Knowledge that Transforms

We derive a general expression for the value of information to a price-taking investor in a dynamic environment and provide a framework for its estimation. We study the value of both private and public information and break it into its instrumental and psychic parts. To illustrate, we estimate and rank the values of leading macroeconomic indicators (GDP, employment, etc.). Using variations in option prices, we find that consumer-investors with conventional preference parameters would pay 3 to 5 bps of their wealth for a one-time private peek into these indicators. Such signals provide substantial instrumental value but a minor psychic value.Received August 29, 2016; editorial decision June 6, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We study joint financing between profit-motivated and socially motivated (impact) investors and derive conditions under which impact investments improve social outcomes. When project owners cannot commit to social objectives, impact investors hold financial claims to counterbalance owners’ tendencies to overemphasize profits. Impact investors’ ownership stakes are higher when the value of social output is higher, and pure nonprofit status may be optimal for the highest valued social projects. We provide guidance about the design of contingent social contracts, such as social impact bonds and social impact guarantees.Received May 23, 2016; editorial decision April 28, 2018 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Cryptocurrencies are among the largest unregulated markets in the world. We find that approximately one-quarter of bitcoin users are involved in illegal activity. We estimate that around $76 billion of illegal activity per year involve bitcoin (46% of bitcoin transactions), which is close to the scale of the U.S. and European markets for illegal drugs. The illegal share of bitcoin activity declines with mainstream interest in bitcoin and with the emergence of more opaque cryptocurrencies. The techniques developed in this paper have applications in cryptocurrency surveillance. Our findings suggest that cryptocurrencies are transforming the black markets by enabling “black e-commerce.” Received June 1, 2017; editorial decision December 8, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

[Some argue too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status increases the value of the largest banks. In contrast, we find that the value of the largest banks is negatively related to asset size in normal times, but much less so during the crisis. Further, shareholders lose when large banks cross a TBTF threshold through acquisitions. The negative relation between bank value and bank size for the largest banks cannot be explained by differences in ROA, ROE, equity volatility, tail risk, distress risk, or equity discount rates, but it can be partly explained by the market’s discounting of trading activities.]

[This paper studies how financial inclusion affects wealth accumulation. Exploiting the U.S. interstate branching deregulation between 1994 and 2005, we find that an exogenous expansion of bank branches increases low-income household financial inclusion. We then show that financial inclusion fosters household wealth accumulation. Relative to their unbanked counterparts, banked households accumulate assets in interest-bearing accounts, invest more in durable assets, such as vehicles, have a better access to debt, and have a lower probability of facing financial strain. The results suggest that promoting financial inclusion for low-income populations can improve household wealth accumulation and financial security.]

Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (“common ownership”), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen—even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informed investors have flexibility over which assets to sell upon a liquidity shock. They sell low-quality firms first, thereby increasing price informativeness. In a voice model, investors’ incentives to monitor are stronger since “cutting and running” is less profitable. In an exit model, managers’ incentives to work are stronger since the price impact of investor selling is greater.Received December 5, 2017; editorial decision August 15, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

Stock exchange operators compete for order flow by setting “make” fees for limit orders and “take” fees for market orders. When traders can quote continuous prices, exchange operators compete on total fee, because traders can choose prices that perfectly neutralize any fee division. The 1-cent minimum tick size, however, prevents traders from neutralizing fee division. The nonneutrality of division between make and take fees (1) allows an exchange operator to establish exchanges that differ in fee structure to engage in second-degree price discrimination and (2) destroys the Bertrand equilibrium, leads to frequent fee changes, and encourages entries of new exchanges. Received May 29, 2016; editorial decision April 19, 2018 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

[Using over 5,000 trades unequivocally based on nonpublic information about firm fundamentals, we find that asymmetric information proxies display abnormal values on days with informed trading. Volatility and volume are abnormally high, whereas illiquidity is low, in equity and option markets. Daily returns reflect the sign of private signals, but bidask spreads are lower when informed investors trade. Market makers’ learning under event uncertainty and limit orders help explain these findings. The cross-section of information duration indicates that traders select days with high uninformed volume. Evidence from the U.S. SEC Whistleblower Reward Program and the FINRA involvement addresses selection concerns.]

[We use computational linguistics to develop a dynamic, interpretable methodology that can detect emerging risks in the financial sector. Our model can predict heightened risk exposures as early as mid-2005, well in advance of the 2008 financial crisis. Risks related to real estate, prepayment, and commercial paper are elevated. Individual bank exposure strongly predicts returns, bank failures, and return volatility. We also document a rise in market instability since 2014 related to sources of funding and mergers and acquisitions. Overall, our model predicts the buildup of emerging risk in the financial system and bank-specific exposures in a timely fashion.]

Using exogenous wealth shocks stemming from the collapse of the housing market, we show that managers who experience substantial losses in their home values subsequently reduce risk in their delegated funds. The decline in fund risk comes through reductions in idiosyncratic risk and tracking error, suggesting that the behavior is likely driven by career concerns. Our paper provides evidence that idiosyncratic personal preferences affect mutual fund managers’ professional decisions and offers a methodology for testing for manager effects that is not subject to the selection critique of Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013). Received March 30, 2016; editorial decision February 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Editor Itay Goldstein.