Knowledge that Transforms

Futures contracts often include a variety of delivery options that allow participants flexibility in satisfying the contract. These options have the potential to broaden the appeal of the contact. However, if these options are valuable, they may reduce the hedging effectiveness of the contract. This article analyzes the GNMA CDR futures contract that appears to have failed because of flaws in the contract's design. For the first 6 years following its introduction, the contract attracted significant and increasing volume, but, subsequently, the volume declined to almost zero. Over the years during which the volume experienced its most dramatic decline, the Treasury-bond futures contract provided a better hedge for current coupon GNMA securities than did the GNMA CDR futures contract. And, over this same period, the value of the quality option embedded in the contract often exceeded 5 percent of the futures price and reached a level of 19 percent at one point. We interpret the evidence to indicate that the contract failed because the delivery options reduced the hedging effectiveness of the contract for current coupon mortgage securities.

We derive and test a dynamic discrete-time model of asset returns. Both the risks of individual securities and equilibrium risk premia change predictably in the model, but these changes can be attributed to movements in the returns and prices of only two well-diversified portfolios. Any other components of returns should be unpredictable. Using the generalized method of moments, the model is estimated and tested on portfolios of equities. We find the data supportive of the model’s restrictions, even when instruments designed to capture the January effect are employed.

This article presents a simple model of the innovation of new futures contracts by transaction volume-maximizing futures exchanges in incomplete markets under uncertainty, with mean-variance preferences and proportional transactions costs. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria for a number of exchanges simultaneously or sequentially choosing contracts. The optimal monopolistic contract design is shown to be Pareto-optimal. An example shows the failure of Pareto optimality for a particular Nash equilibrium. Likewise, in a monopolistic multiperiod setting, an example shows the failure of Pareto optimality given an incentive for the exchange to induce turnover.

We present a model of corporate acquisitions in which initially uninformed bidders must incur costs to learn their (independent) valuations of a potential takeover target. The first bidder makes either a preemptive bid that will deter the second bidderfrom investigating or a lower bid that will induce the second bidder to investigate and possibly compete. We show that the expected price of the target may be higher when the first bidder makes a deterring bid than when there is competitive bidding. Hence, by weakening the first bidder’s incentive to choose a preemptive bid, regulatory and management policies to assist competing bidders may reduce both the expected takeover price and social welfare.

When a firm is in financial distress, in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist. This article shows that the bankruptcy code, by providing rules governing the negotiation process, yields a unique solution to the reorganization process. In addition, the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant's divergent incentives.

This article develops a model of competitive bidding with a resale market. The primary market is modeled as a common-value auction, in which bidders participate for the purpose of resale. After the auction the winning bidders sell the objects in a secondary market, and the buyers in the secondary market receive information about the bids submitted in the auction. The effect of this information linkage between the primary auction and the secondary market on bidding behavior in the primary auction is examined. The auctioneer’s expected revenues from organizing the primary market as a discriminatory auction versus a uniform-price auction are compared, and sufficient conditions under which the uniform-price auction will yield higher expected revenues are obtained. An example of our model, with the primary market organized as a discriminatory auction, is the U.S. Treasury bill market.

This article develops and estimates a simple model for monthly expected stock returns that relies on the rapidly decaying structure of shorter-horizon (weekly) expected returns. The most striking aspect of our finds is that the rapid mean reversion in short-horizon expected returns implies much greater variation through time in monthly expected returns than has been documented in earlier studies. For instance, during the 1962 to 1985 period, over 25 percent of the return variance of small firms can be explained by time variation in expected returns.

This article develops a model in which patterns in buy and sell volume, order imbalances, and expected price changes arise endogenously. The model covers cases in which the market maker is competitive and is a monopolist. Our results provide an explanation for the existence of patterns in mean returns within the trading day and across trading days.

Most models of financial structure embody an assumption about financial distress that causes debt to be costly to the issuing firm. This approach has been criticized on the grounds that the assumed costs could be avoided by a costless financial reorganization. In this article we show that despite the possibility of costless reorganization, it may be rational for firms to incur significant costs in the resolution of financial distress. The main assumptions that give rise to our results are the existence of asymmetric courts to impose a reorganization on the claimants of a firm. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Earnings and dividend announcements on Fridays are much more likely to contain reports of declines and to be associated with negative abnormal returns than those on other weekdays. While Friday reports elicit negative average returns for firms in all size classes, announcements by smaller firms have more negative returns associated with them on the following trading day, suggesting that they are more likely to release reports after close of trading or that prices adjust more slowly to the information in these reports. Nevertheless, a comparison of the average returns by weekday, with and without the Friday announcements, leads us to conclude that these announcements explain a surprisingly small proportion (3.4 percent) of the weekend effect.