Knowledge that Transforms

We document frictions in money market mutual fund lending that lead to the transmission of distress across borrowers. Using novel security-level holdings data, we show that funds exposed to Eurozone banks suffered large outflows in mid-2011. These outflows had significant spillovers: non-European issuers relying on such funds raised less short-term debt financing. Issuer characteristics do not explain the results: holding fixed the issuer, funds with higher Eurozone exposure cut lending more. Due to credit market frictions, funds with low Eurozone exposure provided substitute financing only to issuers they had pre-existing relationships with, even though issuers are large, highly rated firms.

We investigate the effect of ambiguity about hedge fund investment strategies on asset prices and aggregate welfare. We model some traders (mutual funds) as facing ambiguity about the equilibrium trading strategies of other traders (hedge funds). This ambiguity limits the ability of mutual funds to infer information from prices and has negative effects on market outcomes. We use this analysis to investigate the implications of regulations that affect disclosure requirements of hedge funds or the cost of operating a hedge fund. Our analysis demonstrates how regulations affect asset prices and welfare through their influence on opaque trading.

We investigate whether the performance of private equity (PE) investments is sufficient to compensate investors (LPs) for risk, long-term illiquidity, management, and incentive fees charged by the general partner (GP). We analyze the LPs' portfolio-choice problem and find that management fees, carried interest, and illiquidity are costly, and GPs must generate substantial alpha to compensate LPs for bearing these costs. Debt is cheap and reduces these costs, potentially explaining the high leverage of buyout transactions. Conventional interpretations of PE performance measures appear optimistic. On average, LPs may just break even, net of management fees, carry, risk, and costs of illiquidity.

This paper shows that in misspecified models with risk factors that are uncorrelated with the test asset returns, the conventional inference methods tend to erroneously conclude, with high probability, that these factors are priced. Our proposed model selection procedure, which is robust to identification failure and potential model misspecification, restores the standard inference and proves to be effective in eliminating factors that do not improve the model's pricing ability. Applying our methodology to several popular asset-pricing models suggests that only the market and book-to-market factors appear to be priced, while the statistical evidence on the pricing ability of many macroeconomic factors is rather weak.

Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or "common errors"), such as industry-specific shocks, is a fundamental challenge in empirical research. This paper discusses the limitations of two approaches widely used in corporate finance and asset pricing research: demeaning the dependent variable with respect to the group (e.g., "industry-adjusting") and adding the mean of the group's dependent variable as a control. We show that these methods produce inconsistent estimates and can distort inference. In contrast, the fixed effects estimator is consistent and should be used instead. We also explain how to estimate the fixed effects model when traditional methods are computationally infeasible.

A competitive stock market is embedded into a neoclassical growth economy to analyze the interplay between the acquisition of information about firms, its partial revelation through stock prices, capital allocation, and income. The stock market allows investors to share their costly private signals in a cost-effective incentive-compatible way. It contributes to economic growth by raising total factor productivity (TFP). A calibration indicates the effect on TFP to be large but that on income to be modest. Several predictions on the evolution of real and financial variables are derived. Finally, the growth impact of two common forms of investor irrationality, overconfidence and inattention, are analyzed.

Both risk management and payout decisions affect a firm's financial flexibility—the ability to avoid costly financial distress as well as underinvestment. We provide evidence of substitution between hedging and payout decisions using samples of both financial and nonfinancial firms. We find that a more flexible distribution, favoring repurchases over dividends, is negatively related to financial hedging within a firm, consistent with financial flexibility in payout decisions and hedging being substitutes. Our findings, which are robust to controlling for the endogeneity of hedging and payout choices, suggest that payout flexibility offers operational hedging benefits.

We analyze how corporate venture capital (CVC) differs from independent venture capital (IVC) in nurturing innovation in entrepreneurial firms. We find that CVC-backed firms are more innovative, as measured by their patenting outcome, although they are younger, riskier, and less profitable than IVC-backed firms. Our baseline results continue to hold in a propensity score matching analysis of IPO firms and a difference-in-differences analysis of the universe of VC-backed entrepreneurial firms. We present evidence consistent with two possible underlying mechanisms: CVC's greater industry knowledge due to the technological fit between their parent firms and entrepreneurial firms and CVC's greater tolerance for failure.

Previous research indicates mixed conclusions on the potential mispricing of equity index put options. We examine the returns of put writing and other option strategies by comparing historical option returns with returns generated using option pricing models. We find it is generally possible to reject the hypothesis that put returns are consistent with option pricing models. An implication is that the average cost of buying out-of-the-money put options to provide tail-risk protection to a portfolio may include a significant premium. Our results are based on a sample period of 1987–2012 that includes periods of high volatility in equity returns.

We show that Keeping-Up-with-the-Joneses preferences can explain several puzzling retail investor behaviors, including the excessive trading of small local stocks. Status concerns lead households, especially those living in affluent areas, to demand these stocks to track their neighbors' wealth. This demand varies procyclically with the stock market's value and generates household trading. Using Chinese data on local stock turnover, stock message boards, and brokerage account trading, we test and confirm this hypothesis by exploiting the uneven rise of affluence across Chinese cities between 1998 and 2012.