Knowledge that Transforms

[I model the contrasting capital-labor decisions of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. I show that financially restricted firms use relatively more labor than physical capital because informed employees provide more efficient financing than uninformed capital suppliers. I demonstrate that constrained firms cannot easily attract new employees to replace existing staff. Their greater employee retention aligns owner-worker incentives and encourages workers to make firm-specific investments. Constrained firms, however, gradually suffer from their inability to replace low-quality workers, such that their relative labor productivity decreases over time. Empirical tests utilizing instrumental variables confirm several implications of the theory.]

[An investment factor, long in low-investment stocks and short in high-investment stocks, helps explain the new issues puzzle. Adding the investment factor into standard factor regressions reduces the SEO underperformance by about 75%, the IPO underperformance by 80%, the underperformance following convertible debt offerings by 50%, and Daniel and Titman's (2006) composite issuance effect by 40%. The reason is that issuers invest more than nonissuers, and the investment factor earns a significantly positive average return of 0.57% per month.]

[International law prescribes that in a cross-border acquisition of 100% of the target shares, the target firm becomes a national of the country of the acquiror, and consequently subject to its corporate governance system. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value. We construct measures of the change in investor protection in a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 countries. We find that the better the shareholder protection and accounting standards in the acquiror's country, the higher the merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions.]

[In a Lucas exchange economy with standard power utility, we study asset prices under learning and ambiguous information. In contrast with models featuring only learning or ambiguity, our model is successful in matching the equity premium, the interest rate, and the volatility of stock returns under empirically reasonable parameters. Our closed-form formulas also show that a severe downward bias arises in the empirical relation between stock returns and return volatility. We quantify this bias in simulations and show that our model can explain why such a relation is difficult to detect in the data.]

[Using a sample of European venture capital (VC) investments, I study the relation between VC contracts and exits. The data indicate that ex ante, stronger VC control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will exit by an acquisition, rather than through a write-off or an IPO. My findings are robust to controls for a variety of factors, including endogeneity and cases in which the VC preplans the exit at the time of contract choice. My findings are consistent with control-based theories of financial contracting, such as Aghion and Bolton (1992).]

[This paper examines bank behavior in venture capital. It considers the relation between a bank's venture capital investments and its subsequent lending, which can be thought of as intertemporal cross-selling. Theory suggests that unlike independent venture capital firms, banks may be strategic investors who seek complementarities between venture capital and lending activities. We find evidence that banks use venture capital investments to build lending relationships. Having a prior relationship with a company in the venture capital market increases a bank's chance of subsequently granting a loan to that company. Companies can benefit from these relationships through more favorable loan pricing.]

[This article studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in bubble stocks amounts to herding and contracts with high incentives induce managers to diverge from the herd, thus reducing their holding of bubble stocks. The differential exposure to bubble stocks significantly impacted the funds' performance both in the period prior to March 2000, as well as afterwards.]

["The Review of Financial Studies" has among its missions the facilitation and promotion of a vigorous academic debate across unsettled questions in finance. This issue represents a cross section of views regarding one such debate: Can ourempirical models accurately forecast the equity premium any better than the historical mean? Or, is the forecast our empirical models give us any more accurate than what we would get by simply using the historical mean?]

[This article interprets the well-known value effect through the implications of standard Q-theory. An investment growth factor, defined as the difference in returns between low-investment stocks and high-investment stocks, contains information similar to the Fama and French (1993) value factor (HML), and can explain the value effect about as well as HML. In the cross-section, portfolios of firms with low investment growth rates (IGRs) or low investment-to-capital ratios have significantly higher average returns than those with high IGRs or high investment-to-capital ratios. The value effect largely disappears after controlling for investment, and the investment effect is robust against controls for the marginal product of capital. These results are consistent with the predictions of a standard Q-theory model with a stochastic discount factor.]

[This paper investigates the international asset allocation effects of time-variations in higherorder moments of stock returns such as skewness and kurtosis. In the context of a fourmoment International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) specification that relates stock returns in five regions to returns on a global market portfolio and allows for time-varying prices of covariance, co-skewness, and co-kurtosis risk, we find evidence of distinct bull and bear regimes. Ignoring such regimes, an unhedged US investor's optimal portfolio is strongly diversified internationally. The presence of regimes in the return distribution leads to a substantial increase in the investor's optimal holdings of US stocks, as does the introduction of skewness and kurtosis preferences.]