Knowledge that Transforms

The value a director provides to a firm is empirically difficult to establish. We estimate that value by exploiting the commonality in idiosyncratic returns of firms linked by a director and show that, on average, a director’s influence causes variation in firm value of almost 1% per year. The return commonality is not due to industry or other observable economic links. Variation in the availability of information on shared directors and a placebo test exploiting the timing of shared directors provide further identification. The results also imply that the directorial labor market does not fully assess directors in real time.

We consider the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating and a price on a risky bond both provide verifiable signals about a non-contractible state. We allow the investor to both impose ex ante restrictions on the manager’s action and provide outcome-based compensation. The optimal contract is a prohibitive one when the rating and price indicate a high likelihood of a low state, and relies on wages when the low state is less likely. We provide some observable implications of our contracting approach to ratings.

Geophysicists examine and document the repercussions for the earth’s climate induced by alternative emission scenarios and model specifications. Using simplified approximations, they produce tractable characterizations of the associated uncertainty. Meanwhile, economists write highly stylized damage functions to speculate about how climate change alters macroeconomic and growth opportunities. How can we assess both climate and emissions impacts, as well as uncertainty in the broadest sense, in social decision-making? We provide a framework for answering this question by embracing recent decision theory and tools from asset pricing, and we apply this structure with its interacting components to a revealing quantitative illustration.

We examine whether bankers face disciplining consequences for structuring poorly performing corporate loans. We construct a novel data set containing the employment histories and loan portfolios of a large sample of corporate bankers and find that corporate credit events (i.e., downgrades, defaults, bankruptcies) increase banker turnover. The effect is pronounced when bankers issue loans with loose terms or experience severe losses. Credit events prompt bankers to adopt stricter future risk management practices, such as offering restrictive covenant packages. Overall, our findings are consistent with banks disciplining employees as a means to manage their own risk exposure.

We examine the effects of an order cancellation fee on limit order flow and execution quality in the PHLX options market. The cancellation fee on professional order flow effectively reduces the rate at which limit orders are canceled. Whereas the cancellation fee discourages the submission of nonmarketable orders, it encourages the submission of marketable orders. Consequently, nonmarketable order fill rates increase; marketable order fill speeds decrease; and bid-ask spreads widen. We also find slight increases in both dollar volume and market share.

We identify flight-to-safety (FTS) days for twenty-three countries using only stock and bond returns and a model averaging approach. FTS days comprise less than 2% of the sample and are associated with a 2.7% average bond-equity return differential and significant flows out of equity funds and into government bond and money market funds. FTS represents flights to both quality and liquidity in international equity markets, but mainly a flight to quality in the U.S. corporate bond market. Emerging markets, endowment funds, and hedge funds perform poorly during FTS, whereas hedge funds appear to vary their systematic exposures prior to an FTS.

We examine the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations. Banks, not internalizing fire sale externalities, overinvest in risky assets and underinvest in liquid assets in the competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can alleviate the inefficiency, but banks respond by decreasing their liquidity ratios. When capital requirements are the only available tool, the regulator tightens them to offset banks’ lower liquidity ratios, leading to fewer risky assets and less liquidity compared with the second best. Macroprudential liquidity requirements that complement capital regulations implement the second best, improve financial stability, and allow for more investment in risky assets.

We document three phenomena we jointly refer to as monthly payment targeting. First, using data from 500,000 used auto loans and discontinuities in contract terms offered by hundreds of lenders, we show that demand is more sensitive to maturity than to interest rate, consistent with consumers managing payment size when making debt decisions. Second, many consumers appear to employ segregated mental accounts, spending exogenous payment savings on larger loans. Third, consumers bunch at round number monthly payment amounts, consistent with heuristic budgeting. That these patterns hold in subsamples of likely constrained and unconstrained borrowers challenges liquidity constraints as a complete explanation.

We study the transmission of financial shocks across borders through international bank connections. Using data on cross-border interbank loans among 6,000 banks during 1997–2012, we estimate the effect of asset-side exposures to banks in countries experiencing systemic banking crises on profitability, credit, and the performance of borrower firms. Crisis exposures reduce bank returns and tighten credit conditions for borrowers, constraining investment and growth. The effects are larger for foreign borrowers, including in countries not experiencing banking crises. Our results document the extent of cross-border crisis transmission, but also highlight the resilience of financial networks to idiosyncratic shocks.

Using a unique setting in China, where the geographic distance between collective firms and local governments is highly persistent because of legal restrictions on land ownership and mobility, we investigate the role of government involvement in small firms. In our analysis of survey responses, we find that weaker government involvement, measured by greater distance from government, is associated with higher firm autonomy and reduced taxes, protectionism, and anticompetitive behavior. In our analysis of firm-level financial data, we find that distant firms have better operating performance, higher growth, and higher entry rates. We find similar results around exogenous government office relocations.