Knowledge that Transforms

We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.

We analyze the impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on real decision-making within the firm. Our structural model predicts that CDS introduction increases debt capacity more when uncertainty about the credit events that trigger CDS payment is lower. Using a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries, we find that CDSs increase leverage more in legal and market environments where uncertainty about CDS obligations is reduced and when property rights are weaker. Our results highlight the importance of legal uncertainty in the interpretation of the underlying trigger events of global credit derivatives.

We propose testing asset pricing models using multihorizon returns (MHRs). MHRs effectively generate a new set of test assets that is endogenous to the model and that identifies a broad set of possible conditional misspecifications. We apply MHR-based testing to prominent linear factor models and show that these models typically do a poor job of pricing longer-horizon returns, with pricing errors that are similar in magnitude to the risk premiums they were designed to explain. We trace the errors to the conditional factor dynamics. Explicitly incorporating factor timing into the models often makes mispricing worse, thereby posing a challenge for future research.

This paper documents evidence that financial constraints increase firms’ toxic emissions given that firms actively trade off abatement costs against potential legal liabilities. Exploring three quasi-natural experiments in which firms’ financial resources are likely exogenously affected, we find that relaxing financial constraints reduces U.S. public firms’ toxic releases. The effects of financial constraints on toxic releases are amplified when regulatory enforcement and external monitoring weaken. Overall, our evidence highlights the real effects of financial constraints in the form of environmental pollution, which is a costly negative externality imposed on society and public health.

Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the model’s general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.

Higher country taxes on noxious manufacturing emissions lead to substantial increases in firms’ R&D spending. The R&D response is entirely driven by those high-pollution firms most affected by emissions taxes. Pollution taxes increase the marginal value of R&D spending in polluting firms, even when this spending does not lead to new innovation. Pollution taxes have the strongest effect on R&D investment in sectors in which new invention is difficult to appropriate and outside knowledge is easier to acquire, suggesting an important reason dirty firms invest in R&D is to expand their capacity to absorb external knowledge and technical know-how.

We study how retail savings products can share market risk across investor cohorts, thereby completing financial markets. Financial intermediaries smooth returns by varying reserves, which are passed on between successive investor cohorts, thereby redistributing wealth across cohorts. Using data on euro contracts sold by life insurers in France, we estimate this redistribution to be large: 0.8% of GDP. We develop and provide evidence for a model in which low investor sophistication, while leading to individually suboptimal decisions, improves risk sharing by allowing intercohort risk sharing.

Do potential entrepreneurs remain in wage employment because of concerns that they will face worse job opportunities should their entrepreneurial ventures fail? Using a Canadian reform that extends job-protected leave to one year for women giving birth after a cutoff date, we study whether the option to return to a previous job increases entrepreneurship. A regression discontinuity design reveals that a longer job-protected leave increases entrepreneurship by 1.9 percentage points. These entrepreneurs start incorporated businesses that hire employees, in industries in which experimentation before entry has low costs and high benefits.

I document large variation in empirical methodology in corporate finance regressions in top finance journals. Although methodological variation allows for customization of empirical tests to fit specific theories, it can also enable excessive reporting of statistically significant results. For example, given discretion over 10 routine methodological decisions, a researcher could report that over 70% of randomly generated variables are statistically significant determinants of leverage at the 5% level. The methodological decisions that affect statistical significance the most are dependent variable selection, variable transformation, and outlier treatment. I discuss remedies that can mitigate the negative effects of methodological variation.

Public pension boards fear inciting stakeholder outrage if they compensate internal investment managers with market-level salaries. We derive theoretical implications in an agency-portfolio-choice model motivated by inequality aversion. In a global sample, relaxing the effect of outrage on contracting leads to an average annual incremental value-added of $49 million generated through 11 bps in higher excess returns from risky assets, at the cost of $302,429 in additional compensation. Governance reforms that address outrage by reducing political appointees or requiring independent skills-based boards can increase the annual value-added. These findings are orthogonal to costly political distortions from underfunding and pay-to-play schemes.