Knowledge that Transforms

[We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with competitive market makers and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in prices only after a long series of dividend observations. Thus, the insider's information is "long-lived." Surprisingly, however, the monopolistic insider chooses to reveal her information very quickly, within a time converging to zero as the market approaches continuous trading. Although the market converges to strong-form efficiency, the insider's profits do not converge to zero.]

[We analyze an intertemporal portfolio problem with both taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts. Using a tax-arbitrage argument, we identify conditions under which the optimal location decision (where to place an asset) is separable from the allocation decision (how much to allocate to each asset). Investors place highly taxed assets in the tax-deferred account to maximize the tax benefit and adjust their taxable portfolios to achieve the optimal risk exposure. We show that the two-account problem can be reduced to a taxable-account-only problem. The results are robust to capital gains tax deferrals, consumption and contribution decisions, and stochastic tax rates.]

[We consider the choice between stocks and options to provide effort incentives to a risk-averse manager. We show that stocks can dominate options as a means of motivation only if nonviability risk is substantial, as in financially distressed firms or start-ups. Options dominate stocks for other firms. These results hold regardless of the existing portfolio of the manager. We provide empirical evidence that higher bankruptcy risk is indeed correlated with more use of stock.]

[This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody' s KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.]

[On August 12-13, 2005, the department of finance at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, collaborated with the "Review of Financial Studies" to host a conference titled "The Causes and Consequences of Recent Financial Market Bubbles." This article begins with our overview of the themes and findings of the conference, and it ends with the questions that the literature has yet to answer.]

[Microstructure researchers have long understood that information quality has an effect on price formation in the underlying asset market. However, option researchers have largely ignored the fact that information quality might also impact the options market. This article characterizes the nature of the impact by showing how option prices and implied volatility levels are related to the forward looking information quality path. This result follows from a noisy rational expectations model that abandons the normal distribution in favor of the gamma distribution, but maintains the standard assumption of exponential utility. Thus the new model bridges the gap between the microstructure literature that relies so heavily on the normal-exponential framework, and the options literature that relies exclusively on models that are consistent with the limited liability of stock prices. The model's tractability allows for a robustness check against the standard framework and provides a viable setting for analyzing the empirical implications of information quality for the options market.]

[We test and confirm the hypothesis that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns. Attention-driven buying results from the difficulty that investors have searching the thousands of stocks they can potentially buy. Individual investors do not face the same search problem when selling because they tend to sell only stocks they already own. We hypothesize that many investors consider purchasing only stocks that have first caught their attention. Thus, preferences determine choices after attention has determined the choice set.]

[This article presents a model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors. We determine when one would expect inside versus outside directors to control the board, when the controlling party will delegate decisionmaking to the other party, the extent of communication between the parties, and the number of outside directors. We show that shareholders can sometimes be better off with an insidercontrolled board. We derive endogenous relationships among profits, board control, and the number of outside directors that call into question the usual interpretation of some documented empirical regularities.]

[This paper proposes a new family of specification tests and applies them to affine term structure models of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-swap curve. Contrary to Dai and Singleton (2000), the tests show that when standard estimation techniques are used, affine models do a poor job of forecasting volatility at the short end of the term structure. Improving the volatility forecast does not require different models; rather, it requires a different estimation technique. The paper distinguishes between two econometric procedures for identifying volatility. The "cross-sectional" approach backs out volatility from a cross section of bond yields, and the "time-series" approach imputes volatility from time-series variation in yields. For an affine model, the volatility implied by the time-series procedure passes the specification tests, while the cross-sectionally identified volatility does not. This is surprising, since under correct specification, the "cross-sectional" approach is maximum likelihood. One explanation is that affine models are slightly misspecified; another is that bond yields do not span volatility, as in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002).]

[We develop a continuous-time model in which a portfolio manager is hired by a management company. On the basis of observed portfolio returns, all agents update their beliefs about the manager's skills. In response, investors can move capital into or out of the mutual fund, and the management company can fire the manager. Introducing firing rationalizes several empirically documented findings, such as the positive relation between manager tenure and fund size or the increase of portfolio risk before a manager replacement and the following risk decrease. The analysis predicts that the critical performance threshold that triggers firing increases signifi-cantly over a manager's tenure and that management replacements are accompanied by capital inflows when a young manager is replaced but may be accompanied by capital outflows when a manager with a long tenure is fired. Our model yields much lower valuation levels for management companies than simple applications of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods and is thus more consistent with empirical observations.]