Knowledge that Transforms

We study the share privatization process in China to investigate whether and how the removal of market frictions is associated with efficiency gains. Prior to the reform, domestic A-shares were divided into tradable and non-tradable shares. As a result of the reform, holders of non-tradable shares compensated holders of tradable shares in order to make their shares tradable. We show that size is positively associated with both the gain in risk sharing and the price impact of more shares coming on the market as a result of the reform. Our study highlights the role of risk sharing in China's share issue privatization process. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We analyze a comprehensive set of mergers and acquisitions from SDC data from 1992 through 2009. We do not impose common restrictions such as excluding private bidders, small targets, or deals without a deal value. We show a broader scope of mergers and acquisitions activity than that implied in the literature, which generally oversamples larger deals involving public firms. Further, some of our results differ from the extant literature. For example, the finding that mergers occur in waves is attenuated with a greater presence of smaller and/or non-public firms. Also, acquirers gain in most takeovers despite a threefold decline over the sample period in acquirer returns.

The massive losses that banks incurred with the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market have raised concerns about their ability to continue lending to corporations. We investigate these concerns. We find that firms paid higher loan spreads during the subprime crisis. Importantly, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred larger losses. These results hold after we control for firm-, bank-, and loan-specific factors, and account for endogeneity of bank losses. These findings, together with our evidence that borrowers took out smaller loans during the crisis when they borrowed from banks that incurred larger losses, lend support to the concerns about bank lending following their subprime losses. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We quantify the effect of recourse on default and find that recourse affects default by lowering the borrower's sensitivity to negative equity. At the mean value of the default option for defaulted loans, borrowers are 30% more likely to default in non-recourse states. Furthermore, for homes appraised at $500,000 to $750,000, borrowers are twice as likely to default in non-recourse states. We also find that defaults are more likely to occur through a lender-friendly procedure, such as a deed in lieu, in states that allow deficiency judgments. We find no evidence that mortgage interest rates are lower in recourse states.

This article studies bank failures in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. By using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival, we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak. This Too-Many-to-Fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors, financial crises, the Too-Big-to-Fail effect, domestic financial development, and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers. The article also shows that the Too-Many-to-Fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit.

We study 134 vote-no campaigns and 1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007. Union pension funds sponsor most of these initiatives, yet their targeting criteria do not appear to reflect labor-related motives. Shareholders favor proposals related to the pay-setting process (e.g., subject severance pay to shareholder approval) over proposals that micromanage pay level or structure. While activists target firms with high CEO pay (whether excessive or not), voting support is higher only at firms with excess CEO pay. Firms with excess CEO pay targeted by vote-no campaigns experience a significant reduction in CEO pay ($7.3 million). Our findings contribute to the debate on “say on pay” and other reforms empowering shareholders.

Standard approaches to building and estimating dynamic term structure models rely on the assumption that yields can serve as the factors. However, the assumption is neither theoretically necessary nor empirically supported. This article documents that almost half of the variation in bond risk premia cannot be detected using the cross-section of yields. Fluctuations in this hidden component have strong forecast power for both future short-term interest rates and excess bond returns. They are also negatively correlated with aggregate economic activity, but macroeconomic variables explain only a small fraction of variation in the hidden factor. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We propose a new, valuation-based measure of world equity market segmentation. While we observe decreased levels of segmentation in many countries, the level of segmentation remains significant in emerging markets. We characterize the factors that account for variation in market segmentation both through time as well as across countries. Both a country's regulation with respect to foreign capital flows and certain nonregulatory factors are important. In particular, we identify a country's political risk profile and its stock market development as two additional local segmentation factors as well as the U.S. corporate credit spread as a global segmentation factor.

We document the cross-sectional properties of corporate dividend-smoothing policies and relate them to extant theories. We find that younger, smaller firms, firms with low dividend yields and more volatile earnings and returns, and firms with fewer and more disperse analyst forecasts smooth less. Firms that are cash cows, with low growth prospects, weaker governance, and greater institutional holdings, smooth more. We also document that dividend smoothing has steadily increased over the past 80 years, even before firms began using share repurchases in the mid-1980s. Taken together, our results suggest that dividend smoothing is most common among firms that are not financially constrained, face low levels of asymmetric information, and are most susceptible to agency conflicts. These findings provide challenges and guidance for the developing theoretical literature.

Mutual funds change their risk levels significantly over time. Risk shifting might be caused by ill-motivated trades of unskilled or agency-prone fund managers who trade to increase their personal compensation. Alternatively, risk shifting might occur when skilled fund managers trade to take advantage of their stock selection and timing abilities. This article investigates the performance consequences of risk shifting and sheds light on the mechanisms and the economic motivations behind risk-shifting behavior. Using a holdings-based measure of risk shifting, we find that funds that increase risk perform worse than funds that keep stable risk levels over time, suggesting that risk shifting either is an indication of inferior ability or is motivated by agency issues.