Knowledge that Transforms

[We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs.]

[We analyze determinants of secondary debt market liquidity, identifying conditions under which a large investor can profitably buy stakes from small bondholders and offer unilateral debt relief to a distressed firm. We show that endogenous trading by small bondholders may result in multiple equilibria. Some equilibria entail vanishing liquidity and sharp increases in yields absent changing fundamentals. In turn, anticipation of illiquid equilibria induces firms to eschew public debt financing, since such equilibria create higher bankruptcy costs and debt illiquidity discounts. The model thus offers a rational micro-foundation for stylized facts commonly attributed to investor sentiment and CFO market timing. Finally, we show that the vulnerability of debt markets to multiple equilibria is highest during downturns, when small bondholders face severe adverse selection.]

[Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.]

[Should capital cost calculations be based on a global or local market benchmark? The December 2000 redefinition of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) global equity index was a natural experiment addressing this question. It is argued that this event triggered a portfolio shift (by index funds) large enough to affect the residual asset supplies constituting the global and local market benchmarks of all actively managed capital. Changes in the market benchmarks imply distinct and predictable changes to global and local stock betas. Exploring whether global or local beta changes best explain the cross-section of event returns reveals that stocks in developed markets are priced globally and not locally.]

[An originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of lending, where the originator of a loan sells it to various third parties, was a popular method of mortgage lending before the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. We show that banks with high involvement in the OTD market during the pre-crisis period originated excessively poor-quality mortgages. This result is not explained away by differences in observable borrower quality, geographical location of the property, or the cost of capital of high- and low-OTD banks. Instead, our evidence supports the view that the originating banks did not expend resources in screening their borrowers. The effect of OTD lending on poor mortgage quality is stronger for capital-constrained banks. Overall, we provide evidence that lack of screening incentives coupled with leverage-induced risk-taking behavior significantly contributed to the current subprime mortgage crisis.]

This article analyzes corporate responses to the liability risk arising from workers' exposure to newly identified carcinogens. We find that firms, especially those with weak balance sheets, tend to respond to such risks by acquiring large, unrelated businesses with relatively high operating cash flows. The diversifying growth appears to be primarily motivated by managers' personal exposure to their firms' risk in that the growth has negative announcement returns and is related to firms' external governance, managerial stockholdings, and institutional ownership. The results suggest that corporate governance is particularly important when firms are exposed to the risk of large, adverse shocks.

[Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007—2008 crisis.]

[Using microeconomic data for the United Kingdom, we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity market demand. We find that annuity market participation increases with financial wealth, life expectancy, and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then show that these empirically motivated determinants of annuity market participation have the same, quantitatively important, effects in a life-cycle model of annuity and life insurance demand, saving, and portfolio choice. Moreover, reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data. For stockholders, a strong bequest motive can simultaneously generate balanced portfolios and low annuity demand.]

[Assessing the impacts of bank mergers on small firms requires separating borrowers with single versus multiple banking relationships and distinguishing the three alternatives of "staying," "dropping," and "switching" of relationships. Single-relationship borrowers who "switch" to another bank following a merger will be less harmed than those whose relationship is "dropped" and not replaced. Using Belgian data, we find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks are more likely than other borrowers to be dropped. We track postmerger performance and show that many dropped target-bank borrowers are harmed by the merger. Multiple-relationship borrowers are less harmed, as they can better hedge against relationship discontinuations.]

[This article focuses on a key property of asset-backed securities (ABS); namely, that ABS are designed to achieve "bankruptcy remoteness" of securitized assets from the borrowing firm. This provides lenders with protection from dilution that is not available with contracts such as secured debt. ABS allows firms to commit to more efficient investment decisions in bankruptcy. Securitization of replaceable assets (such as receivables) prevents inefficient continuation, but securitization of necessary assets can produce ex-post inefficiency, which favors secured debt. We test a prediction of our model using the LTV Steel bankruptcy, in which bankruptcy remoteness was successfully challenged. We find that ABS spreads for Chapter 11—eligible securitizers increased significantly more than spreads for Chapter 11—ineligible securitizers following LTV.]