Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Between 2009 and 2011, the Spanish banking system underwent a restructuring process based on savings banks’ consolidation. The program’s design allows us to study how banks’ consolidation affects credit supply and performance. We propose a quasi-experimental analysis showing that bank mergers restrict credit supply and set higher interest rates but also reject fewer applicants and report fewer nonperforming loans. We then estimate a structural model of credit in which banks set interest rates and lending standards. We find that, despite the relaxation in their lending standards, merged banks’ credit performance improved thanks to a significant drop in their screening costs.

Abstract We study the structure of public firm buyouts in a model that features the Berle-Means problem (lack of incentives) and the Grossman-Hart problem (holdout). We find that bootstrapping, debt in excess of funding needs, and upfront fees to bidders are socially optimal and increase buyout premiums. These elements make LBO financing tantamount to a “management contract” arranged by an outside manager to receive cash and incentives to manage a firm—except the cash is funded by excess debt imposed on the firm. Our model also rationalizes why PE firms collect fees from their equity partnerships and directly from target firms.

Abstract Wholesale market makers pay for retail options orders that must be executed on exchanges. Payment for order flow (PFOF) wholesalers compete via price improvement in exchange auctions. To attract retail orders, wholesalers run more auctions when their recent price improvement has been lower. However, auction price improvement lowers market maker revenues. Wholesalers earn revenues to pay PFOF in nonauction trades where their designated market maker status increases their execution priority. While some auctions produce substantial price improvement, most do not have multiple bidders offering meaningful price improvement. Overall, options market structure better promotes competition in auctions than in nonauctions.

Abstract What explains wealth and portfolio differences between black and white Americans? We find that disparities in economic factors explain portfolios well, but only partly explain the wealth gap. In a dynamic setting, economic factors often change optimal saving rates in ways that offset their effects on income and returns. Consequently, their net wealth effect is often limited, making the wealth gap harder to explain. We estimate that differences in income levels, income risk, family structures, mortality, health expenditures, property taxes, mortgage rates, and asset returns explain half of the differential between the racial wealth gap and the racial income gap.

Abstract We build a novel data set of time-stamped corporate decarbonization commitments—green pledges—for U.S. public firms by classifying news articles with large language models and human validation. Firms announcing green pledges tend to be larger and browner than other firms, both within and across industries. Green pledges significantly raise stock prices, consistent with a reduction in the carbon premium, and predict sizable declines in future carbon emissions and emission intensities. These effects tend to be strongest for firms in brown industries. Green pledges thus appear credible, convey relevant new information to investors, and provide meaningful financial incentives to decarbonize. (JEL G14, G32, Q54, Q56)

Abstract We examine whether politicians affect local firms’ industrial pollution, and whether such effects are transmitted through plant-level networks to affect pollution in other regions. We first document that close Democrat wins in U.S. congressional races are associated with lower emissions and higher abatement at the plant level, especially when politicians have strong pro-environmental preferences. We also find evidence of reallocation: firms shift emissions away from areas represented by Democrats. However, reallocation is imperfect: firm-level costs are higher and market-to-book ratios lower if firms’ representation is more Democratic. Lower pollution-related illnesses around plants in Democratic districts suggest pass-through effects on local communities.

Abstract This paper studies whether the interplay of social comparisons in housing and rising income inequality contributed to the household debt boom in the United States between 1980 and 2007. We develop a tractable macroeconomic model with general social comparisons in housing to show that changes in the distribution of income affect aggregate housing demand, aggregate debt, and house prices if (and only if) social comparisons are asymmetric. In the empirically relevant case of upward-looking comparisons, rising inequality can rationalize a substantial share of the observed housing and debt boom.

Abstract Mergers and acquisitions are often motivated by an intention to create value from intangible assets. We develop a word list of intangibles and apply it to takeover announcements. One standard deviation more in intangible-related language (“intangibles talk”) lowers announcement returns for the acquirer by 0.53 percentage points and predicts worse operating performance. Bidder managers appear to believe in the deals nonetheless, as evidenced by insider trades, payment choices, and completion probabilities and speed. Overall, takeover announcement texts reveal important information about hard-to-measure aspects of deal quality.

Abstract Some bank regulators require that performance bonuses for risk managers (RMs) and for employees in front offices (FOs) be linked to distinct performance metrics, as correlated pay incentives could lead RMs to rubber-stamp risky investments. We theoretically show that a positive correlation between FOs and RMs is optimal for banks, but can be socially excessive in leveraged institutions. Using data from German bank employees, we show empirically that incentive pay is indeed positively correlated between RMs and FOs. Consistent with our predictions, bonus correlations are higher in banks with higher leverage and weaker performance during the Great Financial Crisis.

Abstract During the 2020–2021 “AAPI Hate,” mutual funds led by female managers perceived as East Asian underperformed relative to other female managers. This effect is stronger in states with higher anti-Asian animus, among more actively managed funds, and when these managers hold sole or senior roles. Factors concurrent with COVID-19, including childcare challenges, concerns for overseas families, marketplace and workplace discrimination, and exposure to the Chinese economy, cannot explain the effect. Underperformance is traceable to poor stock picking due to impairments in generating private information. Racial-ethnic animosity, even outside workplace or marketplace, hinders productivity and decision-making in high-skill professions.