rates. Our results are relevant for different monetary policies and have suggestive implications for the monetary policy pass-through.

Benchmarking incentivizes fund managers to invest a fraction of their funds’ assets in their benchmark indexes, and such demand is inelastic. We construct a measure of inelastic demand a stock attracts, benchmarking intensity (BMI), computed as its cumulative weight in all benchmarks, weighted by assets following each benchmark. Exploiting the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff, we show that changes in stocks’ BMIs instrument for changes in ownership of benchmarked investors. The resultant demand elasticities are low. We document that both active and passive fund managers buy additions to their benchmarks and sell deletions. Finally, an increase in BMI lowers future stock returns.

We label the degree to which individuals are more optimistic at long horizons relative to short horizons as the horizon bias. We examine whether time-series variation in the horizon bias can explain the time-series variation in the equity term structure. We use analyst earnings forecasts to measure the degree of the horizon bias in the stock market. Consistent with the intuition from a stylized present value model, we find that periods of above-average horizon bias are associated with negative term premiums, whereas periods of below-average horizon bias are associated with positive term premiums.

This paper documents that U.S. equity returns are large and positive during the opening hours of European markets. These returns are pervasive and highly economically and statistically significant. Consistent with models of inventory risk, we demonstrate a strong relationship with order imbalances at the close of the preceding U.S. trading day. Rationalizing unconditionally positive “overnight drift” returns, we uncover an asymmetric reaction to demand shocks: market sell-offs generate robust positive overnight reversals, while reversals following market rallies are much more modest. We argue that demand shock asymmetry can arise in inventory management models with time-varying market maker risk-bearing capacity.

We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure.

We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results.

Over 140 countries agreed on a fundamental corporate tax reform in 2021 to be implemented in 2023 and beyond. To measure its potential effects, we study asset price changes within minutes of the reform announcements. We construct proxies for the reform’s costs regarding U.S. companies’ tax burdens and countries’ public finances. Likely exposed companies exhibit significant negative stock returns. Our lower-bound estimates indicate total shareholder value losses of $112.6 billion one day after the reform announcements. Further, likely exposed countries experience increases in sovereign debt credit risk. Our findings inform the cost-benefit analysis of a historical international tax reform.