Knowledge that Transforms

We present a portfolio choice demand model that allows for the nonparametric estimation of investors’ (subjective) expectations and risk preferences. Using comprehensive 401(k)-plan-level data from 2009 through 2019, we explore heterogeneity in asset allocations using our empirical framework. We recover investors’ beliefs about each asset and examine the implications and potential sources of those beliefs. Heterogeneity in expectations across investors accounts for twice as much variation in portfolio holdings as heterogeneity in risk aversion. Belief heterogeneity is partly driven by investors’ characteristics and experiences, reflecting local sources of information such as county-level GDP and employers’ past performance.

We study how intraday and overnight components of past returns predict future stock returns from 1926 to 2019. Portfolios formed on past intraday returns display momentum without long-term reversal, whereas portfolios formed on past overnight returns display no momentum. We link this asymmetric day-night pattern to the fact that most trading occurs intraday, which has remained stable over time. Evidence from international stock markets, intraday intervals, and analyst expectations suggests that investors underreact to private information revealed through trading. This underreaction mechanism is most consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) theory of momentum.

This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. We find that while public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to exit rather than to exercise their voice (vote). As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. Overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, slightly more precise public information can lead to a discontinuous reduction in firm value. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.

This paper examines CEO pay at nonprofits. Using compensation data for 14,111 nonprofits, we find that CEO pay dropped by 2% after legislation in New York reduced CEOs’ ability to influence their own pay. Despite lower pay, CEOs exerted more effort, and nonprofit performance improved. The effects were stronger at commercial nonprofits than at charities and for male CEOs than female CEOs. These findings are consistent with a model where some nonprofit CEOs derive meaning from their work and compensation can be rigged. Overall, our results suggest that regulation that targets the pay-setting process can improve organizational outcomes at nonprofits.

This paper introduces a key factor influencing households’ decision to invest in the stock market: how people view stockholders. Using surveys we conducted with nearly 8,500 individuals from 11 countries, we document that a large majority hold negative views of stockholders based on identity-relevant characteristics. Linking survey and administrative data, we find that negative perceptions strongly predict households’ stock market participation. We show that negative perceptions causally influence household decision-making and provide evidence supporting identity concerns as the underlying mechanism. Our findings provide new perspectives on the malleability of financial decision-making and a novel explanation for low stock market participation.

Why do individuals pay debt interest when they could use their savings to pay down the debt? We explore why individuals “cohold” debt and savings using detailed and highly disaggregated daily-level data on household finances. We find that coholding mostly occurs in short spells within the month and the level of coholding is typically modest. Periods of coholding are not associated with shocks at the individual level. We show that mental accounting has a role to play in explaining coholding, in particular how individuals allocate different categories of expenditure to accounts in credit and debit.

We develop a dynamic theory of “Partial Equilibrium Thinking” (PET), which micro-founds time-varying return extrapolation: extrapolative beliefs are present at all times, but only sometimes manifest themselves in explosive ways. We formalize the distinction between normal times shocks and “displacement shocks,” and study their interaction with extrapolative beliefs. In normal times, PET generates constant extrapolation and momentum. After a displacement shock that increases uncertainty, PET leads to stronger and time-varying extrapolation, triggering bubbles and endogenous crashes. Our theory sheds light on both market dynamics in normal times and Kindleberger’s narrative of bubbles within a unified framework.

Do real assets protect against inflation? Stocks’ core inflation betas are negative, while their energy betas are positive. Currencies, commodities, and real estate mostly hedge against energy inflation, but not core inflation. These hedging properties are reflected in the prices of inflation risks: only core inflation carries a negative risk premium, and its magnitude is consistent within and across asset classes, uniquely among macroeconomic risk factors. Energy inflation has become more procyclical and volatile since the 1990s, which helps explain the time-varying correlation between stock and bond returns. A two-sector New Keynesian asset pricing model accounts for these facts quantitatively.

When members of the same household have different risk preferences, whose preference matters more for investment decisions and why? We propose an intrahousehold model that aggregates individual preferences at the household level as a result of bargaining. We structurally estimate the model, analyze the determinants of bargaining power, and find a significant gender gap. Gender differences in individual characteristics, as well as gender effects, partially explain the gap. These patterns hold broadly across Australia, Germany, and the United States. We further link the distribution of bargaining power to households’ perceived gender norms in a cross-sectional analysis. (JEL G11, G41, G50)

We first document that, despite potential legal issues, overlapping directors are surprisingly prevalent among direct competitors. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, we find that competing firms in markets with dense overlapping-director networks experience innovation herding, lose product differentiation, and, ultimately, perform poorly. Novel text-based network propagation tests of technologies show that intellectual property leakage plays a role as firms with dense overlapping director networks experience faster propagation of technologies to competitors. Our findings suggest a coordination problem where industry participants cannot stop rivals from earning small gains from leakage despite much larger industry-wide negative externalities.