Knowledge that Transforms

This paper traces the evolution of extreme illiquidity discounts among Treasury securities during the financial crisis; bonds fell more than six percent below more-liquid but otherwise identical notes. Using high-resolution data on market quality and trader identities and characteristics, we find that the discounts amplify through feedback loops, where cheaper, less-liquid securities flow to investors with longer horizons, thereby increasing their illiquidity and thus their appeal to these investors. The effect of the widened liquidity gap on transactions costs is further amplified by a surge in the price liquidity providers charged for access to their balance sheets in the crisis.

A large literature finds evidence that pricing kernels nonparametrically estimated from option prices and historical returns are not monotonically decreasing in market index returns. We argue that existing estimation methods are inconsistent and propose a new nonparametric estimator of the pricing kernel that reflects the information available to investors who set asset prices. In simulations, the estimator outperforms existing techniques. Our empirical estimates using S&P 500 index option data from 1996 to 2014 and FTSE 100 index option data from 2002 to 2014 suggest that the “pricing kernel puzzle” is due to flaws in existing estimators rather than a behavioral or economic phenomenon.

We propose a new measure, active fundamental performance (AFP), to identify skilled mutual fund managers. AFP evaluates fund investment skills conditioned on the release of firms’ fundamental information. For each fund, we examine the covariance between deviations of its portfolio weights from a benchmark portfolio and the underlying stock performance on days when firms publicize fundamental information. Because asset prices on these information days better reflect firm fundamentals, AFP can more effectively identify investment skills. From 1984 to 2014, funds in the top decile of high AFP subsequently outperformed those in the bottom decile by 2% to 3% per year. Received August 25, 2016; editorial decision December 17, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We evaluate whether management risk, which arises from investors’ uncertainty about management’s added value, affects firms’ default risks and debt pricing. We find that, regardless of the reason for the turnover, CDS, loan, and bond yield spreads increase at the time of management turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure. The effects increase with prior investor uncertainty about the new management. These results are consistent with the view that management risk affects firms’ default risk. An understanding of management risk yields a number of implications for corporate finance. Received May 15, 2016; editorial decision February 27, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher incentive pay and come from firms with lower cost structures and higher asset sales. Performance and productivity improve after forced turnover. Received November 27, 2014; editorial decision July 18, 2017 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We empirically explore a trade credit channel through which foreign direct investment (FDI) firms can propagate global liquidity shocks to the host country despite its tight controls on portfolio flows. In a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, we find robust evidence that FDI firms provide more trade credit than local firms during tight domestic credit periods and that a favorable global liquidity shock amplifies FDI firms’ advantage in trade credit provision. Moreover, the differential responses of FDI and local firms are stronger in financially more dependent industries or in Chinese provinces with less financial depth.

We develop a restriction that precludes implausibly high reward-for-risk in incomplete international economies to consider a theoretical problem that characterizes a lower bound on the covariance between stochastic discount factors (SDFs) subject to correct pricing. The problem is analytically solvable and synthesizes domestic and foreign SDFs into spanned and unspanned components. Our novelty is that exchange rate growth need not equal the ratio of SDFs and that the SDF correlations are plausibly lowered. Exploiting the realities of cross-country correlations of macroeconomic quantities, namely, consumption, wealth, dividend growths, and asset returns, our empirical investigation refutes the specification of complete markets. Received September 19, 2016; editorial decision August 31, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This study explores the distress risk anomaly—the tendency for stocks with high credit risk to perform poorly—among 38 countries over two decades. We find a strongly negative relationship between default probabilities and equity returns concentrated among low-capitalization stocks in developed countries in North America and Europe. Although risk-based explanations provide a poor account of these patterns, several pieces of evidence point to a behavioral interpretation, suggesting that stocks of firms in financial distress are temporarily overpriced.

We examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs. Higher capacity, ceteris paribus, increases operating leverage and default probability, but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields. A key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium. We develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs, operating costs, and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment. Received March 17, 2016; editorial decision July 8, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We develop a theoretical model of a network of intermediaries whose optimal behavior is jointly determined, leading to heterogeneous financial norms and systemic vulnerabilities. We apply the model to the network of U.S. mortgage intermediaries from 2005 to 2007, using a data set containing all private-label, fixed-rate mortgages, with loan flows defining links. Default risk was closely related to network position, evolving predictably among linked nodes, and loan quality estimated from the model was related to independent quality measures, altogether pointing to the vital importance of network effects in this market. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision July 11, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.