Knowledge that Transforms

We show that name-induced stereotypes affect the investment choices of U.S. mutual fund investors. Managers with foreign-sounding names have about 10% lower annual fund flows, and this effect is stronger among funds with investor clienteles more likely to be suspicious of foreigners. Foreign-named managers experience lower appreciation (greater decline) in flows following good (bad) performance. Following 9/11, flows to funds with managers with Middle-Eastern-sounding names declined abnormally. In an experimental setting in which skill differences are absent, individuals allocate 11% less money to an index fund managed by a foreign-named manager. This gap widens following the Boston marathon bombings.

Home Equity Conversion Mortgages ("HECMs") implicitly bundle nondefaultable credit lines with put options that let borrowers, or their heirs, sell mortgaged homes for the credit line limit when borrowers move or die. The put option's value, net of closing costs, bounds HECM's value to borrowers below. Older homeowners' weak demand is commonly attributed to HECM's "high costs," and the government prices insurance intending to avoid subsidy. However, simulations indicate put value has often exceeded closing costs, even ignoring other embedded options and using backward-looking expectations near the recent price-cycle peak. These results make weak demand more puzzling.

The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules (collectively, SOX) as natural experiments, to examine whether board independence improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. The results are strongly supportive: after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve postacquisition performance, and have better operating performance and market value. Importantly, these changes are absent for overconfident-CEO firms that were compliant prior to SOX.

This paper derives the value and risk of aggregate human capital in a stochastic equilibrium model with Duffie-Epstein preferences. A three-factor asset-pricing model is derived, where the factors are the market, the capital share, and investment in human capital. When the model is calibrated to match the historical ratio of wages to consumption in the United States, the weight of human capital in aggregate wealth is estimated to be about 93%, well above most previous estimates, and human capital's riskiness is lower than that of the market portfolio.

This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws, poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate-control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.

It is widely argued that shadow banking grew rapidly before the recent financial crisis because of rising demand for "money-like" claims. This paper assesses a key premise of this argument: that investors actually treated short-term debt issued by shadow banks as a money-like claim. I present a model where the financial sector and the central bank jointly respond to demand for money-like claims. The model generates predictions about the prices and quantities of Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and shadow bank debt. These predictions are borne out in the data, suggesting investors did treat shadow bank debt as money-like.

We document that announcement-period abnormal returns of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) equity investments in publicly traded firms are positive but lower than those of comparable private investments. Further, SWF investment targets suffer from declining return on assets and sales growth over the following three years. Our results are robust to controls for target and deal characteristics and are not driven by SWF target selection criteria. Larger discounts are associated with SWFs taking seats on boards of directors and with SWFs under strict government control acquiring greater stakes, supporting the hypothesis that political influence negatively affects firm value and performance.

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure, trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default. Bankruptcy costs are endogenous, as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets, resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid. When the corporate income tax rate is positive, firms have a unique optimal capital structure. In equilibrium, firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices. The equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient. In particular there is too little debt and default.

We develop a 10-K-based multidimensional measure of firm locations. Using this measure, we show that firm-level information is geographically distributed and institutional investors are able to exploit the resulting information asymmetry. Specifically, institutional investors overweigh firms whose 10-K frequently mentions the investors' state even when those firms are not headquartered locally and earn superior returns on those stocks. These ownership and performance patterns are stronger among hard-to-value firms. Local investor performance increases with the degree of local bias and with the local economic exposure of portfolio firms. Overall, geographical variation in firm-level information generates economically significant location-based information asymmetry.

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.